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Abstract 
Goaded by the regional repercussions of the Syrian crisis sectarian tensions are 
emerging as the key threat to Middle Eastern and Syrian stability.  Sectarianism 
has had a big impact on politics in Syria, it is implicated in the maintenance of 
authoritarianism, and sectarian dynamics are escalating the intensity of the 
uprising against the Assad regime.   Prior to the civil war communal bonds 
between regime members and minority sect insecurity were key to the survival of 
the regime.   Political power and control was maintained through fear and this was 
not just fear of the powerful security forces but also fear of sectarian conflict with 
the regime highlighting the risk of sectarian conflict, minority persecution and 
instability should the regime fall.  As a result many supported or tolerated the 
Assads out of fear of the alternative.  
This thesis aims to analyse the extent and the manner in which political players in 
Syria have used religious narratives and manipulated sectarian identities in their 
pursuit of power. It concludes that sectarian tactics have been intensified within 
the Syrian uprising by both the regime and within the opposition.   Religious 
narratives for mobilising support have become widespread and an emphasis on 
dangers from the ‘other’ is prevalent.  Given Middle Eastern history of intolerance 
towards other religious and ethnic groups this emphasis on confessional narratives 
is intensifying the dangers of sectarian violence within the civil war and creating 
rifts that will be hard to heal.    
The use of religious narratives for political goals is a feature of the religious and 
political landscape and this is analysed through the lens of Ethnic Conflict 
Theory.   With radical Islam heavily featuring narratives that emphasise 
opposition to other, an entitlement to dominate and an admiration of religious 
warrior characteristics alongside the cultural importance of nested communal 
groups, Islam has served as a readymade construct for mobilising sectarian groups 
against political foes. 
However although many sectarian narratives refer heavily to history the current 
confessional tensions relate specifically to the present. With Middle Eastern 
autocratic regimes under threat due to the Arab Spring many groups perceive that 
political power is up for grabs and are finding it expedient – and religiously 
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justifiable - to mobilise through the established channels of confessional loyalties 
and networks particularly along Sunni versus Shia lines.  Plus given the 
importance of religion to the region it is a clear front runner as justification for 
political and/or armed action.    
Advances in communications technology, specifically social media, and the 
breakdown of regime authority has allowed for voices to be heard from within an 
autocratic state that had otherwise been silenced, thus providing an unprecedented 
opportunity to analyse sectarian politics within a civil war. 
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Introduction 
 
Contrary to the openness across borders achieved by globalisation, religious 
violence and intolerance has asserted itself across the globe with the Middle East 
leading the stakes for religious tensions (Danin R. M., Religious Restrictions and 
Violence Growing Globally led by the Middle East, 2012).  An exploration of the 
political culture of the Middle East is in order to ascertain why it is the region 
with the highest number of religious conflicts.   
 
Sectarianism primarily encompasses religious belonging but it also overlaps with 
other communal identity indicators such as ethnic and tribal origins.  Sectarian 
issues were complicated in the Middle East after new states were created and 
independence granted by the West.  With the traditional order of the past 
disrupted, many religious, ethnic and tribal groups competed in the new political 
environment for political power and control.    
 
New borders and statehood required the formation of a nation, however this was 
compromised by communal contests for political authority resulting in dominant 
ethno-sectarian groups basing the emerging national identity and political 
hierarchy on their own sectarian group.  As such the transition from a communal 
based sense of belonging within a regional sphere to a state identity was only 
partially achieved.  Instead sectarian identity remained important and clashed with 
the notion of statehood, creating a mosaic of communal groups rather than a 
unified state.  Due to domination and discrimination many sectarian groups seek 
to regain or achieve dignity by pursuing sectarian advantages thus intensifying 
and continuing sects as an identifier for confrontation lines within the struggle for 
power and authority within the state.   As such political power is based on 
alliances that are a complex tapestry of tribal, religious and family connections. 
 
Sectarianism is the deliberate use of religious identities to achieve political or 
social goals.  From 1990 the majority of internal conflicts have had a significant 
ethnic or sectarian element.  Unfortunately it appears that internal armed conflicts 
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along ethno-sectarian lines are particularly complex and long lasting, with 
seemingly inhuman brutality.  Many of these conflicts emerge from a history of 
bloodshed with past marginalisation and persecution interwoven into the minds 
and culture of the communities involved (Scott, 2008, p. 4).   
 
The emergence or intensification of ethno-sectarian conflicts is often caused by a 
shift in power from one group to another.  For instance the fall of an autocratic 
regime can lead to an explosion of conflict as power is up for grabs and 
simmering resentments get the chance to express themselves.  In the vacuum of 
power that results communities revert back strongly to their sectarian groups for 
security and in order to pursue opportunities for power.  Leaders co-ordinate their 
bids for power around their sectarian support base, and groups interested in 
seizing power converge on the scene from within and without, often using 
religious or ethnic narratives to legitimise their actions (Scott, 2008, p. 6).  As 
such the breakdown of autocratic leadership does not necessarily lead to 
pluralistic and tolerant democracies but rather unleashes pent-up ethno-sectarian 
hatred and an intense identity driven conflict to grab the reins of power. 
This thesis researches the premise that a political culture based on opposition to 
other is at the root of Middle Eastern unrest.  It also looks to explain how the links 
between this political culture and the resulting sectarianism have created politics 
that focus on power and control at the expense of human rights and the freedom of 
individuals.   
The rise and present weakening of the Syrian regime provides an ideal 
opportunity to analyse how autocratic regimes use sectarianism to facilitate the 
establishment of power and control over their citizens and to analyse the 
mechanisms of sectarianism within an uprising and civil war.  In my thesis I 
answer the question of how this is used by both the opposition, radical Islamists, 
the people and the regime to debate and struggle over power and control of Syria.      
 
The question of sectarianism and legitimacy is analysed with the breakdown of 
the Assad regime providing an ideal opportunity to explore the question of 
legitimacy.  The comparative stability of Syria achieved by the al Assad regime 
prior to the uprising justifies analysis, particularly with regards to the regime’s 
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assertion that it has been able to contain ethno-sectarian conflict.  The regime 
primarily rests its case for legitimacy on this assertion.    This enquiry investigates 
how sectarianism is used to secure autocratic power and control.  I outline the 
power and control mechanisms that autocratic regimes use to control and 
manipulate their citizens.  Within this analysis an investigation is made into 
whether the Allawites are being used by the Assad regime to capture power and 
control over Syria or whether Syria is ruled by the Allawite sect. 
 
In order to explore this I have drawn on Ethnic Conflict Theory which clearly 
describes ethno-sectarian politics. In order to further dissect the sectarian situation 
in Syria with regards to the ongoing uprising and civil war, Social Movement 
Theory is applied to separate out communal drives for increased power and status 
from the popular movement for political change. 
 
Ethnic Conflict Theory proposes that myths, symbols and narratives are used by 
elites to encourage and direct ethnic violence for political purposes.  The political 
culture of religion in the Middle East makes it a readymade source of mobilising 
narratives for use in conflict. Mark Juergensmeyer supports this by identifying 
that religion provides groups with the means to recast their struggle for identity 
and dignity as a ‘cosmic war’ in which acts of violence have a symbolic and 
spiritual significance that they are able to relate to their religious heritage. As 
Michael Ignatieff states ‘today most of the justifying ideologies (for terrorism) are 
religious’.   Military analyst Paulette Oris goes on to state that religion ‘is now 
emerging as the single most important political-ideological default mechanism in 
global conflict’.  Due to the intense emotions evoked by religion, sectarian 
violence is often more brutal and harder to resolve then secular conflict. Oliver 
McTernan described that religious extremists can find in the teachings and history 
of their religion, spiritual justifications for the use of violence ‘to protect or 
promote their own sectarian interests’.  As such religion often features heavily in 
narratives for resistance and rebellions against a dominant group (McCormick, 
2006, pp. 144-146). 
 
Importantly there are signs within the Middle East of an emerging shift in the 
choice of political narratives from the ideology of resistance to the US and Jewish 
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Israel towards religious conflicts centred on Sunni-Shia rivalry and theological 
disputes over the interpretations of Islam and the political application of Islam.  
The concern is that political narratives prominently centring on the more internal 
Sunni Shia contest for power is casting these tensions within political Islam as the 
new focus for seeking to establish political power and stability in the Middle East 
(Abdo, 2013).  As a result of the Arab uprisings identities in the Middle East are 
being reassessed from gender issues to positioning between sectarian groups, as 
such the emphasis on identity politics is greater than previously (Abdo, Arab 
Uprisings Have Led to Greater Religious Sectarianism, 2013).   The uprisings 
have created a shift in the political and sectarian balances in the region and the 
main result is the deepening of the Sunni Shia divide. 
 
Methodology 
This section establishes the methodology of this thesis.   First the choice of Syria 
as the country in which to study sectarian issues is justified.   Then sources of 
information are discussed and the theories applied are outlined. 
 
i)  Syria was chosen to analyse due to its history of sectarian tensions but 
also significantly because of its recent history of relative tolerance 
between the sects under the Assad regime.  Additionally the 
weakening of the regime and the contrasting emergence of outright 
sectarianism by both the regime and extreme elements within the 
current uprising provides ample material through which to analyse 
sectarian politics.  Syria’s key place in the regional sectarian tensions 
between the larger and competing sects, Sunni and Shia, is also crucial 
to this thesis.    
ii) In order to analyse Syria’s sectarian politics information has been 
gathered from a wide range of sources.     Extensive use has been made 
of primary sources such as online YouTube videos posted by 
opposition groups and Shabbiha, activist blogs, Facebook pages, 
journalists’ interviews, online rhetoric from websites and defectors’ 
opinions, all being important to understanding the sectarian dynamic 
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within the Syrian uprising.     Secondary source investigations of both 
the Assad regime and the uprising have also been utilised including 
think tank reports, United Nations (UN) press releases, newspaper and 
magazine articles and academic analysis.   A key limitation of Syria as 
a case study is the closed and secretive Assad regime and its repression 
of internal voices other than those officially sanctioned.  This is a key 
problem in studying sectarian based authoritarian regimes.   
Specifically this has severely reduced the primary sources available for 
the pre-civil war period.   However the weakening of regime 
repression due to the 2011 initiated uprising has resulted in a huge leap 
in the amount of voices emerging from Syria and helpfully most are 
discussing the current crisis.   This is extended by the huge 
international and regional interest in the crisis generating a significant 
rise in media and academic attention which is providing fascinating 
study.   Social media and the internet has meant that the current Syrian 
crisis has provided an unprecedented opportunity – the inside story and 
videos of a civil war in real time from primary sources.  This is 
invaluable in terms of understanding how ethno-sectarian conflicts 
develop within internal crises.  This also explains the chief focus 
within this thesis on the time period between the start of the uprising to 
the thesis end date, August 2013. 
iii) Ethnic Conflict Theory, which relates to identity politics and as such 
extents to the study of sectarian conflict, has been employed in order to 
provide a framework through which to analyse Syria’s sectarian 
dynamic.   An Ethnic Conflict Theory based approach provides an 
understanding of the sectarian issues exploited by the regime and the 
sectarian issues underlying the civil war, however it does not provide a 
means to separate out definitively the social movement component of 
the opposition from the sectarian dynamics.   To clarify this difference 
Social Movement Theory is also applied to the civil war.  This has 
enabled an accurate assessment of which dynamics are due to 
sectarianism and which are due to social activism within the uprising. 
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Chapter One 
Theoretical Framework:  Ethnic Conflict Theory and Social 
Movement Theory 
1.1 Social Identity Theory 
In order to examine the nature of Syria’s ethnic and sectarian divisions I have 
used Ethnic Conflict Theory as the theoretical framework.  Differences of opinion 
within Ethnic Conflict Theory exist with primordialists asserting that ethnic 
groups operate out of a common history, culture and ancestry within communal 
bonds leading to conflict driven by deep seated communal loyalties.  
Constructivists believe ethnicity is a ‘social construct’ and therefore the society 
system creates ethnic conflict.  Instrumentalists describe ethnic conflict as 
motivated by rational political motives.  Most theorists do not hold purely to one 
rationale for ethnic conflict maintaining instead that the theoretical causes of 
ethnic conflict overlap (Kaufman, Ethnic Fears and Ethnic War in Karabagh, 
1998, p. 3).    Ethnic Conflict Theories tend to be tied together by an 
understanding that the ethnic groups involved perceive themselves to be under 
threat and are attempting to achieve group security.   
 
Social Identity Theory looks at the social-psychological motivations within ethnic 
conflict as explored by Muzafer Sherif in 1954.  This theory suggests that hostility 
between groups stems from conflicting goals where zero sum competition is 
employed leading to negative stereotypes and hostility (Wolff, 2009, p. 37).   
 
The most prominent social identity theorists are Donald Horowitz, Michael Billig 
and Henri Tajfel.  Social identity theory proposes that people seek a positive 
social identity which is based on belonging to a group.  Group loyalty is reflected 
in a tendency for individuals to make social comparisons between their in-group 
and out-groups which reflects favourably on the in-group, an approach which 
enhances an individual’s self esteem  (Wolff, 2009, pp. 38-39).    In positively 
defining one’s own group, members often resort to discriminatory descriptions of 
out-groups  (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 141-143).     If the group’s standing falls and as 
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such it no longer boosts the self esteem of its members, individuals will either 
seek to change the group (social change) or change the narrative on which their 
group identity is based (social creativity) or leave to join another group (social 
mobility) (Wolff, 2009, pp. 38-39).   
 
Horowitz identifies competition between groups as a major factor within ethnic 
conflict.   Experiments have shown that group loyalty generates a desire to 
promote the advancement of one’s in-group relative to other groups.  As such 
analysts have concluded that humans have an instinct towards belonging to a 
group and towards achieving a positive self and social identity through this group 
(Horowitz, 1985, pp. 141-143).    
 
Social Identity Theory also supposes that minority groups often have lower social 
status than majority groups, thus in order to obtain a positive social identity 
minority groups must use innovative strategies. If the social system is stable there 
is generally little opportunity for change and the minority group must accept their 
status. However opposition to the status quo will rise if the minority group 
perceives an opening, such as political instability, to improve their status. In 
response the majority group typically resorts to repression of the minority group 
to maintain its own position.  Additionally if the minority group perceives its 
status in relation to the majority group is illegitimate, they will reject their lower 
status and attempt to resolve their social identity accordingly (Wolff, 2009, pp. 
38-39).   
 
Horowitz outlines how low status groups must decide whether to emulate out-
group behaviour to improve their position through competition or adopt other 
strategies.   Socially and economically disadvantaged groups fear extinction if 
they are unable to compete and the resulting anxiety contributes to an exaggerated 
reaction to perceived threats.   Under these circumstances self esteem improves 
when an individual from a disadvantaged group chooses an aggressive stance as 
self protection against out-group prejudices and threats.   The combination of 
defensiveness and anxiety increases the likelihood that a group will adhere more 
closely to ethnic and religious bonds for security, as a basis for rationalising group 
entitlements and as a symbol of social status (Wolff, 2009, pp. 38-39).   
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Ethnic divisions and conflicts within states have become a global phenomenon 
since the World Wars.   With the struggle for independence from colonial forces 
over, many new nations have entered into internal struggles for power and 
resources between domestic ethnic and sectarian groups.    The global spread of 
new ethnical norms such as equality has made the repression of sectarian and 
ethnic groups illegitimate resulting in an increased number of repressed groups 
seeking to address the distribution of political power and resources within their 
nations and as such improve their conditions (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 3-5). 
 
Horowitz identifies that ethnic groups are ranked hierarchically in order of 
dominance from the ethnic elite towards subordinate and unranked ethnic groups 
(Horowitz, 1985, pp. 22-23).  Uprisings and revolutions, whilst typically 
associated with class ideology, can also be instigated by ethnic groups wanting to 
advance by removing social, economic and political barriers, and attempting to 
force the redistribution of economic and political power in order to change their 
position within the state’s ethno-sectarian hierarchy (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 83-84).   
 
In states where ethnic divisions are pervasive, ethnic concentrations exist across 
political, economic and military structures creating a situation where ethnic 
conflict and competition are the prominent political features.  Where one ethno-
sectarian group holds political power alongside a strong representation within the 
military and security forces, the security apparatus becomes a tool for the internal 
repression of challenges from other ethnic groups (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 10-12).    
In a state where political parties are drawn along ethnic and sectarian lines a 
situation can develop where one group is never in power and the military,  
particularly if it comprises of predominantly one ethnic group,  may decide it is 
fairer  and safer to seize power (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 83-84).  
 
Horowitz also states that ethnic groups benefit their members as they are a unit of 
secure solidarity that offers help and support.   This unity hardens within 
ethnically divided and unstable states as the need for visibly belonging to a group 
intensifies due to the lack of security (Horowitz, 1985, p. 74).  He identifies that if 
a state provided for the security of all its citizens and supplied effective legal 
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recourse for injustice this would reduce the need for ethnic affiliations with group 
members instead able to rely on the state to provide for their security concerns 
(Horowitz, 1985, p. 74).   
 
There is a strong interplay between ethno-sectarian affiliations and kinship.  
Additionally ethno-sectarian affiliations can create ties between the political 
bureaucracy and citizens.   Again this is particularly relevant where human rights 
are not adequately protected within a state as in this instance belonging to the 
same ethno-sectarian group as members of the regime can help provide security.  
Ethno-sectarian group members who are in positions of political influence and 
working to protect their communal group’s rights contribute markedly to in-group 
security and prosperity particularly in a system where citizens are vulnerable.  
Additionally belonging to an ethnic group ensures members do not have to face 
any new emerging political or social system alone (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 79-81).   
 
Claims are made that history, traditions and tribalism are a major contributors to 
ethnic violence, however modern ethnic wars show that those groups associated 
with modernisation such as educated elites, army officers and the urban 
population are more often at the forefront of ethnic conflicts.  Therefore whilst 
previous conflict and persecution goes some way towards explaining feelings of 
insecurity and hostility between groups, ethnic conflict tends not to be explained 
as solely due to the revival of previous disagreements (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 97-
99).     
 
Modernisation can contribute to ethnic conflict with populations undergoing 
‘social mobilisation’ as their conditions change due to increased media exposure, 
urbanisation, a rise in the number of educated citizens, and moves away from 
traditional agricultural lifestyles.  These changes provoke insecurity and therefore 
can contribute to moves towards the shelter of ethno-sectarian belonging.  Social 
mobilisation rates can differ greatly from assimilation rates therefore competition 
for the benefits of modernisation can lead elites to turn to the collective support of 
their communal group to increase their competiveness (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 99-
101).     Communal groups that are successful at advancing their social and 
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economic position are in turn envied, resented and often feared by groups who 
occupy a lower position in the class system (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 105-113).   
 
Psychoanalytic and Social Dynamic Theory develops group identity further by 
stating that group self esteem is comprised of symbols, rituals and narratives 
relating to a groups’ successes/failures with borders which clearly differentiate 
between out and in group inclusion.      Minorities can become part of a majority 
groups’ narrative for framing its failures and traumas.   This is particularly 
relevant when the majority group projects responsibility and blame onto the 
minority group.  If the minority historically belonged to a state or nation that 
inflicted a great trauma on the majority ethnic group and the majority later 
becomes dominant they may commit mass atrocities as retaliation to redress past 
injustices (Wolff, 2009, pp. 39-40). 
 
The importance of collective memories and a shared identity embedded within the 
culture of an ethnic group can help to understand mobilisation within ethnic 
conflict.  In many instances of ethnic conflict elites manipulate communal fears 
and narratives as a means to recruit an army to promote their leadership and rise 
to power (Wolff, 2009, p. 41).    Social Identity Theory outlines the role 
communal identities play within conflict situations particularly as this relates to 
in-group loyalty and out-group hostility. 
 
1.2  Symbolic Politics Theory 
Kaufman’s Symbolic Politics theory asserts that ethnicity is based on a ‘myth 
symbol complex’ and that when hostility towards another ethnic group is an 
important part of this complex the likelihood of inter group conflict increases 
(Wolff, 2009, p. 28).    Alongside group mythologies that justify hostility towards 
other ethno-sectarian groups Kaufman outlines two other preconditions that 
indicate that ethnic conflict is likely, these preconditions being when a group feels 
that it is facing an existential threat to its survival, and the opportunity to mobilise 
(Wolff, 2009, pp. 30-31).  
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Kaufman adds that conditions within the political sphere such as demographic 
concentrations of an ethnic group, political freedoms, third party involvement, 
regime losing power due to internal opposition and a base in a neighbouring state 
also contribute to communal conflict.  However in order for the situation to 
escalate to mass or elite lead violence Kaufman asserts that ‘mass hostility, 
chauvinist political mobilisation and security dilemma’ must be present (Wolff, 
2009, p. 31).     
 
Sufficient mobilisation to engage in communal conflict is encouraged by 
emotional appeals to ethnic bonds.   As such Symbolic Politics makes the ‘central 
assumption... that people make political choices based on emotion and in response 
to symbols’.  Ethnicity is defined as an ‘emotional bond based on kinship 
feelings’ (Kaufman, 2001, p. 29).   In order to understand the symbols which work 
to mobilise a communal group an examination of the myths and prejudices shared 
by group members is required and this leads to an understanding of ‘their greatest 
collective fears’ (Kaufman, 2001, pp. 29-30). 
Groups are more likely to engage in ethnic conflict where there is a pre-existing 
ethnic myth which justifies violence towards specific out-groups.  This 
justification can include a belief that one’s own group is superior and more 
entitled than the target out-group (Kaufman, 2001, p. 30).    Additionally a group 
that admires warrior characteristics and includes this admiration as part of their 
shared identity increases the likelihood of the group engaging in out-group 
violence.  Opportunistic elites often attempt to mould such myths to support their 
own aims and to strengthen their legitimacy (Kaufman, 2001, p. 30). 
Fear is the driving factor which turns ethno-sectarian tensions to communal war.  
Extreme fear and insecurity are perceived as justifying violent self defence and 
can lead to drives for political dominance in order to achieve in-group security.  
The primary source of group fears is identified as existing within the group’s 
myth symbol complex, particularly when this emphasises feelings of persecution 
and victimization.  Often a dominant group fears revenge whilst a dominated 
group fears group and thereby individual extinction (Kaufman, 2001, p. 31). 
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Another precursor to ethnic conflict is the opportunity to mobilise.  Political 
repression can prevent ethnic or sectarian opponents from being able to effectively 
mobilise ethnically based opposition groups.   Consequently a breakdown in state 
authority within an ethnically divided state can create an opportunity for ethnic 
groups to violently seek to redress the political balance (Kaufman, 2001, p. 32).   
 
Mass led ethnic movements tend to develop where ethnic myths and fears are 
strong.   Elite lead movements also have their origins in ethnic myths and symbols 
but in this instance elites are creating narratives from within the group’s myth 
complex in order to intensify fear and insecurity which they in turn use to justify 
their extremist policies and to support their assertion that their political 
empowerment is necessary for the protection of the group.  Thus the security 
dilemma is in this case cynically intensified by a predatory elite and again 
emerges as a dominant cause of ethnic conflict   (Kaufman, 2001, p. 34).   
 
Kelmen makes the observation that the escalatory and self perpetuating nature of 
ethnic conflict is also based within the myth complex.  As new conflicts and 
massacres are endured new symbols and myths emerge that incorporate these new 
traumas, strengthening and hardening existing chauvinistic and hostile attitudes to 
relevant out-groups.   The end result is emotive and dramatic ethnic mythologies 
that reinforce zero sum politics and make compromise seem like a betrayal of the 
group’s myth complex.  This creates a significant barrier to peaceful settlement as 
it reinforces justifications for aggressive defensive actions and confirms the 
necessity of further violence to achieve security.  Extreme fear, reinforced by 
ethnic myth complexes and accompanying security dilemmas, pervades ethnic 
conflicts making them very difficult to resolve (Kaufman, Escaping the Symbolic 
Politics Trap: Reconciliation Initiatives and Conflict Resolution in Ethnic Wars, 
2006, p. 205 & 215). 
 
1.3   The Security Dilemma and Communal Conflict 
 
In this section I look at Ethnic Conflict Theory with a focus on the more 
prominent security dilemma explanation for communal violence.  Theories based 
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around the security dilemma draw from realist International Relations theory 
relating to Kenneth Waltz’s 1979 description of an anarchical international system 
in which in order to become secure states take action, such as acquiring military 
power, which in turn decreases the security of other states who seek to address 
this resulting in a subsequent reduction in security of the original state.  Inherent 
anarchy within the international political system means that security is the most 
significant concern of states (Wolff, 2009, p. 26).   
 
 Barry Posen highlighted that the anarchy and lack of central authority inherent in 
international political system emulates the anarchy that exists when a regime loses 
control or a state is undergoing regime change.   He explains further that two 
factors in this scenario increase ethnic groups’ perceptions of insecurity, one 
being that communal ties can be used to mobilise an army, the second being that 
when ethno-sectarian groups are geographically isolated or vulnerable to 
aggression from radicals they take action to ensure they can defend themselves 
and often these actions are perceived as offensive rather than defensive to rival 
groups.   Complicating these matters is the tendency of people to refer to history 
when they lack insight into the plans of competing groups (Wolff, 2009, pp. 26-
27).   Drawing on the inter-group conflict between Croatians and Serbs in what is 
now the Republic of Croatia, Posen noted that once the more violent fanatical 
segments of each group began terrorising the other ethnic group both the ethnic 
groups as a whole were more likely to pursue violence  (Wolff, 2009, p. 27).   
 
Barbara Walter builds on the security explanations for ethnic conflict by 
extending the conditions that create communal fears to include government 
breakdown, changing balances of political or demographical power, redistribution 
of economic and/or military resources and forced or voluntary disarmament.  
Regional and global political dynamics are also important  (Wolff, 2009, pp. 27-
28).   
 
Walter asserts that whilst these conditions make ethnic insecurity likely, the actual 
outbreak of violence is orchestrated by predatory and manipulative elites who 
develop rhetoric which increases their own ethnic group’s fears and offer 
themselves as a protective source of unity and defence from out-group threats.  
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Political opportunists are able to find traction for their spread of inflammatory 
myths within shared communal memories which in turn become the   base of 
emotionally driven decision making within highly charged situations  (Wolff, 
2009, p. 28).   
 
Furthermore Lake and Rothchild state that information failures and a lack of 
credibility lead to ethnic groups being unable to reassure out-groups and also 
unable to bargain effectively as commitments from either side are not perceived as 
credible.   As insecurity intensifies pre-emptive force starts to emerge as the safest 
defensive option   (Wolff, 2009, p. 28).   
 
1.4 Contentious Politics:   Social Movement Theory 
 
In order to fully understand the communal conflict within Syria, and particularly 
within the uprising, analysis needs to extend beyond Ethnic Conflict Theory to 
include Social Movement Theory so as to separate out communal aspirations from 
popular activism.   
 
Social Movement Theory outlines three causal factors that lead to social 
movements.   These factors are ‘political opportunity, mobilising structures and 
framing’.   Political opportunity presents itself as the grievances and 
dissatisfaction which leads to the opportunity to take collective action.     In order 
to collectively mobilise structures and resources are needed.   Collective action is 
typically mobilised through established social structures and communicated 
through existing social networks.    In order to motivate and focus collective 
action, the opposition group frames dissatisfaction into a strategy by outlining 
grievances and attributing responsibility and blame resulting in a  compelling 
argument for political change (Jackson J. W., 2006, p. v & 4). 
 
McAdams, Tilly and Tarrow elaborated on Social Movement Theory through 
their  contentious politics analysis, asserting that mobilisation through existing 
social structures went so far as to appropriate existing social structures and turn 
them into vehicles for mobilisation.  This accounts for the ability of opposition 
10 
 
groups to organise effectively despite repression or a lack of resources.    
Furthermore they went on to state that the  framing narrative of the opposition 
movement was not just a motivational tool used by leading activists but was a 
construct influenced by narratives of competing groups, opponents, third party 
groups, the state and the media.    As such the narrative of a social movement is 
contained within the cultural and social restraints of its locality.    The manner in 
which a movement is reported through media, communication channels and the 
cultural filter of its environment impacts on the movement leaders’ attempts to 
frame the movement.  Contentious politics is a dynamic and evolving mechanism 
that is a function of both itself and its political and social circumstances 
(McAdams, 2001, p. 44).  
 
In order to analyse the Syrian uprising I will be drawing from the Social 
Movement Theories described as the Ethnic Communal Mobilisational Model, 
Resource Mobilisation Theory, Political Process Theory and New Movement 
Theory.   Resource Mobilisation Theory stresses the role of power and power 
struggle within social movements.   It explains that groups can mobilise to address 
grievances or deprivation when they have the resources to do so.   Mobilisation 
requires the creation of a potential support base, recruitment networks, the 
motivational framing of issues, removal of barriers to participation and the 
building of a coherent collective identity.  The ability to do this relies heavily on 
necessary resources such as financial support and resources, political influence, 
access to media outlets and the necessary workers.    Without adequate resources 
to enable their movement to develop the group is less able to address their 
grievances (Opp, 2009, pp. 127-160). 
 
The existence of the necessary resources to mobilise is understood within Political 
Process Theory however the emphasis here is on the timing of collective action.    
The emergence of a political opportunity to organise is recognised as being crucial 
to the instigation of a social movement.  Political opportunities can be created by 
various factors such as the growth of political pluralism, a decline in the 
effectiveness of state repression, elite disunity with a corresponding decline in 
regime legitimacy, increased and broadened access to institutions involved in the 
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political process and the advocating of protest by an elite group looking to expand 
its organisation and raise its profile (Opp, 2009, pp. 161-165). 
 
Political Process Theory also establishes the political environment as a key 
determinant of collective action.   The political environment is influenced by a 
number of factors including the nature of the regime’s elite, the distribution of 
skills and status within the population and levels of social disintegration.  The 
political environment plays a key role in either facilitating the development of or 
the obstruction of social movements  (Opp, 2009, pp. 161-165).     
 
Mixed systems where there are some openings for political mobilisation but also 
repression generate greater numbers of social movements as they have both the 
grievances and the opportunity, although limited, to mobilise.   The limited 
opportunities for influencing political change increases frustration with protests 
often the only avenue for voicing grievances.   Additionally rising expectations 
can also sharpen discontent leading to collective action.  Furthermore a perception 
that there is an increased likelihood of a movement’s success can increase 
participation in protests (Opp, 2009, pp. 161-165).  This is in line with the King’s 
Dilemma as outlined by Samuel Huntington whereby limited reforms from the top 
increase rather than decrease demands for more reforms from the bottom.   The 
resulting pressure for additional and more radical reforms imperils the incumbent 
regime increasing the risk it will be swept from power (Dunn, 2007).    
 
New Movement Theory was constructed to expand understanding of 
contemporary activism which emphasised cultural reproduction in advanced 
capitalist societies such as the Green movement and human rights movements.   
New Movement Theory describes movements that focus on issues relating to 
symbols, ideology, culture, social consciousness and generalised beliefs and 
values with key themes being quality of life, self determination and identity.  It is 
theorised that these new movements are a response to communications 
technology, the influence and plurality of modern urban centres, the fast pace of 
life, and the constant change within modern civilisations leading to activist themes 
that are attempting to address the resulting fracturing of personal identities that 
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this complexity brings.  As such these social movements are constantly evolving 
(Buechler, 1995).  
 
New Movement Theory outlines collective action that focuses not just on 
initiating instrumental action from the state in relation to highlighted grievances 
but also focuses on changing the values and behaviours of citizens.  New 
Movements are often grass roots movements and frequently focus on the interests 
of marginal groups (Buechler, 1995).     
 
New Movement Theory’s emphasis on grass roots collective action is reflected in 
Gene Sharp’s political theory outlining an action plan for revolution which was 
referenced by activists within the Egyptian Arab Spring.   Gene Sharp promoted 
revolution in terms of understanding that dictators are never as powerful as they 
say they are and that they can be toppled through peaceful means through acts of 
noncompliance, using symbols to demonstrate opposition unity, highlighting 
brutal and repressive state actions, creating a movement identity and undermining 
the regimes’ pillars of support (Arrow, 2011).  Unfortunately this has not been 
successful in Syria.  
 
The remaining theory I am aiming to outline, is Ted Gurr’s Ethnic Communal 
Mobilisational Model which outlines four chief traits which contribute to 
communal mobilisation.   The first trait is the extent of the gap between the 
aggrieved population and the governing elite, namely the larger the gap the greater 
the motivation for political mobilisation.   Secondly, Gurr identifies that the 
stronger the groups’ identity through common historical experiences, religion, 
ethnic origin, language and shared locality, the greater the likelihood of 
communal political mobilisation.   Thirdly the stronger the networks and social 
cohesion within a group the greater the ability to organise political action and 
fourthly the extent of repression by the dominant group over the subordinate 
group points to the potential for political mobilisation in that harsh repression 
makes aggrieved groups reluctant to resort to open violence (Sahliyeh, 2001, p. 5). 
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1.5   Theoretical Framework:  Conclusion 
 
Ethnic conflict theory and social movement theory help to shed light on the Syrian 
sectarian situation.    Ethnic conflict theory assists in identifying and analysing 
sectarian mobilisation.  Social movement theory teases out the dynamics that stem 
from the popular movement and separates them off from the underlying sectarian 
dynamic.  In order to show how these two have overlapped within the 
revolutionary conditions both theories have been applied simultaneously. 
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Chapter Two 
The Communal Context within Middle Eastern Politics 
 
2.1 Arab Culture and Communalism:  Opposition to Other as Political 
Structure 
 
The Pew Research centres’ 2007-2010 research poll revealed that the Middle East 
eclipses the rest of the world both in terms of tensions between religious groups 
and with regards to state repression of religion.    The poll also showed that 
religious restrictions and tensions are on the rise across the globe with the 
increased exposure to outside religions and cultures afforded by globalisation 
often met with a measure of defensiveness and ethno-sectarian chauvinism (Danin 
R. M., Religious Restrictions and Violence Growing Globally led by the Middle 
East, 2012).    Given the poll revealed the Middle East as the region with the 
highest level of religious hostilities it is relevant to investigate the dominant 
culture and religion in the region, Arab culture and Islam, and assess its impact on 
the creation of this statistic.   
 
Middle Eastern culture is based on a history of predatory warrior tribalism and 
identity politics in which individuals belong to a series of nested communal 
groups from family through to sectarian group.   The tribal culture is based on self 
preservation through out-group hostility which correspondingly reinforces in- 
group loyalty (Salzman, 2008). Symbolic Politics Theory outlines how ethno-
sectarian communities with a warrior mythology and a strong emphasis on ‘them 
and us’ engage more readily in ethno-sectarian conflict (Kaufman, Modern 
Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War, 2001, p. 30).  With both these 
characteristics present within Arab culture this has significantly influenced 
Middle Eastern politics and the politization of Islam  (Salzman, 2008).   
The Muhammad ascendency and the rise of Islam can be attributed to 
Muhammad’s ability to unite the Bedouin tribes into a political and religious 
collective through which they were able to dominate out-groups and provide in-  
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group security.    As Salzman describes;  
Building on the tribal system, Muhammad framed an inclusive 
structure within which the tribes had a common, God-given identity 
as Muslims. This imbued the tribes with a common interest and 
common project.  But unification was only possible by extending 
the basic tribal principle of balanced opposition. This Muhammad 
did by opposing the Muslim to the infidel, and the dar al-Islam, the 
land of Islam and peace, to the dar al-harb, the land of the infidels 
and conflict. He raised balanced opposition to a higher structural 
level as the new Muslim tribes unified in the face of the infidel 
enemy. Bedouin raiding became sanctified as an act of religious 
duty. With every successful battle against unbelievers, more 
Bedouin joined the umma. Once united, the Bedouin warriors 
turned outward, teaching the world the meaning of jihad, which 
some academics today say means only struggle but which, in the 
context of early Islamic writing and theological debates, was 
understood as holy war (Salzman, 2008).    
Symbolic Politics Theory illustrates how the politics of Middle Eastern states are 
influenced by their myth symbol complexes which encompass their cultural 
histories.   For the majority of Islamic groups their myth symbol complexes 
clearly denounce out-groups as infidels.   Furthermore myths attesting to the 
divine purpose of Jihad were strengthened by the conquests of the Muslim armies 
between the 7th and 9th centuries who ‘with Islam as their national religion and 
war-cry’ successfully challenged the Byzantines in the North and the Persians to 
the East, going on to conquer Christian and Jewish populations in Egypt, Libya 
and the Maghreb, and the Hindu population of Northern India (Lewis B. , 1956, 
pp. 13, 49-63).   These conquests were followed by successful invasions into 
much of Christian Spain, Portugal and Sicily (Salzman, 2008).    
Whilst editing primary source descriptions of Jihad Andrew Bostom, an associate 
professor of medicine at Brown University, discovered lengthy quotes from major 
ancient Islamic authorities confirming the obligation of Muslims to engage in holy 
wars against infidels.  Modern Jihadi rhetoric reflects this ancient justification for 
16 
 
sectarian violence.  This is an extension of a culture in which tribal identity is 
based on a premise of opposition to ‘other’ and this flows through to Muslim 
attitudes to non-Muslim.   This attitude is confirmed in the historical persecution 
and repression of Christian and Jewish peoples in Muslim lands.   The persecution 
of Jews and Christians was based not just on a tribal culture of opposition to other 
but also on the deeply rooted Muslim belief that Islam was the one true religion 
and all others were inferior or false, a belief that most religions have at least 
historically held about themselves.    Thus, as Salzman describes ‘The theological 
foundation of the Arab empire was the supremacy of Islam and the obligation of 
each Muslim to advance its domination.    The relationship between Muslims and 
non-Muslims is thus defined by ancient Islamic doctrine as one of superiority 
versus inferiority and of endless conflict until the successful conquest of the non-
Muslim’ (Salzman, 2008). 
Opposition to other is also reinforced through the importance of honour within 
Middle Eastern tribal culture with violence against outsiders a common path for 
those seeking honour (Salzman, 2008).  With honour heavily embedded in a 
warrior’s successful confrontation with others, Arab honour is correspondingly 
challenged by the global spread of Western values and this is perceived as a threat 
to Islam.   In order to find honour in a world politically and economically 
dominated by Western values as opposed to Islamic values, Islamic honour ‘can 
be found only in resistance’ (Salzman, 2008).     We can see this dynamic utilised 
within Syrian politics with the regime’s use of the Islamic myth symbol complex 
in order to cast themselves as the champions of Arab honour and Islam through 
resistance to the West and Israel. 
The regions’ zero sum politics and lack of power sharing means that the 
introduction of human rights and democracy will require a shift in the political 
paradigm (Symth, Interview: Phillip Symth on Syria, 2013).  Secular democracy 
is part of the modernity paradigm which has affected the globe at varying times 
and depths.  Modernity projects towards the future (Lavoix, 2012).  In contrast 
radical Islam, autocratic leadership and tribalism draws from the past, hence many 
radicals and leaders quote historical fatwas and/or use religion to legitimise their 
political choices. 
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The political culture of the region, which is based on the suppression of others in 
order to achieve socio-political goals and dominance, a dynamic particularly 
noticeable in reference to the lack of gender and sectarian equality, favours the 
development of autocracy.   Both the autocratic secular regimes and the radical 
Islamists are a direct product of this winner takes all mentality although they are 
sworn enemies.  They are not sworn enemies solely because of their different 
ideological and religious ideals but also because they are directly competing for 
the same goal, the right to impose their own needs and wants onto society 
legitimised either through ideology or religion, through a system secured either by 
a radical interpretation of Sharia law or by secular use of force, in order to obtain 
power and privilege. 
Middle Eastern sectarianism is based upon the ‘central principle of tribal political 
organisation’ which frames sectarian in-groups in opposition to out-groups, or 
more basically ‘us versus them’  (Salzman, 2008).   This effectively ensures in- 
group cohesion and ultimately survival in a harsh and politically competitive 
reality but it destroys the opportunity for stability based on cooperation and 
human rights.   Political mobilisation within Middle Eastern cultures is usually 
framed in opposition to a heretic other, this makes for a difficult process from 
revolution to democracy, secularism and equal sectarian rights.     As such the 
Syrian democratic social movement within the 2011 initiated uprising must 
withstand the temptation to draw from its own political culture too greatly.    It 
must resist the urge to secure political support along sectarian lines as this will 
ultimately defeat its aims, reducing support from out-groups such as the religious 
minorities and making the social cohesion required for a successful democracy 
difficult. 
2.2    Religion, Political Narratives and the Mechanisms of Power 
and Control 
The political culture of ‘us versus them’ translates to sectarianism being available 
to use as an important part of the imposition of autocratic power and enables the 
use of religious political narratives in the Middle East and within Syria.  Power 
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and control is achieved through mechanisms that encourage the submission of 
targets and enforces the psychological dominance of the tyrant.  I have outlined in 
the table below the typical mechanisms used by autocratic regimes to create 
conditions that strengthen illegitimate political power and control.    
Fig. 1 Power and Control 
Physical – Fear Economic Psychological 
 
State of Emergency 
legislation enabling 
security apparatus to 
repress citizens 
Elite control over resources Manipulation of ethno-
sectarian fears 
Corrupt criminal justice 
system used to imprison 
political opposition 
Regime’s patronage 
systems only way to secure 
wealth 
Regime maintaining 
divisiveness between ethno-
sectarian groups 
Security apparatus’s 
internal intelligence means 
organising internal 
opposition difficult 
Resources primarily 
distributed to leadership’s 
own ethno-sectarian group 
or within patronage 
networks 
Conspiracy theories 
declaring  the state is under 
threat from external sources  
to distract from internal 
discontent 
Corrupt immunity of 
security officials from 
punishment for  human 
rights abuses 
Disproportionate allocation 
of resources to suppressing 
internal opposition 
Minimising of regime 
deficiencies and failings 
People who criticise the 
regime going missing or 
receiving beatings  
Corrupt acquisition of 
wealth by regime elite 
Denial of regime brutality 
Torture of opposition 
figures 
Ability to direct funding 
within religious 
organisations 
Blaming common enemies 
for regime failings and/or 
violence – i.e. Israel ,the US 
Incorporation of military 
into political spheres of 
Ownership of media outlets 
to ensure the dominate 
Truth Owning – punishing 
those who challenge the 
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power message is the regimes 
narrative supporting its rule 
state narrative 
Symbolic violence – the 
punishment of loved ones 
in the steed of concealed 
opposition figures 
 Cult of Personality around 
rulers, naming as Lion, 
Father of the Nation , forced 
displays of adoration 
State terrorism – violence 
such as massacres within 
opposition strongholds to 
send message to entire 
population  
 Using religion to legitimise 
rule 
Assassination of leading 
internal and external 
opposition figures 
 Using religious symbolism to 
enforce power and devout 
right to rule of leader 
Assassination of leading 
figures within ethno-
sectarian groups 
 Creating chaos in order to 
obscure securing rule by 
force 
Assassination of any elites 
with the potential to 
challenge leadership from 
within 
 Discrediting internal 
opposition in derogatory 
language i.e. terrorists, 
criminal gangs, inciting 
sectarian hatred 
Assassinating politicians in 
other countries who 
challenge the 
Wall of fear 
 Deflecting blame for 
internal chaos by claiming 
victimisation by external 
mutual enemies i.e. US 
conspiracy 
Terrorising population to 
install wall of fear whilst 
claiming legitimacy 
 Holding mock elections than 
releasing statements about 
how much the President is 
loved 
 
Fear is the base on which autocratic political power and control is constructed.   
The wall of fear is built around corruption, the criminal justice system, a brutal 
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security apparatus focused on domestic dominance, media repression, corrupt elite 
enrichment, exaggerated elite influence, politically inspired narratives, clientism, 
sectarianism and control of the armed forces.   
Due to the social and cultural role of religion and nested identity groups in the 
Middle East, these bonds represent significant tools for the imposition of power 
and control.  This has its roots in Islamic history.  Islam created a psychological 
change in the people that Muhammad and his successors sought to lead, through 
unifying tribes and making them more controllable despite being unused to 
centralised leadership.  So it emerged that historically ‘In the Wars of Conquest 
(Islam) was the symbol of Arab unity and victory’ even though the main aims of 
the conquests were based in power and resources as opposed to religion (Lewis B. 
, 1956, p. 56).     
Additionally Bernard Lewis describes Islam as being the means through which 
cause and following were expressed.   ‘The faith was the official credo of the 
established order, the cult the external and divisible symbol of its identity and 
cohesion, conformity to them, however perfunctory, the token and pledge of 
loyalty.  Orthodoxy meant the acceptance of the existing order, heresy or apostasy 
its criticism or rejection...in the minds and feelings of men Church and State were 
indistinguishably fused’ (Lewis B. , 1956, pp. 99-100).   Therefore the communal 
myth symbol complexes as described by Symbolic Politics Theory heavily 
featured Islam as intrinsically bound within Middle Eastern politics. 
In modern history Hafez al Assad, followed by Bashar al Assad, used religious 
and sectarian strategies to ensure control over the Syrian population.   Hafez al 
Assad sought to gain the trust of the Sunni majority by co-opting Syria’s religious 
establishment.    He gave high ranking Islamic clerics positions in the Peoples’ 
Assembly and he made large personal donations to Hama religious charities and 
Homs religious schools. Furthermore he increased the salaries of religious 
establishment employees and designated extensive funds for the building of new 
mosques in an attempt to decrease the Sunni majority’s reservations about their 
President belonging to the Allawite sect.  Through the contrasting strategies of co-
opting religious leaders and the Ba’ath party’s secular stance Hafez al Assad 
sought to establish legitimacy (Ziadeh D. R., 2008).      
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Furthermore Hafez worked to create a cult of personality to reinforce the 
legitimacy of his rule (Pipes, 1996, p. 15).  This included the regime issuing 
propaganda using religious iconography and depicting the leader imitating 
divinity in an attempt to subjugate religious and constitutional challenges to an 
Allawite ruling elite.   An example in 1992 occurred upon the death of Hafez’s 
mother Na’isa, when the regime issued a poster featuring Na’isa al Assad with a 
halo and Hafez bowing at her feet (Pipes, 1996, p. 15) (Wedeen, 1999, p. 13). The 
lack of mainstream media reports and civilian challenges to the Islamic styled 
propaganda illustrated the regime’s power through their ability to impose their 
own narrative.    
However, although the regime was able to ensure that the majority of its citizens 
participated in outward displays of admiration of their leader none of this worked 
towards creating genuine legitimacy or popularity, rather it was his ability to 
publicly proclaim these things and remain relatively unchallenged which proved 
and perpetrated his power and control leading to an everyday culture of 
compliance and fear of the regime.  It established a visible dominance whereby 
the people deemed it was in their own best interests to submit to the, at times 
religious, slogans and symbols of the non-charismatic regime and in doing so 
psychologically submit to its power and control over their lives (Wedeen, 1999, 
pp. 6-7 & 9-11).    Essentially forcing the population to put up pictures of al Assad 
was and is a discipline strategy of the regime (Wedeen, 1999, p. 15).  
 
When he came into power Bashar al Assad also sought to associate himself with 
Islam through securing the support of key Sunni religious figures in order to co-
opt the religious establishment and prevent it mobilising its followers to oppose 
the regime’s power.   Given its importance to the Sunni majority, religion forms 
an important part of the regime’s strategy for maintaining power and control over 
Syria (Ziadeh D. R., 2008). 
After a surge of demands followed Bashar al Assad’s inauguration in 2000 due to 
perceptions he was a reformer, the regime swung back towards suppressing 
internal opposition in 2006.  At the same time in recognition of the Islamic revival 
across Syria and the Middle East, Bashar al Assad sought to further accommodate 
religious conservatives as a means of broadening his support base.  This included 
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an increased use of references to his Islamic identity within the President’s 
speeches (Slackmen, 2012). 
Another method that the regime employed in order to control their population was 
to deliberately associate the increasing visibility of Sunni Islamic religiousness 
with Islamic extremists and terrorists.  They made use of the West’s ‘war on 
terror’ post 9-11 and the sectarianism within the Iraqi civil war to help facilitate 
this association.  Additionally when it has felt threatened such as during 2004-
2006 the regime highlighted increased Sunni religiousness in order to make the 
impression that the only alternative to their rule was Sunni majority rule and due 
to increased Sunni religiousness this would mean the repression of ‘heretic’ 
religions within an Islamic state  (Alhaj, 2012, pp. 3-4) 
 
In contrast to its highlighting increased Sunni devoutness the Syrian regime did 
not publicise the rises in Shi’ite religiousness evident in the increasing number of 
Shi’ite pilgrims visiting holy sites in Syria (Alhaj, 2012, pp. 3-4).   Through his 
greater association with Shia Islam Bashar al Assad has inflamed Islamic 
defensiveness by departing from the careful balancing act that Hafez al Assad 
maintained between sectarian groups.  This balancing act often entailed absorbing 
individuals from different sectarian groups into positions within the government 
that did not entail decision making.   This balance has been upset with Bashar al 
Assad favouring the support of the Neo Shi’ites in line with the regime’s foreign 
alignment with Shia Iran and Hezbollah with criticism regarding this from Sunni 
Muslims dealt with through the security forces (Alhaj, 2012, pp. 3-4). 
 
However the most visible and significant illustration of religion as political 
propaganda has been seen within the uprising.  This highlights the continued 
importance of religion as a mobilising force and has resulted in a battle to 
establish religious legitimacy. For example many Free Syria Army (FSA) units 
are becoming increasingly identifiable as predominantly Sunni Muslims due to 
brigade names that draw on Sunni Islamic myths and figures (O'Bagy E. , Jihad in 
Syria, 2012, p. 18 & 21). The regime and its supporters are also seeking to create 
religious legitimacy for their cause through slogans such as ‘God, Syria and 
Bashar’ (Khodr, Inside Syria's Sectarian Divide, 2012).   
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The Supreme Iftaa council, whose leader is Sunni cleric Grand Mufti Ahmad 
Hassoun, issued a statement in which the regime’s fight for survival was 
described as religiously sanctioned, stating that ‘we implore our people in Syria to 
stand shoulder to shoulder with our Syrian Arab army and our armed forces and 
we call on our sons to fulfil the religious duty of joining the Syrian Arab army for 
the defence of our homeland which the heavens have blessed and which the Imam 
of the prophets [i.e. Mohammed] called to him.’  It went on to reference the 
Zionist conspiracy theory and the regime’s identification of itself as a front of 
resistance to Zionist aggression and North American hegemony with ‘The country 
that has remained lofty through the ages of time in the face of Zionist aggression 
and its policies of expansionism ‘ (Al-Tamimi, 2013). 
Bashar al Assad’s image has been marketed more extensively through a religious 
lens since the uprising.  Widespread public portraits accord him holy status with 
slogans under his image such as ‘God Protects Syria’, ‘We have God in the Sky 
and Bashar on Earth’ and ‘God to be Praised and Bashar to be Followed’.  Given 
Allawites were rescued from marginalisation to a large extent by the Al Assads 
and now perceive they face an existential threat from retribution at the hands of 
Sunni Muslims it is easy to see how the hero worship of Bashar al Assad as their 
protector has developed within the insecurity of the uprising and in face of rising 
sectarianism.   However these portraits offend many Sunni Muslims (Syria, 2013).  
Opposition rhetoric encouraging mobilisation is also reinforced by religious 
references, expressing frustration and anger at the regime with comments such as 
‘God curse you O Bashar’ posted on the Syrian Revolution Facebook page  
(Syrian Revolution Facebook Page, 2011).      
Fig.2  Bashar Al Assad Facebook Page Visual (1)
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Facebook visuals posted by loyalists and the regime, such as the one above, 
reference Syria’s rhetoric in defence of its rule as a resistance force against 
Zionism and the US  (Bashar al Assad Facebook Page, 2012).  A further posting 
described the actions of the FSA as ‘impure terrorism’ (Bashar al Assad Facebook 
Page, 2012).  Here the regime is reinforcing its conspiracy argument in which the 
uprising represents Islamic terrorism instigated by Zionists and the US in an 
attempt to ignite Syrian patriotism to ‘protect the homeland’ (Bashar al Assad 
Facebook Page, 2012).    Highlighting the Islamist presence in the uprising also 
works to discourage Western intervention through reinforcing fears that that they 
may be intervening on behalf of their enemies, Islamic terrorists.  However the 
rhetoric is primarily aimed at the regime’s main constituents, minority sectarian 
groups, who are fearful of the revolution installing a radical Sunni Islamic regime. 
Visuals that are most likely dishonest are posted onto the Bashar al Assad 
Facebook page to drum up religious fears such as the visual and post ‘Egyptian 
Farhat Ramadan, founder of the Salafist Call in Kafer Al-Sheikh in Egypt, has 
joined the terrorist Jabhet Al-Nusra in Syria’ (fig. 3) (Bashar al Assad Facebook 
Page, 2012). 
Fig. 3  Bashar al Assad Facebook Page Visual (2) 
 
Clearly it would be highly unusual for an Islamic terrorist leader to appear looking 
jolly when their preferred look is severely taciturn, casting serious doubt on the 
authenticity of this image.  However reading comments below the image it 
appears to have struck a chord with some loyalists who posted the following, 
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many with religious references:  ‘The faces of demons...God damn them all’, 
‘Look at their faces. They are of European origin were Mossad agents’ and ‘these 
enemies of Islam and Peace’ (Bashar al Assad Facebook Page, 2012).  Conspiracy 
theories that distort and distract from the truth are a key ploy of regimes and 
political religious movements in the Middle East (Pipes, The Hidden Hand: 
Middle Eastern Fears of Conspiracy, 1996). 
On 11 December 2012 Bashar al Assad’s Facebook page also declared that a 
Wahhabi fatwa was issued to support militant Islamic units in Syria encouraging 
temporary marriages between Jihadi women and soldiers in order to raise morale.   
Comments posted again reflected a sectarian bias against Jews in order to 
discredit those involved in the uprising, with claims that temporary marriages 
represented ‘the same opinion as the rabbis of Zion’ (Bashar al Assad Facebook 
Page, 2012).    
The conspiracy theory using Israel as the protagonist for the uprising reflects the 
Middle Eastern use of Israeli Jews as the common enemy or ‘other’ which ‘true’ 
Arabs oppose.   Although there are likely to be sincere political motivations 
behind opposition to the state of Israel, Israel is cynically used within political 
narratives to resonate with Islamic prejudices and fears by corrupt Middle Eastern 
regimes including the Assad regime and radical groups.  This draws on the Middle 
Eastern myth symbol complex in which honour is based in tribal and religious 
systems and thus reflects Jewish Israel as a challenge to Muslim Arab honour, 
ensuring that the Syrian regime appears honourable in its resistance to the Israeli 
state.  According to Salzman this particularly resonates with the Muslim belief 
that Jews, as well as all other religions outside Islam, are followers of a false 
religion therefore the establishment of a Jewish state on Arab Muslim territory is 
intolerable (Salzman, 2008).  Not all Syrians accept the state’s political narratives 
which is evident in the comment, also with religious references, posted on 11 
December 2012 in reference to a Syrian TV documentary and unrelated to the 
Israel narrative ‘To be honest they lost confidence in public information and 
media from the time of Adam and Eve’ (Bashar al Assad Facebook Page, 2012). 
With both the regime and the opposition using religious rhetoric, including both 
sides referring to their dead as martyrs, it is evident that both resisting and 
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engaging in the uprising is being portrayed as a religious cause intensifying the 
feelings of citizens on both sides.  This is intensifying the risk that the civil war 
will degenerate into a zero sum sectarian contest. 
2.3 Conclusion: The Communal Context within Middle Eastern 
Politics 
The myth symbol complexes of sectarian groups in Syria significantly influences 
current political narratives and strategies for enforcing political power and control.    
With Islam historically embedded in politics and emerging from within tribalism, 
traditionally it has placed significant emphasis on opposition to other, honour, the 
supremacy of the Islamic religion and warrior characteristics making it the ideal 
religion for mobilising a sectarian group within a conflict situation.   As a result 
religion features strongly within mobilising narratives of the diverse groups within 
the opposition, particularly radical Islamic groups, and also within the rhetoric of 
the Assad regime.   
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Chapter Three 
The Allawite Ousting of Sunni Power 
 
3.1 The Origins of Sectarianism under the Assad Regime 
 
Sectarianism has been a significant feature of the political landscape in Syria since 
its creation in 1916.  Prior to the introduction of the Western state system to the 
Middle East which spurred the conception of Arab nationalism, sect was the key 
identifier within the region that became Syria  (Dam N. v., 2011, p. 2).    
Sectarianism was both the historical cause of Allawite misery, the motivation to 
organise politically and the means by which the Allawite elite secured political 
power. 
Fig. 4  Syrian Ethno-Sectarian Groups 
 (Holliday, 2011, p. 10) 
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In 2010 the Syrian population numbered 22 million, and although accurate figures 
do not exist estimates place Arab Sunni at approximately 60%, Shi’ites, Ismailis 
and Druze 5%, Allawites make up 12%, Christians 13%, Sunni Kurds 9% and 
Turcoman, Circassian, Assyrian and Jewish at 1% (fig. 4).    Just over 30% of the 
population are non-Muslim or heterodox Muslim (Holliday, 2011, p. 10).    
Ethnically the population is approximately 90% Arab and 10% other ethnic 
groups such as Kurds and Armenians.  Syria also has a large number of refugees 
with 1.5 million Palestinian and 1 million Iraqis (Bar S. , 2006, p. 359).   Many of 
these figures are in flux given the exodus of refugees from Syria due to the civil 
war. 
Fig 5 Distribution of Ethno-sectarian Groups within Syria 
 
(Kaplan, 2012) 
The Latakia region is the traditional homeland of the Allawite sect   (Faksh M. A., 
1984, p. 134).    Whilst the Alawi, Druze and Ismailis are compact minorities 
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concentrated in districts, Christians and Sunni live throughout the country (Dam, 
Spring, 1978, p. 201).    The sectarian distribution within Syria is illustrated 
within figure 5. 
On the surface communal identities seemed comparatively less pronounced in 
Syria than the rest of the Middle East however rather than a social phenomenon 
this was a reflection of the regime’s co-option of key parties and repression of 
sectarian tensions through such means as preventing expressions of communal 
identity through media channels  (Worren, 2007, pp. 3-4).     Sunni Arabs, Kurds 
and Turks displayed comparative tolerance of each other, however less tolerance 
was extended towards heterodox Muslims such as the Druze, Ismailis, Allawites 
and Shia.  Generally however ethno-sectarian fault lines remained strong, 
cemented throughout Syria’s history by invasions, localism due to a pre Assad 
lack of a strong central authority and the geographical isolation of the Jabal al 
Druze and the Allawite sects (Dam N. v., 1979, p. 16).  
 
The Druze community was and is primarily located within the Southern al-
Suwayda’ province where, unlike the Allawite Latakia region, the Druze 
constituted both the traditional elite and the populace, creating in a strong sense of 
regional identification.    As a result when either the Ottoman rulers or 
governments in Damascus have sought to increase their influence within the al-
uwayda’ region they have come up against solid sectarian cohesion (Dam N. v., 
The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society Under Assad and the Ba'ath 
Party, 2011, pp. 10-11). 
Ismailis are concentrated in the Hama province where 80% of their population 
reside with most living in the rural districts of Salamiyah and Masyaf. Salamiyah 
was the centre of Ismaili influence in the ninth and tenth centuries, a period of 
time where the Ismailis were feared by other sectarian groups.  In the eleventh 
century they fled to the Latakia region but encountered resentment from the 
Allawites contributing to many returning to Salamiya after the Ottoman empire 
granted them local territory in 1845 (Dam N. v., The Struggle for Power in Syria: 
Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party, 2011, pp. 11-12).   
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Notwithstanding Christianity’s low profile domestically, Syria is the birthplace of 
the Christian faith. The faith was named Christian for the first time at the Turkish 
city of Antioch and it was travelling to Damascus that Saint Paul converted to 
Christianity.  Syrian Christians, in particular the Orthodox Greek branch, are 
aware that they are the heirs to ancient Christianity.   However a significant 
proportion of Syrian Christians are newer arrivals including refugees from World 
War 1 who were deported and/or escaped the massacres in Turkey.  These 
refugees are typically Armenian Orthodox (112,000), Armenian Catholics 
(25,000), the Syrian Orthodox (89,000) and Syrian Catholics, with additional 
17,000 Assyrian Christians and 7,000 Chaldean Catholic refugees who escaped 
violence in 1933 from newly independent Iraq (Mouawad, Disappearing 
Christians of the Middle East, 2001).  Iraq’s recent civil war also saw an influx of 
Christian refugees into Syria however many Christians are now fleeing Syria.   
Although the Sunni represent the majority sectarian group the Sunni community is 
split on significant issues such as religious jurisprudence, political position 
relative to the Assad regime and discords over religious family of origin  (Donker, 
2010).     Divides also exist across a spectrum from secular to fundamentalist, this 
divide often reflects the parallel divide between urban and rural Sunni  (Kaplan, 
2012).   
The Kurds represent the largest non-Arab ethnic minority within Syria and 
possess their own language and culture (Human Rights Watch, 2009).    The 
Kurds are significantly marginalised in Syria (Human Rights Watch, 2009).   
Sunni non Arabs such as the Kurds, Turkomans and Circassians tend to be less 
orthodox than Arab Sunni (Bar S. , 2006, p. 359) contributing to the ethnic divide 
between these groups. 
Little is known of the Allawite sect given their history of quietism in order to 
avoid persecution, their historical geographical isolation in Northwest Syria’s 
mountainous expanses and the secretive nature of the sect.   In the Middle Ages 
the Allawites moved towards an Arab identity adopting the Arabic language and 
linking their religion specifically to the Islamic Ismailiyyah sect before re-
emerging as a separate sect  (Faksh M. A., 1984, p. 134).    
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The Allawite’s low social status marked them for economic exploitation and 
discrimination by other sectarian groups in particular the regionally dominant 
Sunni Arabs.  This historical discrimination and subsequent communal 
separateness was reinforced by Ottoman rule which governed groups according to 
their sectarian and tribal divisions.  A person’s sectarian extraction was the most 
important indicator of identity and social status (Faksh M. A., 1984, p. 138).    
Albert Hourani described Syria during the Ottoman Empire as under a system of 
localised tribal communities from the same sectarian group where the groups 
operated as ‘closed communities...each looked at the rest with suspicion even 
hatred’ (Dam N. v., The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under 
Asad and the Ba'th Party, 2011, pp. 17-18).  This reflects Social Identity Theory’s 
proposition that individuals make comparisons that reflect positively on their in-
group and display discriminatory attitudes towards out-groups (Horowitz, 1985, 
pp. 141-143).       
The emphasis on sectarian origins was deepened by competing Western states at 
the beginning of the eighteenth century who sought to establish sponsor type 
arrangements with Syrian sectarian groups, particularly during the gradual demise 
of the Ottoman Empire.   The French looked to protect the Lebanese Maronite 
Christians, the English pursued ties within the Druze community, and the 
Russians made overtures towards the Greek Orthodox sect (Eddin, 1998, p. 238).   
Although the different sects were generally reluctant to accept foreign 
involvement in their affairs as the Ottoman Empire declined they began to seek 
outside protection from the increasingly corrupt central authorities and other 
sectarian groups (Eddin, 1998, pp. 238-239).    The Europeans’ establishment of 
ties on a sectarian basis strengthened the political mobilisation of sects, it also 
contributed to Sunni hostility towards the minorities who were perceived to be 
clients of Christian Europe and thereby a threat to the Islamic sphere (Dam N. v., 
1979, pp. 17-18).   Later the Cold War and the strategies of big power rivalry 
would also intensify the sectarian divisions and conflicts within the Middle East 
(Eddin, 1998, pp. 238-239).     This culture of sectarian competition was the 
grounding for Allawite fears of Sunni power and their historical marginalisation 
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meant that they very motivated to make use of the opportunities presented to them 
to move into positions of power and to reduce Sunni authority. 
During the French administration of Syria after World War I the religious 
leadership who had dominated during the Ottoman rule aligned with the urban 
elite Sunni families with this alliance maintaining authority within what continued 
to be a largely feudal society.    The French, looking to make political use of 
sectarian divisions, encouraged the empowerment of minority groups in an effort 
to weaken the Sunni elite. This opportunity was taken up strongly by the most 
disadvantaged group, the Allawites, who quickly moved into careers within the 
army, civil service and education (Worren, 2007, p. 42).   
An argument was made by nationalists for Arab unity across the Middle East as a 
means to mobilise political will in opposition to Western influence  (Worren, 
2007, p. 41).   In response the French extended use of their sectarian strategies to 
weaken emerging Arab nationalism, awarding two of the five states created under 
the French mandate to the Druze and Allawite minority sects.  Additionally North 
Eastern Kurdish political mobilisation was encouraged although the French 
stopped short of granting them autonomy (Dam N. v., 1979, p. 18).   
The 1925 revolt against the French mandate was a civilian rather than elite lead 
resistance movement.  The French emphasised a sectarian element to the uprisings 
in order to discredit it as sectarian chaos, however later analysis suggests that 
many sects were united in their opposition to the French mandate.  The French 
attempted to appeal to minority sect fears through stating that their political 
administrative role in Syria was necessary for the protection of Christians   
(Oztan, 2011) a claim to legitimacy later used by the Assad regime.   
The Syrian political elite from 1928 to 1934 were primarily occupied with the 
formation of political parties that opposed the French mandate.  The Ba’ath party 
was founded in 1940s on the principles of Arab nationalism, Arab unity, freedom 
from colonialism and imperialism, socialism and secular non-sectarianism.  The 
non-sectarian secular stance was a reflection of the sectarian concerns of the 
founders who were typically non-Muslim (Bar S. , 2006, pp. 359-360).      
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Before World War II four of the states were combined to form Syria with the fifth, 
Alexandretta, ceding to Turkey when independence was granted in 1946 (Dam N. 
v., 1979, p. 18).  The Allawites were considerably anxious about the merger of 
their region into Syria due to the Sunni majority in the new State.   In 1936 this 
lead to  six Allawites, including the Grandfather of the current President, sending 
a letter to the French Prime Minister Leon Blum in which they stated ‘The spirit 
of hatred and fanaticism embedded in the hearts of the Arab Muslims against 
everything that is non-Muslim has been perpetually nurtured by the Islamic 
religion. There is no hope that the situation will ever change. Therefore, the 
abolition of the Mandate will expose the minorities in Syria to the dangers of 
death and annihilation, irrespective of the fact that such abolition will annihilate 
the freedom of thought and belief’.  Despite Allawite fears the creation of the 
modern Syrian state went ahead as originally planned (MacKey, 2011).   
From 1936 to 1939 Allawite religious leaders issued pamphlets that declared the 
Allawi faith was a Muslim religion and stated that any community members who 
did not consider themselves Muslim or accept the Koran as the holy book would 
not be deemed Allawi (MacKey, 2011).   This seems to be a move towards 
asserting a stronger identification as Muslim in order to avoid Sunni religious 
chauvinism.  
The minority groups sided with Arab nationalism due to its policies of equality 
and secularism (Worren, 2007, p. 42).  The traditional Sunni elite were also 
heavily invested in Arab nationalism however, suspicious of their influence, rival 
nationalists strains notably within the Ba’ath party developed a more radical 
nationalism which focused its ideals around class politics including economic and 
social justice and a redistribution of power away from the existing Sunni elite 
(Worren, 2007, pp. 41-42).   
Syria achieved independence in 1946 however it was difficult for post-colonial 
states to create a sense of national identity as the colonial drawing up of state 
boundaries was not in line with the existing ethno-sectarian territories  (Wedeen, 
1999, p. 16).   Thus communal groups felt threatened by dominant sects within the 
colonial borders.   In line with Ethnic Conflict Theory, past persecution added to 
this insecurity, as a result colonial borders intensified ethnic and sectarian tensions 
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with citizens seeking security through a renewed emphasis on the unity and safety 
of communal groups.   
Therefore  by the 1940s there had been little change in ethno-sectarian 
communities attitudes towards each other with Jacques Weulersse stating ‘each 
gesture by a neighbouring community appear a menace or challenge to one’s own 
and which unifies each collectivity in its entirety at the least outrage committed 
against any one of its members’ (Dam N. v., 1979, pp. 18-20).  It appears that 
Syrian communal groups possess myth symbol complexes which include 
significant hostility towards out-groups, greatly increasing the likelihood of inter-
group hostility (Wolff, 2009, p. 28).  This attitude was projected into national 
politics where compromise was not a motivation, alternatively politics was 
conducted in pursuit of zero sum aims that reflected local political struggles.  
Therefore political parties and organisations focused on local issues and 
commanded strong loyalty from within their own ethno-sectarian communities 
whilst ignoring or suppressing the aims and aspirations of other groups  (Dam N. 
v., 1979, pp. 18-20).    
The Allawites did not hold political influence in the post-independence era due to 
their lack of participation in the independence struggle and the removal of 
Allawite autonomy (Landis, 1998).  In the 1950s the Allawites were at the bottom 
social stratum in Syria, they were the least educated Syrian sect and suffered 
extreme poverty within their region of Latakia in North Western Syria.   It was 
typical for upper class Syrian’s to have Allawite domestic servants and this 
contributed to their being treated with contempt by Sunni Muslims (Faksh M. A., 
1984, p. 133).   Historically subject to discrimination, the isolation of the 
mountainous Allawite region both reinforced Allawite sectarian cohesiveness and 
served to protect them from persecution (Faksh M. A., 1984, p. 138). 
In the years of political instability that followed independence the military became 
increasingly involved in politics with the Ba’ath party seizing power in a coup 
d’état in 1963 beginning the change from a parliamentary, democratic system to 
closed authoritarian one party rule  (Ziadeh, 2011).     
Prior coups tended to be led by Sunni officers however the regimes following the 
Ba’ath coup were socialist and secular, bringing in radical policies such as the 
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nationalisation of sectors of the economy which removed the traditional Sunni 
leaders from power (Worren, 2007, pp. 41-42) (Dam N. v., The Struggle for 
Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party, 2011, p. 27).    
A group of largely Sunni Nasserists led an abortive coup later in 1963 which was 
suppressed by Allawi officers causing Sunni opposition figures to seek to 
discredit the regime by claiming that the regime was sectarian which increased the 
Sunni   distrust of the Ba’ath regime  (Dam N. v., The Struggle for Power in 
Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party, 2011, p. 33).   
Ba’ath party policies of land expropriation and redistribution improved the lot of 
Allawite rural poor but their social mobility was still limited with the sect largely 
continuing to occupy the lowest socio-economic group.    In attempts to move out 
of this position younger more educated Allawites found that army and security 
apparatus careers were open to them.   This became an important form of social 
mobility for Allawites with Allawite numbers in the upper ranks continuing to rise 
(Faksh M. A., 1984, p. 136).     
Patronage along sectarian lines was evident following the Ba’ath party’s land 
reforms as part of its introduction of socialism, with Ayoub Agha describing the 
situation as ‘supposed to create a more equal society, [however] the Ba’ath Party 
favoured members of their sect; hordes of Alawites from the North flooded 
Damascus and land was distributed amongst friends and families of the 
government’ (Lababedi, 2008, pp. 41-42).   
 
After the Ba’ath coup a battle for supremacy over the Allawite community and 
Syria erupted between the three Allawite ringleaders of the Military Committee, 
Hafez al Assad, Salah al Jadid and Muhammad ‘Umran.  The conflict was 
overlaid with tribal and familial rivalries with al Assad belonging to the Kalbiyya 
tribe, Jadid the Haddadin and ‘Umran from the Khayyatin (Worren, 2007, pp. 41-
42).   
In 1965 Salah al Jadid and al Assad united to oust Muhammad ‘Umran exiling 
him to Lebanon and finally Assad ordered him assassinated in 1972 (Zisser, 
Commanding Syria, 2006, p. 7).      In light of increased tensions between Assad 
and Jadid that followed the ousting of Muhammad ‘Umran, the Ba’ath party 
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developed a rift between two distinct factions, the civil lead by Jadid and the 
military lead by  Assad (Dam N. v., The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and 
Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party, 2011, pp. 63-65). 
One of the men involved in the Ba’ath coup in 1963 was Druze Salim Hatum who 
after a later failed takeover accused  Salah al Jadid and Hafez al Assad of 
favouring Allawites and tribal connections stating ‘sectarian spirit is spread in a 
shameful way in Syria, particularly in the Army...the (filling of) powerful places 
in the state and its institutions is limited to a specific class of the Syrian people  
(i.e. the Allawis)’ (Dam N. v., The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and 
Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party, 2011, pp. 56-57).    Opposition to the 
regime during this period tended to stress the sectarian nature of the regime as a 
means to try and mobilise the majority Sunni and other groups against its rule.   
 
The two remaining leaders vied for dominance until 1970 by which time Assad’s 
officers faction had almost monopolised political power, creating an opportunity 
for Assad who staged a corrective revolution and put Jadid in jail where he 
remained until his death in 1993.  The Minister of Defence, Hafez al Assad, 
installed himself as President in 1971 ending the Syrian tradition of Sunni 
Presidents.  His brand of socialist politics was less radical than the preceding 
President and instead he focused his energies on the creation of a ‘presidential 
monarchy’.  Most of his supporters were Allawites from the military which had 
important implications for how his government was perceived by the Sunni 
majority and the Syrian population as a whole (Worren, 2007, pp. 41-42) (Dam N. 
v., The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society Under Assad and the 
Ba'ath Party, 2011, p. 68) and also gave him considerable power to enforce his 
rule through the security forces.   
 
The rule of Hafez al Assad began a period of unprecedented stability in Syria, in 
part because he represented periphery groups such as the Allawites, other minority 
sects and rural populations.  To broaden his support base Assad set out to co-opt 
urban Sunni through his economic policies, as despite being politically displaced 
Sunni merchants still held influence within the economy.   Additionally although 
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the regime remained secular Assad increased his public participation in Islamic 
rituals in order to strengthen his legitimacy with the religiously conservative 
Sunni majority and to discredit radical Islamists arguments which declared his 
rule was illegitimate as he was not an orthodox Muslim  (Zisser, Commanding 
Syria, 2006, p. 9).    At the same time the Ba’ath party repressed the traditional 
Sunni elite, particularly the Islamic elements who had been thrown into disarray 
following the Ba’ath party takeover (Zisser, Commanding Syria, 2006, p. 7).    
Al Assad’s use of both Ba’ath ideology and Islam did not disguise that Allawite 
Hafez al Assad’s autocratic Presidency had ousted traditional Sunni leadership of 
Syrian society, essentially inverting the previous socio-political arrangement and 
introducing a new system of patronage and elite recruitment that focused largely 
on his Allawite allies. The Assad regime styled itself on Ba’athist principles in 
order to present itself as a legitimate Arab nationalist movement but in reality it 
was a military regime in which personal loyalties and rivalries dominated politics   
(Faksh M. A., 1984, p. 133).      
In line with Gurr’s Ethnic Communal Mobilizational Model it is evident that the 
discrimination and grievances experienced by the Allawites meant that the 
potential for them to seize an opportunity for political power was high.  As such 
Allawite sectarian networks were and are the keystone for the Assad regime.   
With Assad in power, minority sectarian groups were now in a position of relative 
security which cemented their support of the Assad regime.    By using existing 
sectarian alliances and assuming control over the military through the 
proportionally high number of Allawites in the officer classes, Hafez al Assad was 
able to secure autocratic rule over Syria. 
3.2 Hafez al Assad and the Allawite rise to Power 
 
In a society in which communal identity is a key means of defining individuals it 
made sense that Hafez al Assad, as with earlier Syrian politicians, found the most 
natural and effective means of building up political support was along religious, 
tribal and familial lines.  Hafez al Assad’s ability to build a loyal and largely 
Allawite power base whilst repressing his enemies was the key to his durable 
presence on the Syrian political scene (Dam N. v., The Struggle for Power in 
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Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party, 2011, p. 65).  As such 
sectarianism was an important part of Hafez al Assad’s implementation of power 
and control over the Syrian people. 
 
However it is inaccurate to claim that Hafez al Assad saw power as a chance to 
impose Allawite rule over Syria, alternatively his aims were to gain authoritarian 
power and control (Pipes, Syria Beyond the Peace Process, 1996, pp. 10-11).  
Nevertheless the Allawites were a readymade support base given the traditional 
strength of tribal and sectarian ties especially given Allawite sectarian insecurity 
resulting from past marginalisation (Goldsmith, Syria's Allawites and the Politics 
of Sectarian Insecurity: A Khaldunian Perspective, 2011, p. 40 & 52).  
Furthermore in view of  the comparative safety Assad afforded Christians and 
other minorities, and their preference for the regime’s secular repression to the 
fundamentalist Sunni alternative,  Assad’s support based extended beyond just the 
Allawite minority   (Pipes, Syria Beyond the Peace Process, 1996, p. 10).     This 
is supported by Ethnic Conflict Theory which clearly identifies that elites within 
divided states typically achieve power through the mobilisation of political 
support via communal ties through the manipulation of ethno-sectarian fears  
(Wolff, 2009, p. 41).       
The high number of Allawites employed within the security apparatus meant that 
after Hafez al Assad came into power his Allawite supporters were ideally placed 
to move into powerful positions within the military and to consolidate on this rise 
in status by assuming control of key political positions  (Pipes, 1996, p. 10).  
Allawites continued to enrol in the military in disproportionally large numbers, a 
trend which was reinforced by Allawite poverty as Allawite youth lacked the 
necessary funds to buy their way out of military service, an option often taken by 
Sunni families (Pipes, 1996, p. 10).    Horowitz identifies that where an ethno-
sectarian group has a significant representation within the military and security 
forces, the security apparatus can become a tool for the internal repression of 
political opposition from other ethno-sectarian groups (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 10-
12).  As such the Allawite dominance of the military gave the Assad regime 
considerable power to use the security apparatus to project political authority. 
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Hafez strengthened his political control by embedding loyal co-religionists, often 
members of his Kalbiyya tribe and family, into leadership roles within the armed 
forces, intelligence services, the government and the civil bureaucracy.  With 
many co-religionists holding key positions within the regime many non-
ideological Allawi pragmatically adopted Ba’athism as a means to secure 
themselves within the regime patronage system (Dam N. v., The Struggle for 
Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party, 2011, p. 97) 
(Zisser, 1999, p. 135).   Dominating the regime were twenty loyal men, 
collectively called the Group or al Jama’a.   These men were predominantly both 
Allawites and military officers reflecting the military and sectarian intersect that 
constitutes the backbone of the regime (Pipes, Syria Beyond the Peace Process, 
1996, p. 10).      
The Ba’ath Socialist Party’s 1947 constitution stated ‘The Arab nation constitutes 
a cultural unity.  All differences existing amongst its sons are accidental and 
spurious, and will disappear with the awakening of the Arab consciousness’ 
(Dam, Spring, 1978, p. 201).   However although the Ba’ath party proclaimed that 
cultural unity was central to its political agenda (Rais, 2008) Syria’s culture of 
communalism created a vicious cycle, as in order to generate enough support to 
secure power political groups were forced to rely on traditional sectarian and 
tribal loyalties thereby perpetuating sectarianism (Dam N. v., The Struggle for 
Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party, 2011, p. 74).    
The Ba’ath party’s response to this cultural environment was pragmatic with the 
party chosing to use its ideological slogans to support the Assad regime’s 
legitimacy as well as obscure the Allawite elite’s dominance of Syria (Bar S. , 
2006, pp. 360-361).   
One of the weaknesses of Assad’s rule was a direct result of his reliance on 
communal loyalties to maintain political power.   The lack of accountability 
expected of politically connected Allawites and regime members resulted in 
widespread corruption which Hafez attempted to address in 1977.   Upon 
discovering that key members of his inner circle, including his brother, were 
among the worst offenders he was forced to accept their corruption as their 
prosecution would have severely undermined the regime’s legitimacy (Dam N. v., 
The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'th 
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Party, 2011, p. 73).    However corruption decreased the security of citizens and 
greatly reduced the reliability of legal recourse against injustice.   Ethnic Conflict 
Theory asserts that where a state neglects to safeguard citizens’ interests there is 
an increased perception that ethno-sectarian affiliations are a necessary alternative 
to address injustice and security concerns  (Horowitz, 1985, p. 74). 
As his ultimate aim was power for an Allawite elite, as opposed to the dominance 
of the Allawite sect in its entirety, Hafez sought to make ties within the Sunni sect 
appointing loyal Sunni politicians such as Abd al Halim Khaddam, Mustafa Tlass 
and Faruq al Sharaa to highly placed cabinet positions, an action which again 
helped to obscure the Allawite elite’s dominance of Syrian politics (Pipes, 1996, 
pp. 10-11).    Crucially however Allawites occupied the lead positions within any 
part of the security apparatus giving the President ultimate control over the state.    
In order to prevent coups Hafez ensured that non-Allawite regime members were 
isolated thus limiting their ability to mobilise opposition movements along 
sectarian lines and effectively weakening any potential Sunni, Druze or Ismaili 
factions within the power structure (Dam N. v., The Struggle for Power in Syria: 
Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party, 2011, p. 69). 
Hafez worked to pacify the Sunni population with additional tactics.   The Assad 
regime’s initial support base was the social and economic periphery which 
explains its early alignment with Sunni rural communities as they shared a 
common interest in ousting the previous leadership (Zisser, 1999, p. 136). The 
established Sunni elite were given the option retaining wealth and some status 
through commerce so long as they remained out of politics, whilst in order to 
appeal to the Sunni masses the regime continued to promote itself as socialist 
(Pipes, 1996, pp. 10-11).       However from 1970 to 1995 the Syrian cabinet saw a 
significant increase in the numbers of Damascenes and urban Sunni as Hafez 
worked to co-opt this group behind his leadership (Dam N. v., The Struggle for 
Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party, 2011, p. 78).  
After the 1990s the regime succeeded in establishing greater ties with the Sunni 
urban business elite who supported the regimes restricted economic reforms and 
imposition of stability   (Zisser, 1999, p. 137).  
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Despite efforts to pacify Sunni the ascendency of the Allawite elite caused non-
affiliated Sunni to increasingly oppose the regime, specifically within the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood who staged riots in Hama in 1964 and again in 1982  (Pipes, 
1996, pp. 12-13).     Hafez used three sectarian strategies to manage the early 
1980’s uprisings.  He selectively deployed politically reliable troops, pairing 
Allawite elite units with front line troops to compel allegiance and prevent 
defections.  He encouraged the development of paramility units from within the 
Allawite community to supplement the military.  He also mounted clear and hold 
campaigns within major predominantly Sunni population centres using armoured 
forces and long term garrisons, the most obvious of which resulted in the 1982 
Hama massacre of between 10,000 and 30,000 people  (Holliday, The Assad 
Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War, 2013, pp. 10, 11 & 12).     The 
1982 massacre effectively intimidated both opposition groups and the population.  
However whilst internal opposition assumed a much lower profile following the 
Hama massacre, it became increasingly anti-Allawite (Pipes, 1996, pp. 12-13).    
In order to discredit the regime and discourage Sunni acquiesce, opposition 
figures sought to highlight sectarian divisiveness.  Hafez’s rule was described by 
Egyptian President Anwar al Sadat as ‘firstly Alawi, Secondly Ba’thi, thirdly 
Syrian’.  However the regime is not firstly Allawi it is firstly interested in the 
maintenance of power and privilege for its central elite rather than Allawite 
ascendency as a whole, although the regime would be unable to maintain political 
power without the support of the Allawites  (Pipes, 1996, p. 10).    
Despite many coastal Allawites in the mountainous regions remaining 
comparatively poor and outside of the regime’s patronage networks,  (Reuters, 
2011) there was considerable resentment of the entire Allawite sect as a result of 
the Assad elite’s rise to power with many Sunni continuing to see themselves as 
socially superior (Zisser, 1999, p. 138).     As such the opposition’s accusations of 
sectarianism and rising anger at the Allawite elite increased insecurity amongst 
the Allawite sect, with rising fears  of resentful sectarian out-groups   causing 
them to continue to defensively back the regime  (Dam N. v., The Struggle for 
Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party, 2011, pp. 70, 
97 & 100).  Ethnic Conflict Theory identifies that a dominant groups fears of out-
group resentment and retaliation is a typical feature within ethnic tensions and any 
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subsequent outbreak of ethnic conflict (Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic 
Politics of Ethnic War, 2001, p. 61).  
After 30 years of rule Hafez al Assad died on 10 June 2000 with a plan in place to 
secure the Presidency and the regime for his eldest surviving son, Bashar al 
Assad.  Under Hafez al Assad sectarian networks and sectarian politics were 
crucial to the establishment and maintenance of power and control over the Syrian 
people.   However despite 30 years of stability Hafez left his successor with some 
brewing problems.   The most significant amongst these threats resulted from his 
sectarian strategies, with widespread Sunni resentment of repression by the 
Allawite elite, and the Allawite elite’s corruption and autocratic power having 
placed Allawites at significant risk of future retribution.    Furthermore the 
economy had suffered under his brand of socialism, Lebanese resentment of 
Syrian domination was high and stability had been secured not through 
improvements but a repression that ensured the opposition was intimidated into 
silence, elite corruption continued unabated, and Sunni still largely rejected the 
assertion that the Allawi were Muslim. Stability was secured by a repression so 
harsh and effective that it masked but did not eradicate the deep tensions and 
communal divisions within Syrian society which were to make themselves felt 
during the reign of his successor, Bashar al Assad.   
 
3.3 Bashar al Assad and the Pillars of the Assad Regime 
 
Bashar al Assad became President in 2000.   The structure of Hafez al Assad’s 
regime continued under Bashar al Assad with sectarian insecurity assuring the 
loyalty of minority sects, however important differences existed primarily caused 
by Bashar al Assad’s less successful management of the pillars on which the 
Assad regime was based and acerbated by the global economic downturn.  The 
management of the sectarian patronage system and co-opted individuals from 
other sects continued however the nature of this changed under Bashar al Assad 
with wealth becoming a key unifying feature within the regime networks. 
 
 In preparation for Bashar’s takeover potential opposition from within the regime 
was removed, with Hafez shifting power away from Sunni Vice President Abdul 
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Halim Khaddam who could have conceivably sought the Presidency, and two 
other senior Sunni officials Hikmat Shihabit and Ghazi Kanaan with whom 
Khaddam shared charge of security in Lebanon.   Hafez perceived that these 
Sunni government officials   were getting too close to Lebanese Sunni Rafik 
Hariri, who opposed Syria’s presence in Lebanon, and to Hariri’s Saudi Arabian 
Sunni connections. Power shifted towards Bashar’s maternal relations Hafidh 
Makhluf and Allawi tycoon Rami Makhluf  (Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal, 
2010, p. 6).   
 
Additionally Bashar al Assad ran an anti-corruption campaign which was 
conspicuous in that it focused on officials that were critical of his inheritance of 
the Presidency.   Bashar was also involved in the 1999 crackdown in Latakia, the 
remaining stronghold of his uncle Rifaat al Assad who had previously sought to 
overthrow Hafez al Assad.  This brutal crackdown against an Allawite clan in an 
Allawite city was particularly significant, as it sent a very clear message that 
Allawite political opportunism during the comparatively vulnerable succession 
process would not be tolerated (Bar S. , 2006, p. 369).  
 
The succession went smoothly primarily due to an assessment by the regime elite 
and co-opted groups that a continuation of the status quo best served their 
interests.     The interests of Bashar al Assad and the support bases he inherited 
from his father were largely reciprocal and co-dependent, centring on power and 
control over Syria and the protection of elite privileges (International Crisis 
Group, 2011).  
Bashar al Assad’s assumption of power in Syria lead to a short period of hope and 
increased dialogue on political and economic reform which was known as the 
Damascus Spring.  It appears likely that Bashar saw limited gradual reforms as a 
means to tackle unemployment and economic stagnation.  However the 
unexpected groundswell of civilian demands which followed talk of reforms (Bar 
S. , 2006, p. 373) resulted in the security apparatus renewing pressure on civil 
society activists by February 2001.  This was due to fears that reforms, 
particularly reforms towards allowing political plurality, would alter the balance 
of power by reducing the climate of fear and subsequently reducing the regime’s 
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control.   There was concern that this would destabilise Syria and cause 
widespread ethno-sectarian violence  (Project, 2006, p. 14) . 
Additionally the regime was aware that political pluralism would spell its demise 
as indicated by former Syrian Vice President Abd al-Halim Khaddam who 
declared that the ‘National Mosaic’ or multi-culturalism was an attempt by the US 
and the West, to shatter Third World countries into pieces by demanding the self-
determination of their different ethnic groups.  Khaddam posed the query “Are 
there any conflicts between people in Syria today? ...We will under no 
circumstances let Syria turn into Algeria or Yugoslavia”.  The regime’s 
dependence on a crafted hierarchy of power between the Allawite elite and 
sectarian groups plus a carefully maintained balance between minority sectarian 
insecurity and stability made political reforms too risky a venture for the regime  
(Rais, 2008).   
Syrian stability was helped by a common perception between the sects that they 
are all jointly experiencing misery and repression under the Assad regime.    
Additionally the instability of neighbouring Lebanon and Iraq reinforced the 
dangers of antagonising other sectarian groups, at the same time reducing 
confidence in the ability of alternatives to the current regime to maintain stability.  
However, years of enforced unity has not eradicated the communal divisions 
within Syria, beneath the surface the state is still very much divided along 
sectarian lines.  Identification of individuals along ethnic or sectarian lines 
remained standard practice resulting in underlying animosity between sects and 
low rates of intermarriage and socializing    (Bar S. , 2006, p. 391).    
 
In an attempt to gain legitimacy amongst Muslims the regime supported moderate 
Islam whilst discrediting radical Islam.  Bashar al Assad has followed his father’s 
path where Hafez declared  ‘It is not the right of anyone to impose on the others 
his path to Allah . . . Allah is for all and he regards all men as equal . . . every 
human is free how he prays, how he worships and how he sees Allah.’ (Bar S. , 
2006, p. 366).   However in contrast to this rhetoric the Syrian school system’s 
compulsory religious studies are essentially Sunni in nature despite the regime’s 
support being primarily based amongst Allawites and Christians.  Syrian school 
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texts criticise religious sectarianism whilst proclaiming Islam to be the only true 
religion thereby paradoxically endorsing sectarianism.   However in contrast to all 
other Middle Eastern states the texts do recognise Christians go to heaven rather 
than insisting that both Jews and Christians are unbelievers destined for 
damnation (Landis, Islamic Education in Syria: Undoing Secularism, 2003, pp. 
22-23).   This reflects the regime’s complicated sectarian strategy as it works to 
pacify the Sunni majority and promote the regime as genuinely supportive of 
Islam, whilst asserting its commitment to political stability and secularism in 
order to appease minority sects.     
 
Despite the Assad regime’s narrative which proclaims the regime’s legitimacy 
rests in its ability to prevent chaotic sectarianism, opposition to the regime has 
often been along ethno-sectarian divides such as the Muslim Brotherhood 
insurgency from the late 1970s to 1982, the Druze intifada in 2000 and the 
Kurdish rebellion in 2004.   Notwithstanding the regime’s declared nationalist 
aims there  is a perception amongst opposition groups that the regime encourages 
communal suspicions whilst suppressing outbreaks of communal conflict and 
opposition in order to maintain this legitimacy  (Harling, 2012).   However 
weakening confidence in the regime by the mid decade saw citizens increasingly 
turning to tribal or sectarian leadership for guidance and the outbreak of 
communal conflict between Bedouin and Druze in Suwayada and Alawis and 
Ismailis in Masyaf (Hinnebusch, 2012, p. 99). 
 
Given its minority support pillar is based on sectarian insecurity, sectarian unity is 
the enemy of the Assad regime (Goldsmith, Syria's Allawites and the Politics of 
Sectarian Insecurity: A Khaldunian Perspective, 2011, pp. 53-55).  As such the 
regime has not worked to genuinely create national feeling and unity amongst the 
ethno-sectarian groups, instead it has done its best to highlight communal divides 
in order to hail itself as the sole means of avoiding sectarian fragmentation and 
conflict (International Crisis Group, 2011, p. 2).    
 
The Damascus Declaration for Democratic National Change issued in 2005 was 
the first unified opposition statement in a decade.  It contained accusations against 
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the regime of ‘authoritarianism, totalitarianism and cliquish’ strategies that were 
responsible for Syria’s international isolation (International Crisis Group, 2009, p. 
3).  In response the regime backed further away from reforms accusing activists of 
both corruption and ‘inciting racial and sectarian strife’ as a cover for the  state 
repression of the activists’ political agendas (Bar S. , 2006, p. 372) (Ehsani, Could 
Syria's current predicament been avoided over a decade ago?, 2012).  In this 
instance a manufactured defence of the Ba’ath party’s nationalist ideology which 
contends that unified Arab nationalism should transplant regional, sectarian, 
religious and tribal loyalties, served as a means to justify the suppression and 
arrest of both opposition figures and political rivals  (Dam N. v., The Struggle for 
Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party, 2011, p. 39).  
Initially Bashar al Assad attempted to modernise the regime’s authoritarianism 
through an early focus on corruption by government officials.  However like 
Hafez al Assad, Bashar abandoned his attempts to rout corruption as it risked 
disrupting the political crony networks (Bar S. , 2006, p. 389).      Corruption and 
the patronage networks underpinned the regime’s power.  Under Hafez al Assad 
corruption was somewhat restrained, in contrast under Bashar al Assad corruption 
had become rampant.  Although it ensured the continued support of the corrupt 
officials and the predominantly Allawite elite, corruption had become so blatant 
that it undermined civilian support for the regime (International Crisis Group, 
2011, p. 11).   
Civilian acquiesce to the regime also weakened in reaction to Bashar al Assad’s 
leadership style.  He did not inspire the same loyalty, deference or fear that his 
father commanded with the result that the regime’s apparatus was a less malleable 
instrument for Bashar than Hafez.  Consequently Syrians were less assured of the 
states continued stability (Bar S. , 2006, pp. 366, 374-375).   In an attempt to 
rectify this over 60% of officials within the regime were replaced with younger 
members effectively removing the old guard from power and installing new 
people who owed their new positions directly to Bashar al Assad  (Bar S. , 2006, 
p. 371).     
However Bashar al Assad’s regime members have a significantly different 
outlook than the old guard.  The old guard started their careers as socio-political 
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underdogs and had worked to project themselves and to a lesser extent the 
Allawite sect into a position of political power.  In contrast the new guard have 
been born into wealth and power, widening the gap between the regime and the 
majority of Syrian’s who are feeling increasingly disenfranchised (Haddad, My 50 
Minutes with Manaf, 2012).     Furthermore Bashar’s new guard are less invested 
in their ancestral homes and their Allawite identity.   Their social reference groups 
have tended to be associates from within their immediate sphere in the military, 
academic or economic world rather than limited to sectarian networks (Bar S. , 
2006, pp. 382-385).   This disrupted the traditional patronage networks and 
corruption arrangements resulting in corruption going from organised to 
disordered and contributing to a situation where authority was ambiguous leading 
to ‘authority grabs’ (Bar S. , 2006, p. 392).    
From 2005 on the power base within the regime narrowed, and became 
increasingly concentrated in the hands of the Assad and Makhlouf families at the 
expense of other regime elites  (Tabler A. , How Long Can Syria Last?, 2005).  
This move to concentrate power more specifically within the Assad clan 
contributed to Allawite loyalty beginning to fray (Ismail, 2009). 
Faced with the global economic downturn and a domestic economic crisis, Bashar 
introduced limited economic reforms and was largely credited with improving 
Syria’s economic position.  However these reforms came at significant cost to the 
support base of the regime.  Typically the regime was supported by the periphery; 
peasants, blue colour workers, rural minority groups and civil servants, however 
lifting subsidies significantly increased the cost of living of these groups.     
Furthermore reforms threatened another regime pillar of the sectarian and military 
regime, the powerful merchants and factory owners who had relied on energy 
subsidies along with political cronyism to mitigate the effects of their own 
underinvestment and lack of economic competitiveness  (International Crisis 
Group, 2009, p. 7).  In contrast the alliance between the merchants and their 
religious leaders was strengthening.  Together with economic liberalisation this 
religious-mercantile connection was an early sign that the regime was developing 
fractures within its socio-political structure (Ismail, 2009).     A palpable sense of 
public discontent developed, with Al Hayat reporting protests against the reforms 
on 6 May 2006  (International Crisis Group, 2009, p. 7). 
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The economic reforms ultimately benefited big business that was heavily invested 
in the regime.  As such families with close ties or direct involvement with the 
regime such as the Assad, Makhlouf, Shalish, al Hassan, Najib, Hamsho, 
Hambouba, Shawkat and al As’sad families, reaped disproportionate rewards.    
The economy of the al Assad regime had moved from semi socialist to crony 
capitalism, with the visible wealth of regime sponsored big business families 
again highlighting the economic disparity between the wealthier Damascus and 
Aleppo cities and the rest of the state, in particular the rural areas (Haddad, The 
Syrian Revolution's Business Backbone, 2012).    
Furthermore despite the Assad regime’s social roots within the sectarian 
minorities and socio-economic classes on the periphery, under Bashar al Assad 
the children of the rich, known as the awlad al-sultah or ‘sons of power’, emerged 
as a visibly rich and privileged urban elite.   The developing gap between the state 
and the industrial bourgeoisie was also directly connected to the rise of the awlad 
al-sultah, with the awlad al sultah significantly involved in  flights of capital, 
illegal commandeering of state resources and usurious investments   (International 
Crisis Group, 2011, p. 14).  The visibility of privileges secured by the awlad al-
sultah began to drive a wedge between the regime and many of its pillars of 
support, including the Allawite sect.  The elite began to be described as the Assad-
Makhlouf mafia for their frequent use state authority to procure assets and 
advantages within the private sector  (Bar S. , 2006, p. 395).   
Tellingly, the corruption, whilst being internally cohesive, was externally 
disintegrative given its few benefactors  (Billon, 2003, p. 415).  The increasingly 
smaller number of benefactors was indicated by the widening wealth gap in Syria, 
by 2004 the poorest 20% of the population consumed 7% of all expenditure whilst 
the richest 20% consumed 45% (Haidar, 2010).    Increasingly it looked as if the 
‘President had abandoned the poor for the sake of the rich’ (Hinnebusch, 2012, p. 
102).   The nature of the regime’s sectarianism had changed towards a blatant and 
visible favouring of the wealthy, predominantly from within the Allawite sect but 
including a notable number of co-opted members of other sects. 
49 
 
Not only had the regime moved away from its earlier support base within the rural 
poor but the economic decline gripped the country and was particularly felt in 
many rural areas due to droughts.   Basic services declined and salaries stagnated 
whilst the cost of living increased largely due to the removal of subsidies.    The 
middle class also declined, with the predominant socio-economic categories being 
the wealthy few constituting the regime elite, those in the public sector who 
supplemented their often insufficient salaries through bribery, and the increasing 
number of poor (Hinnebusch, 2012).  There was a perceptible decrease in public 
deference to the regime as a consequence of the death of Hafez, economic 
hardship, elite corruption, talk of reforms, the ousting of the Syrian army from 
Lebanon, the US removal of the Iraqi Ba’ath regime and the UN investigation into 
the assassination of Hariri looking likely to implicate top Syrian regime officials  
(International Crisis Group, 2011).   As a journalist observed in 2010 ‘the country 
is about to explode’ (International Crisis Group, 2011, p. 16). 
 
Correspondingly the uprising broke out in 2011 causing the administration and 
governance arms of the regime to falter.  The psychological ‘wall of fear’, which 
is a huge factor in the regime’s maintenance of power and control over the Syrian 
population, is now significantly weakened  ( International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 
5).  Furthermore the pillars of the regime are narrowing as the economy weakens 
and state brutality alienates sections of their support (International Crisis Group, 
2011, p. 3).   
Although Syrian politics is dominated by an Allawite elite, its ability to rule over 
all of Syria was based on a form of confessional coalitionalism    (Bar S. , 2006, p. 
357) which is under serious strain due to the uprising.    However it becomes clear 
upon analysis that the regime has manipulated genuine and perhaps relevant 
minority sect fears regarding the Sunni majority, and citizens’ general fears of 
sectarian instability in the manner of Iraq and Lebanon, through the highlighting 
and exacerbating or downplaying of these fears according to internal calculations.   
 
The Assad regime’s primary preoccupation is self enrichment and empowerment 
facilitated by sectarian politics rather than the protection of minorities and 
stability for the sake of the nation.   The pillars of the regime were significantly 
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under stress prior to the uprising and this ignited into a protest movement given 
the opportunity afforded by the Arab Spring and hope of a similar outcome to the 
Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions. However with the regime’s determination to 
remain in power at all costs the stakes in Syria are high.   With the 2011 initiated 
uprising devolving into a civil war with high sectarian animosity it is not only the 
Assad elite’s wealth and position at stake but increasingly their survival as well.   
As such they will be prepared to go to any lengths in order to remain in power 
ultimately utilising sectarian mobilisation and narratives as justification for 
military attacks against the predominantly Sunni uprising. 
 
3.4   Conclusion:  The Allawite Ousting of Sunni Power 
The Allawite elite rose to power from within the lowest and poorest social group 
in Syria, largely through their high numbers within the state military due to 
limited alternative employment opportunities available to them.   This 
disproportionately high presence within the military was crucial in a state plagued 
by military coups since independence and where both the military and 
sectarianism were firmly entrenched in politics.    
 
With communalism a strong feature of Syrian society the Assad regime primarily 
used Allawite sectarian bonds to form political alliances whilst incorporating co-
opted Sunni and minority group members to create a regime structured as an 
Allawite dominated sectarian coalition.     Despite its claims around national unity 
and secularism the regime continues to rely heavily on sectarian divisiveness to 
maintain power. It has been arguably been necessary to do so within a social 
system in which the Sunni majority were and to extent still are hostile to Allawite 
leadership  due to prejudices against the Allawite sect.   
 
As such autocratic militarily backed power and control was the only way for the 
Allawite elite to raise their socio-economic position in a land hostile to their 
interests.  It is important to note however that the Assad regime supports the 
power and privileges of an Allawite dominated elite not the Allawite sect in its 
entirety, although there is a wide spread belief that Allawites are favoured over 
Sunni by the regime particularly within the military and security forces. 
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As Bashar al Assad’s Presidency progressed the divide between regime affiliated 
families and the rest of the population has become increasingly obvious with Syria 
transforming from a brand of socialism to corrupt crony capitalism.  The disparity 
has caused many Syrians, particularly the large youth population and rural areas 
hit by the global economic decline, to believe that the Assad regime had deserted 
its rural poor support base in favour of the rich and this contributed significantly 
to the outbreak of the uprising in early 2011.    The Arab Spring initiative for 
human rights and democracy has joined forces with economic dissatisfaction and 
Sunni historical feelings of entitlement and resentment to erupt into a popular 
uprising for the downfall of the regime which has devolved into civil war with an 
intensifying sectarian dynamic.  
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Chapter Four 
The Sunni Shia Divide 
 
4.1 Allawite alignment as Shia 
 
The characterisation of Muslims into the broader categories of Sunni and Shia has 
significant political and security implications for minority sects such as the 
Allawites, particularly given the strong emphasis on communal opposition to out-
groups within the region.   Effectively the nested communal groups to which 
minority groups belong extends from family through to sectarian group then 
finally through to where they sit relevant to the larger and more politically visible 
sectarian groups, Sunni and Shia. 
 
The Allawite faith emerged from the teachings of Mohammad ibn Nusayr and his 
follower Hussein ibn Hamdan al-Khasabi in the 9th and 10th centuries (Henegan, 
2011).   The faith believes that the first Allawites were stars to which virtuous 
Allawites revert back to after death whilst sinning Allawites become Jews, 
Muslims and Christians.  The faith has elements in common with other religions 
in the region, for example it shares the Shia Islam belief in the successive divine 
emanations of Ali.  In common with Ismailis  they admit only a select few into the 
core creed which includes a reverence of a holy trinity, reincarnation and a rite of 
drinking consecrated wine which echoes Christianity   (Faksh M. A., 1984, p. 
136).   In contrast to mainstream Muslims, Allawites read the Koran allegorically 
and tend to pray at home rather than in mosques    (Henegan, 2011).      
 
A main focus of the Allawite faith is the belief that Islam emphasises tolerance 
and acceptance of other religions including different Muslim sects, and that 
judging an individual’s religious faithfulness is reserved for God, thus the Allawi 
faith stands in stark contrast to radical Sunni beliefs which reject all out-groups 
and extremists assume the right to judge and punish others according to their own 
strict interpretation of Sharia law (Worren, 2007, p. 65). 
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The Allawites claim their religion is an offshoot of Shia Islam.  However, the 
Allawite religion has significant differences to Shi’ism, having broken away from 
the Shia branch of Islam over 1000 years ago. Whilst Allawites  share the Shia 
reverence of Prophet Muhammad’s cousin and son in law Ali from which the 
name Allawite is derived, in contrast to the Shia Allawites they believe that he is 
one of many materialisations of God along with Jesus, Adam, Mohammed, 
Socrates, Plato and a number of pre-Islamic sages from Persia.   As such the 
Allawite faith blends together Zoroastrian, Islam, Christianity, Gnostic and Neo-
Platonic thought, a blending of faiths that has lead orthodox Muslims to declare 
them to be heretics and apostates (Heneghan, 2011).   Historically the Shia 
considered the Allawites, along with the Druze, to be religious extremists and 
rejected their inclusion within Shi’ism (Talhamy, 2010, pp. 176-177). 
The Allawites historical isolation among mountains near the Mediterranean 
coastline, their unusual religious practices and the secretive clannish nature of 
their communities triggered suspicion among Sunni and to a lesser extent amongst 
Shia.   Animosity between Allawite and Sunni predates by centuries the current 
sectarian struggles within the 2011 initiated uprising  (Heneghan, 2011).    
Since the creation of the Syrian state the internal sectarian composition has caused 
concerns for the Allawites.  These concerns were strong enough to prompt an 
attempt to avoid inclusion in Syria by a group, which included Hafez al Assad’s 
father Ali Sulayman, who petitioned the French to include the Allawite region 
within Lebanon asserting that Allawites would never be accepted or secure within 
Syria.   An excerpt from the group’s statement read as follows ‘The Allawites 
refuse to be annexed to Muslim Syria because, in Syria, the official religion of the 
state is Islam, and according to Islam, the Allawites are considered infidels...’ 
(Landis, Islamic Education in Syria: Undoing Secularism, 2003, pp. 36-37).  
Historical persecution of the Allawites had created significant levels of sectarian 
insecurity. 
 
The persecution of Allawites was justified religiously through fatwas, with the 
most significant fatwas issued by Sunni Shaykh al –Islam Iaqi al-Din Taymiyya 
(died 1328) in the 14th century.  These fatwas are still referred to today, including 
by radical opponents of the Assad regime.  Ibn Taymiyya advocated for the return 
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of the Muslim faith to its origins, Salafiyya, and as such rejected the Shi’ite 
religion as heretical.   Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwas refer to the Allawites as ‘pretending 
to be Shia’ that ‘they are not Muslims, or Jews, Or Christians’ that ‘their warriors 
should be killed and their property confiscated’.  The Fatwas directly affected the 
Allawites (Nusayris) with one fatwa preceding a 1305 military attack within the 
religiously diverse Kisrawan region in Lebanon causing many Allawites  to be 
killed whilst survivors fled to the security of the ‘Nusayriyya Mountains’ in Syria 
(Talhamy, 2010, pp. 175,179-180).    
 
The massacre of up to 50,000 Allawites living near the Persian border occurred 
after a fatwa was announced by Sheikh al-Hanafi in 1516 which outlined an 
‘obligation to fight and kill’ Shia and Shia creeds and that ‘their women and 
children may be enslaved’.  This caused another exodus of Allawites to the 
‘Nusayriyya’ Mountains where since the 16th century Allawites have 
predominantly occupied remote villages in order to avoid Sunni prejudice 
(Talhamy, 2010, pp. 181-183). 
 
Sunni Sheikh Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Mugrabi issued a fatwa in the 1820s 
which declared that Allawite lives and property were at the disposal of Muslims.  
This fatwa preceded an attack on insurgent Allawite villages surrounding Latakia 
resulting in the deaths of up to forty men and the enslavement of a number of 
women, men and children.  This fatwa was also adopted by the Egyptians 1832-
1840 during an Allawite insurgency against Egyptian occupation of  Syria, 
although it was discredited by  the actions of the Egyptian General Selim Bay who 
when conscripting Syrian Muslims included the Allawites thus  inferring that 
Allawites were Muslim.  The Ottomans had also conscripted from Muslim sources 
and as such they required the Allawites to enlist in face of considerable Allawite 
resistance (Talhamy, 2010, pp. 183-184).    
 
After the 1920 French Mandate of Syria significant changes began for the status 
of Allawites. First of all they changed their name from Nussayriyya to Alawiyya 
which Allawites explain was their original name and that the label Nussayriyya 
had been given to them by their opponents.    In addition to this Allawite religious 
leaders began to stress that the Allawites were Muslim, declaring in 1926 that  
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‘Every Alawi is a Muslim . . . every Alawi who does not confess his Islamic faith 
or denies that the Quran is the word of God and that Muhammad is his Prophet is 
not Alawi . . . The Alawis are Shi’ite’ (Talhamy, 2010, p. 185).   The Middle East 
was and is a dangerous place to be a minority.  In a region where sectarian 
belonging has serious implications for security it is to be expected that the 
Allawites would seek to align their religion where it is politically expedient and 
safer to do so. 
 
In 1936 the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Muhammad Amin al-Husayni strengthened 
the Allawites claim to be Shia by issuing a fatwa which described Allawites as 
‘brothers in faith’.  This was a political move to ensure Muslim Arab unity and to 
reassure Allawites so as to facilitate the incorporation of their region into Syria 
following the end of the French mandate.  This is the first time that the Allawites 
were recognised as within Islam rather than as endangering Islam with their 
heretic beliefs.  Following this fatwa Allawite religious scholars left for Iraq to 
study at Iraqi religious schools and mosques were built in Allawite villages.  In 
1952 the Grand Mufti of Syria also accepted the Allawites as Shia and this was 
approved by the President of the Syrian Republic (Talhamy, 2010, pp. 185-187).   
Additionally as Allawites abandoned sectarian particularism they gained 
increasing acceptance from Sunni Arab nationalists promoting Arab unity 
(Kazimi, 2010, p. 23). 
  
In 1972 Ayatollah al-Shirazi, a Shi’ite cleric from a prominent Iraqi-Iranian 
religious family issued a statement which is taken as a fatwa declaring that ‘the 
Allawites are Shia’.   Al-Shirazi’s fatwa was seen by Allawites as proof that they 
have been formally included as part of the Shia community and as evidence of the 
rapprochement of the Shia religious establishment towards Allawites (Talhamy, 
2010), a rapprochement which intensified within Bashar al Assad’s Presidency 
through his alignment within the so described Shia crescent.    
Compared to many Middle Eastern states which are fragmented along sectarian 
lines, under the Assad regime the tension between the sects was comparatively 
quiet giving credence to the regime claim it has been able to maintain stability.  
However the sectarian tensions within the state are suppressed rather than solved 
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with an underlying animosity between the sects still apparent.  Region wide 
sectarian persecution was common and typically minority sects such as the 
Allawites, Druze and Shia have practised what the Shia describe as taqqiya or 
quietism i.e. hiding your religious beliefs in order to avoid persecution, usually 
from radical Sunni (Talhamy, 2010, pp. 188-189). 
In view of regional and domestic prejudices Hafez al Assad sought to strengthen 
the impression that Allawites were Muslim by publically demonstrating his 
observance of traditional Islamic rituals.  To placate the Sunni majority, he also 
supported the building of Sunni style mosques for Allawite worship and 
minimised references to the Allawite religion within the media    (Bar S. , 2006, p. 
394).     
However these more recent fatwas did little to lessen the perception by many 
Sunni, particularly within the Muslim Brotherhood, that Allawites were heretics.  
This resentment rose once the Assad elite came into power.  Sunni were adamant, 
urged by the Brotherhood, that the new 1973 constitution include that the 
President must be Muslim.    Yet many Sunni felt that an Allawite President did 
not fulfil this requirement leading to the Allawite community seeking another 
fatwa with regards to their religious status through Musa al Sadr, one of the 
founding members of the Amal movement which sought to mobilise Shia 
politically.  He identified that ‘the Allawites and the Shia are partners in distress, 
since they are persecuted like the Shia’ and called the Allawites ‘brothers of the 
Shia’ (Talhamy, 2010, pp. 189-190).    Despite these moves to promote the 
acceptance of Allawites under the umbrella of the Shia Muslim religion, the 
Assad regime’s violence within the 2011 initiated uprising has strengthened 
sectarianism with various  FSA battalions reacting by naming their units after Ibn 
Taymiyya and thereby recalling his earlier fatwas to exterminate Allawites  (Dick, 
2012).    
It becomes clear whilst looking over the fatwas outlining the status of the Allawite 
religion within the Muslim world that the primary motivation for making a 
declaration as to the religious  category to which the Allawite religion belongs has 
been to either religiously sanction Sunni persecution of Allawites or  to avoid it.   
Although the Allawite religion is fairly unique, and appears to draw from a 
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number of theological sources, the orthodox religion that it has been most 
associated with is Islam, so it is reasonable although politically expedient for the 
Allawites to claim to be Shia.   Fatwas formalising the Allawites as Shia have not 
only provided the previously isolated and persecuted sect with security within the 
safety of a larger religious community, which has contributed to the Assad regime 
receiving support during the uprising from both Shia Iran and Hezbollah, but it 
has also strengthened Syria regionally through the political unity within the Shia 
Crescent and within that Syria’s alignment with the Shia theocracy in Iran. 
 
4.2 Syria and the Shi’ite Crescent 
 
In 2006-2007 the Jordanian King Abdullah II warned of the Shia crescent, which 
he described as an alliance of Shia centred on Iranian leadership and sponsorship, 
observing that this alliance represented a threat to Sunni political and religious 
authority within the region.   Primarily constituting Iran, Syria and Hezbollah, this 
Shia alliance    identifies itself as the axis of resistance to the ‘evil’ of the US 
supported Zionist occupiers in Israel and to proclaimed US imperialism in the 
Middle East (Abdo, The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth 
of the Shi‘a-Sunni Divide, 2013, p. 4).   
 
The Ethnic Communal Mobilizational Model outlines how the political 
mobilisation of domestic communal groups is facilitated by the supply of 
resources and support from transnational religious or ethnic networks (Sahliyeh, 
2001, p. 5).  As such the political culture of the region with its strong communal 
allegiances means that internal politics is overlaid with transnational politics 
conducted through sectarian bonds.   This gives Middle Eastern states the ability 
to interfere in each other’s affairs through religious and tribal networks and 
further points to the impact sectarianism has on Syrian politics.  
 
As Barbara Walters outlines security explanations for ethno-sectarian conflict 
extends to the impact of changing dynamics within the regional political 
environment (Wolff, 2009, pp. 27-28), consequently both the emergence of the 
Shia crescent  and the resurgence of Sunni power within the Arab Spring have 
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heightened the contest for power between Sunni and Shia increasing sectarian 
tensions across the region and within Syria (Gavlak, 2013). (Abdo, The New 
Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi‘a-Sunni Divide, 
2013, p. 1). 
 
The split into Sunni and Shia Islam began over 1400 years ago and centred on a 
disagreement regarding succession following the death of Prophet Muhammad.   
Shia make up 10-15% of the Muslim world and the Shia identity is centred on a 
narrative of marginalisation, resistance and martyrdom which has a basis in reality 
given Shia’s historical marginalisaton and current prejudices revealed within an 
2012 Pew Forum survey which discovered that at least 40% of Sunni in Arab 
states reject the notion that Shia are true Muslims (Abdo, The New Sectarianism: 
The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi‘a-Sunni Divide, 2013, p. 6). 
 
 The Middle East has been largely ruled by Sunni autocracies with the exception 
of Iran where the 1979 revolution introduced a Shi’ite theocracy lead by 
Ayatollah Khomeini.  The Iranian revolution was a significant turning point for 
the region’s Shia.  With a Shia theocracy in power, Iran emerged as a state 
prepared to support the development of Shia politicisation and empowerment 
across the region (Nasr, 2004, p. 9).    
 
Despite being Persian rather than Arab, Iran had goals of extending its influence 
beyond its own borders and developed close ties with Arab Shi’ites for this 
purpose.   It has particularly close ties with Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon and 
considerable influence with the Shi’ite dominated democracy in Iraq.  Although 
Syria, Iran and Hezbollah seek to mobilise the region’s Shia to expand their own 
power and influence, in general Shia are bigger than Iranian ambitions and local 
agendas remain prominent in their calculations (Susser, 2003, p. 6).   
 
The tension between Sunni and Shia has intensified as a result of the Arab Spring.   
Protests in the Gulf states in which Shia are significantly involved have been 
particularly harshly suppressed as they represent a threat to Sunni power and 
status.  For instance Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states deployed Gulf Alliance 
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troops in Bahrain to help the Sunni royal family quell the predominantly Shia 
Bahraini protests (Chulov, 2011).    
Additionally sectarian violence has increased dramatically in Iraq following the 
departure of the US military and again following the outbreak of the Syrian 
uprising in 2011.  The removal of Saddam Hussein stripped the Sunni elite from 
power.   Furthermore democracy introduced Shia political dominance with Shia 
making up 90% of the senior officials in the Interior and Defence Ministries 
(Cockburn, 2011).   Sunni protesters in 2012-13 claimed that the government is 
sectarian and impinges on Sunni rights, however this is disputed by the Iraqi 
Prime Minister Maliki who counter claims the current unrest has been mobilised 
through transnational sectarian connections, in particular from within Sunni 
Turkey and the Sunni dominated FSA within Syria  (Al Jazeera, 2012).  
Saudi Arabia is widely perceived to be the leading Sunni power and together with 
its allies within the Gulf their wariness of Shia is at an all time high with the threat 
of nuclear weapons development in Iran, the primarily Shia uprising in Bahrain, 
Shia support of the Syrian regime and their own restless Shia populations.  The 
region wide protests and revolutions against autocratic rule make a tense backdrop 
to the persistent tensions between Sunni and Shia.   The Gulf States are very 
nervous of the region’s Shia seeking to challenge Sunni regional dominance and 
this explains Saudi Arabia’s support of the predominantly Sunni lead uprising in 
Syria (Heydemann, 2012).   
Although Shia leaders such as the Iranian ex-President Ahmadinejad have 
attempted to frame the Arab Spring as an Arab street mobilisation to remove 
autocratic regimes in favour of Islamic theocracies, it is evident that the current 
unrest is best described as grass roots movements against autocratic leaders who 
enrich themselves whilst ruling via corruption and violent repression.  The 
region’s ruling families tend to treat state’s resources as their own and their 
leadership is based around procuring elite privileges, riches and power at the 
expense of their citizens (Yacoubian, 2011).    
Despite Bashar al Assad’s confidence that Syria was insulated against the Arab 
Spring, protests erupted in early 2011.    Iranian enthusiasm for the Arab Spring 
died down in face of the Syrian uprising (Gwertzmann, 2011).  Social Movement 
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and Ethnic Conflict Theory both confirm that political mobilisation  is more likely 
when there is a perception of a political opening and an opportunity to mobilise 
(Wolff, 2009, pp. 30-31) (Jackson J. W., 2006, p. v & 4).  As such the successful 
revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya created the perception that the time was 
right to overthrow the Assad regime.   
Regionally Sunni and Shia are siding with their sectarian counterparts in Syria.  
Support from Sunni regimes such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia for the Syrian 
uprising contrasts with the presence of Hezbollah fighters and Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards on the side of the Assad regime and this is heightening 
perceptions that this is a sectarian contest between Sunni and Shia thus escalating 
sectarian tensions across the region (Blog, 2012).  Moreover the regime coalition 
was openly reinforced in mid-2013 by Hezbollah forces within selected 
engagements such as the battle for Qusayr (Pollack K. M., 2013, p. 7) which may 
have significant regional implications should the regime fall as the fight could 
follow Hezbollah back to Lebanon (Riedel, 2013). 
The Sunni regimes support of the opposition has enabled Bashar al Assad and 
Iranian officials to attempt to frame the conflict as the work of outside forces 
seeking to weaken the Shia axis of resistance.   Correspondingly Syria took 
advantage of high anti-US sentiment following global Muslim protests against the 
US  made anti-Muslim amateur film ‘the  Innocence of Muslims’, to claim that 
the Syrian uprising is not part of the  Arab Spring protests but is  instead as a 
US/foreign instigated conflict aimed at the whole axis of resistance (Al Arabiya 
News , 2012).   
 
Iran remains very concerned about the internal challenges to the Assad regime.  
Syria supports Iranian ambitions by forming part of the supply chain to its key 
proxy in the region, Hezbollah (Kreps, 2010, p. 8).  If the Assad regime was to 
fall it is likely that any new democratic political system in Syria would be 
characterised by sectarian parties.  Given Sunni represent approximately 60% of 
the population, free elections would most likely result in a Sunni dominated 
government opposed religiously and politically to Iranian and Shia aspirations.       
Any subsequent withdrawal of Syria from the axis of resistance would greatly 
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impact on Iran’s patronage of Hezbollah, and would represent a serious blow to 
Iran’s regional ambitions.    
Alongside Iran and Syria, Hezbollah’s President Nasrallah has also attempted to 
frame the Syrian uprising as a conspiracy against Syria and Shia.  In line with Ted 
Gurr’s Ethnic Communal Mobilization Theory Hezbollah’s narrative draws 
heavily from Shia historical memories and religious traditions (Sahliyeh, 2001, p. 
5) with claims that the downfall of the Assad regime will be theologically 
damaging to Shia.  Hezbollah has related the Syrian uprising to the Shia mystical 
text al Jahr, with some clerics claiming that the downfall of the Assad regime will 
precipitate the premature arrival of the (occulted Imam) Mehdi  (Rowel, 2012).   
In keeping with Ethnic Conflict Theory this is an example of an elite using an 
ethno-sectarian myth symbol complex in order to muster support for political aims 
through the central assumption that ‘people make political choices based on 
emotion and in response to symbols’ (Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic 
Politics of Ethnic War, 2001, p. 29).   
The Syrian crisis is having a significant impact on the political calculations of 
sectarian groups within Lebanon.   Hezbollah’s dominance of Lebanese politics is 
under threat given that the Syrian regime’s continued rule is insecure and the loss 
of the regime will deprive Hezbollah of Syrian support and alter its supply path 
from Iran.  Furthermore Hezbollah’s support of the regime has damaged its 
previously high standing on the Arab Street.  Hezbollah is struggling to stay 
relevant as its narrative positioning itself as the vanguard of the people and a 
resistance force has been undermined by its rejection of the aspirations of the 
grass roots Syrian protest movement  (International Crisis Group, 2011).  
Additionally it is likely that openly backing the Assad regime from May 2013 is a 
risk for Nasrallah as it puts pressure on his Shi’ite support base who may require 
some convincing to send their sons into battle in Syria (Al Monitor, 2012). 
 
Like Iran Hezbollah are concerned that any new Syrian government is likely to be 
Sunni dominated which would cause the abandonment of the Shia crescent 
alignment within Syria’s foreign policy.  This could result in a reversal of the 
current Lebanese sectarian politics whereby Shia affiliate with Syria, alternatively 
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it could be Lebanese Sunni aligning with Syria for support against their Christian 
and Shi’ite political adversaries (Shawaf, 2012).  For the Lebanese the situation in 
Syria is a very divisive issue.  Tension between Hezbollah and their Lebanese 
political adversaries was already high, particularly following the assassination of 
Hariri, and the situation in Syria has added to this tension (Ali, 2011). 
Western interests within the Middle Eastern region are complicated and 
threatened by the hardening Shia and Sunni divide.  The tension between the US 
and Iran over Iran’s nuclear ambitions and retaliatory threats regarding the Straits 
of Hormuz also intensifies the significance of Syria’s revolution.   The US and the 
Sunni regimes want to see a decrease in Iran’s influence and its  nuclear ambitions 
stymied, consequently they are prepared to support the uprising whilst remaining 
wary of the Islamic extremists within the opposition movement.   The risk of Iran 
– or other Islamic radicals - having nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
is summed up by Bernard Lewis who states that Mullahs ‘are religious fanatics 
with an apocalyptic mind-set.  In Islam, as in Christianity and Judaism, there is an 
end-of-times scenario – and they think it’s beginning or already begun’. Thus 
unlike the dynamic within the earlier West-USSR Cold War ‘mutually assured 
destruction is not a deterrent – it’s an inducement’ (Lewis B. , The Trannies are 
Doomed, 2011). 
The Sunni Shia divide has the potential to emerge as the most prominent conflict 
and narrative in the Middle East supplanting the Muslims against the West and/or 
Israel contest.  The region wide contention has led to a climate of insecurity and 
uncertainty and the recent weakening of autocratic power has increased the 
salience of pre-existing communal bonds and led to increased attention being paid 
to identity politics.   During a recent interview with Geneive Abdo a Lebanese 
religious scholar stated that ‘when states are weak sectarianism rises…and the 
more reliosity in a society the more the state is weak’.  Yet this contemporary 
sectarianism is not a return to traditional communalism rather it is a contest to 
seize power mobilised through sectarian bonds and arguments in the face of 
declining autocratic power   (Abdo, The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings 
and the Rebirth of the Shi‘a-Sunni Divide, 2013, pp. 2-5).    
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However the current wave of anti-Shi’ite sectarian violence across the region is 
unprecedented in modern Islamic history and such extreme sectarianism has not 
been seen since the Saudi and Wahhabi sacking of Najaf and Karbala in 1806 
(Riedel, 2013).  This surge in sectarianism does not suggest that autocratic 
repression suppresses inevitable sectarianism rather that sectarianism rises during 
insecurity in this case resulting from political uncertainly and decreasing law and 
order (Abdo, The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the 
Shi‘a-Sunni Divide, 2013).   To the detriment of Middle Eastern stability this 
decreasing law and order has led to a resurgence of al Qaeda’s deceased leader 
Zarqawi’s violent crusade against ‘heretic’ Shi’ites (Riedel, 2013). 
Additionally Gurr’s Ethnic Communal Mobilizational Model outlines how the 
absence of democracy predisposes marginalised groups towards political 
mobilisation.  Further to this Gurr explains that transnational communal networks 
support political mobilisation in that they provide resources such as ideology, 
materials, leadership and a forum for the media distribution of grievances    
(Sahliyeh, 2001, p. 5).  The transnational Sunni and Shia networks have facilitated 
both mobilisation within the Arab Spring and the counter revolutionary measures 
in response.    
Sectarian communities that exist on both sides of porous borders, long term 
disagreements with neighbouring states and disputed territories are all factors that 
increase the risk of the violence spreading beyond a state’s borders (Wolff, 2009, 
p. 7 & 31).  With rising Iraqi sectarian violence, Syrian regime attacks crossing 
the Turkish and Lebanese borders, conflict between Sunni and Allawite 
neighbourhoods in Tripoli, high Shia numbers in protests against Sunni 
autocracies, and the Syrian conflict progressing towards a Allawite/Shia versus 
Sunni confrontation, fears of the regional sectarian dynamic transforming into a 
darker fear of an outright regional war between Sunni and Shia are intensifying 
(Pollack, 2012).   
A transnational sectarian conflict would be difficult to resolve not least because  it 
would transcend state boundaries making UN resolutions and solutions which are 
based on the Westphalian state system difficult to implement, thus leaving the 
international community at a loss at how to approach a conflict that exists outside 
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of the state systems and  therefore outside of state solutions.  Plus Middle Eastern 
political narratives and conspiracy theories that portray the West, and by 
extension the UN, as a Christian threat out to exploit and control the Islamic 
world greatly complicates Western intervention in the region.   As such a 
transnational sectarian conflict would be a real and probably severe test of the 
UN’s ability to address the problems of globalisation and transnationalism, in this 
instance violence spilling over state boundaries largely through the politicisation 
of transnational religions.  Furthermore the eruption of the Syrian uprising against 
a backdrop of rising regional sectarian tensions is increasing sectarian fears and 
suspicions within Syria.  
With regional political positions polarising along sectarian lines there is an ever 
increasing danger that the Syrian protesters demands will become obscured 
behind the broader political contest between Sunni and Shia governments across 
the region.   As rebels continued to battle government forces in Damascus, Aleppo 
and Hama in August 2012 Saeed Jalili, a senior aid to Ayatollah Ali Khameini 
attempted to further Iran’s interests by stating that Syria’s crisis ‘wasn’t an 
internal issue’ instead describing the internal uprising as ‘a conflict between the 
axis of resistance on one hand and the regional and global enemies of this axis on 
the other’  (Al Jazeera, 2012). The uprising that began as a protest movement 
against Syria’s repressive dynastic dictatorship is at serious risk of degenerating 
into a proxy conflict between regional sectarian groups (Kinninmont, 2012) 
possibly presenting as a straight contest between an Allawite-Shi’ite–Iran-
Hezbollah Western mini-state versus a Sunni-al Qaeda-Saudi-Qatari Eastern mini-
state (Riedel, 2013) with the social movement for change breaking down into 
small brigades and joined by tribal militias fighting to protect their local 
communities from both sides.     
4.3  Radical Islam and Regional Sectarianism 
 
The sectarian politics between Sunni and Shia are further complicated by the 
intensifying divisions within Sunni Islam.  The recent spread of Sunni Salafists, 
extremist Sunni militias and the initial emergence of governments dominated by 
Islamic parties in Egypt and Tunisia had on the surface strengthened Sunni 
hegemony.   However with Sunni extremism seeking to expand its power and 
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hijack the democratic outcomes within Egypt and Tunisia and the persistent 
existence of Islamic militia threatening the Libyan security,   there is a growing 
backlash from civilians against the transparent use and reinterpretation of Islam in 
order achieve power and impose sectarian dominance.    
Since the beginning of the 20th century Islam’s religious and political authority 
has been under threat within Syria and the Middle East.  In Syria the introduction 
of the ‘revolutionary’ and secular Ba’ath regime disrupted the historical links 
between religious and political leadership and advanced a rhetoric that in theory  
departed from opposition towards out-groups and advocated for Arab unity (Bar, 
2012, p. 1 & 3).  
Given the traditions of religions authority Middle Eastern regimes understood the 
necessity of bringing the religious networks into their patronage systems and 
called on clerics to publicly indicate their support.   However as Middle Eastern 
regimes are out of step with their citizens, extending support to the regimes 
caused a decline in the stature of the traditional religious establishments.   The 
resulting vacuum of credible religious leadership has been predominantly filled by 
an increasing number of clerics operating outside of the traditional religious 
sphere (Bar, 2012, p. 4).       
 
These clerics tend to be radical and virulently anti-Western.  Their ability to evoke 
religious narratives that resonate with the mainstream has given Islamic radicals 
the opportunity to promote themselves as the vanguard of Islamic aspirations 
(Bar, 2012, p. 2).     The breakdown of traditional social, religious and political 
structures within states such as Syria combined with large youth populations with 
limited economic horizons, has led to an increasing number of youth seeking 
validation within radical Islam (Bar D. S., A Toolbox for Countering Extremist 
Religious Doctrines, 2012, p. 5).   Additionally the disruption of secular and 
liberal civil society by regimes like the Assad’s has provided Islamic groups with 
the opportunity to fill this additional vacuum between the populace and the regime 
(Bar, 2012, p. 5).   
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Radical Islam has a long sense of history with a keen memory for the Christian 
crusades paving the way for Western colonialism, and as such radical Islam seeks 
honour through protecting the Middle East from the invasion of Western values 
and ideals into Islamic territory.    The prevalence of Western culture and values 
on the internet and increasingly across media channels is seen as challenging the 
fundamental values of Islamic society making resistance to the West an important 
rallying cry for radical Islamists (Bar D. S., A Toolbox for Countering Extremist 
Religious Doctrines, 2012, p. 5) 
 
Many Middle Eastern regimes, including Syria, lack genuine legitimacy and as 
such their rule is secured predominantly through fear and the manipulation of 
sectarian insecurities.   However in the same way that the violent security 
apparatus of autocratic states attracts membership from the violent and anti-social, 
terrorism does the same, resulting in both sides of the political game becoming 
increasingly violent and coercive (Bar, 2012, p. 6). This contributes to the danger 
of sectarian conflict in line with Posen’s observation that when violent extremists 
of one group begin to terrorise rival groups there is an increased risk that ethno-
sectarian groups will pursue violence as a whole (Wolff, 2009, p. 27).    
 
Traditionally the ultimate Islamic leader is characterised as combining the traits of 
a warrior and an Islamic scholar (Bar, Islamic Leader Paradigms, 2012, p. 6).   
This again intensifies the likelihood of ethno-sectarian conflict with Kaufman 
identifying that a group that both admires warrior characteristics  and incorporates 
them within the group’s identity has an increased likelihood of engaging in out-
group violence as this cultural construct provides a framework for the military 
mobilisation of ethno-sectarian groups by opportunistic elites (Kaufman, Modern 
Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War, 2001, p. 30).    This has important 
implications for the Sunni Muslim driven uprising in Syria. 
 
The regional unrest has helped fuel a resurgence in fundamentalist Salafism and 
its purist approach to Islam.  This rise has contributed to anti-Shia sentiment given 
the Salafi rejection of Shia.  Political Salafi have been portraying the Allawi-Shia-
Iran axis as the greatest threat to Sunni and promoting themselves as the 
resistance to this Shia threat.  Furthermore the brutality of the Assad regime 
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against predominantly Sunni protesters in Syria has been used by Salafi political 
clerics to mobilise Sunni behind Sunni political ascendency.   As such, the 
intersect between the Arab Spring and the rise in Salafi politics has acerbated the 
intensity of the Sunni Shia divide (Abdo, The New Sectarianism: The Arab 
Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi‘a-Sunni Divide, 2013, pp. 4, 6, 7 & 42).    
Furthermore with ‘a legacy of textual incitement to Jihad’ specifically against the 
Allawites by the most important source of inspiration for political Jihadi, Ibn 
Tayymiyya, combined with the symbolic and strategic importance of Syria to 
Sunni Islam, Syria’s civil war is a natural front for the Salafi Jihadists (Kazimi, 
2010, pp. 8-9). 
 
It is important to examine the characteristics of religious fundamentalists in order 
to understand the nature and threat of the Jihadi Salafi movement.  Research has 
shown that religious fundamentalism is related to prejudice and discrimination, 
displaying a combination of religion’s in–group cohesion and loyalty, with 
authoritarianism’s trait of out-group extreme prejudice (Saroglou, 2011, pp. 1-7).    
 
The religious fundamentalist mindset is vehemently opposed to anyone who 
challenges their world view or values.  Their beliefs reinforce the power of the 
traditionally dominant usually meaning there is significant prejudice against 
women, gays and other ethnic or religious groups  (Saroglou, 2011, pp. 6-7).      
Religious fundamentalists often frame their own personal power and the 
prioritising their own needs as ordained by God/Allah.   As such other’s freedom 
and self determination is interpreted not just as a challenge to their own personal 
power but also as a challenge to the dictates of God and history.   From here it is 
easy to understand how  they are prepared to kill, oppress and physically harm 
others to ensure the dominance of their own beliefs as these beliefs are the 
foundation of their personal power and justify their entitlement relative to select 
others  
Radically religious people tend to be highly sectarian and ethnocentric holding a 
belief in a just world which paradoxically is often associated with justifying and 
legitimising the suffering of out-groups. The in-group loyalty of religious 
fundamentalists has been proposed as an explanation for contemporary religious 
terrorism (Saroglou, 2011, p. 22). In addition religious fundamentalists display a 
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high degree of submissiveness towards in-group authority figures with the result 
that they are potentially highly malleable to inflammatory rhetoric from 
manipulative elites (Saroglou, 2011, p. 23).    These traits are shared with non- 
religious authoritarians and as such religious fundamentalism is better understood 
as religious authoritarianism (Saroglou, 2011, pp. 6-7).     
    
Islamic extremists reject the idea of religious tolerance as this would undermine 
their goal of religious dominance which is based upon the rejection of any outside 
faiths including other Muslim sects.  They are often murderously vehement in 
their protection of Islam’s reputation.    Evidence of this is seen within reactions 
to the killing of the US diplomat to Libya during protests against the US made 
anti-Islamic film entitled the ‘Innocence of Muslims’  and by association against 
the US.   Sheikh Mohammed Zahawi, the leader of the Islamic group Ansar al 
Sharia which was accused of being behind the attack on the US diplomatic 
compound was recorded as stating that ‘he did not understand why so many tears 
were being shed over the death of a diplomat when the ‘real crime’ was the insult 
to Muslims within the film, ‘Innocence of Muslims’ (Davies, 2012).    Islamic 
fundamentalism is often characterised as in confrontation with globalisation i.e. 
‘Jihad versus McWorld’ (The Wiley-Blackwell Enclopedia of Globalization, 
2012, p. 1770).    
 
There is a growing divide within Islam between moderates and 
extremists/religious authoritarians.   This struggle between moderate and radical 
Islam is proving challenging for the new governments in Libya, Egypt and 
Tunisia.   The Libyan protests against the ‘Innocence of Muslims’ and the 
coinciding attack on the US diplomatic compound were followed by contradictory 
protests which ousted Islamic militant groups from their headquarters illustrating 
the extent of the divide (Davies, 2012).  There has been a backlash to the rise of 
political Sunnism which has been particularly evident within Egypt where when 
President Morsi sought to increase his Presidential powers protests erupted 
ultimately resulting in his removal. 
 
Furthermore just as government violence represses criticism, the aggressive 
rejection of religious pluralism and violent reactions when religious traditions are 
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challenged from religious extremists serves to limit analysis of Islam within both 
the general population and amongst Islamists.  However the state of flux caused 
by the Arab Spring has created an opening for criticism not just of Middle Eastern 
regimes but also of the opportunistic use of Islam.  An example was reported by 
the BBC in reference to Syrian refugees in Libya.   Syrian refugee Ahmed Atrash  
claimed that wealthy Libyan businessmen were approaching hungry and poor 
Syrian refugee families and offering money for marriage to their, at times 
underage, daughters.    Ahmed Atrash took the unusual step of making a public 
criticism of religion practices in defence of women by saying ‘Syrian women 
escaped from rapes by [President] Bashar al-Assad's thugs to face rapes in the 
name of religion.’  He also disputed Libyan Sheikh Ashraf Al-Aqrabi, the Imam 
of the Garyounis Mosque’s defence of the practise as a ‘religious duty’ to protect 
Syrian female refugees from turning to prostitution in desperation as incorrect, 
declaring instead  that ‘This is modern-day slavery, using the word marriage is 
just a euphemism’ (Maher, 2012). 
 
The Arab Spring has altered the Middle Eastern political landscape and the 
outcome of the social movement for democracy and freedom underway in Syria 
will have further repercussions.  Religion plays a central role in the Middle East 
and was reflected in the election of Islamic parties in Egypt and Tunisia, and the 
emerging Islamification of the Syrian uprising.  However upon analysis of 
religious authoritarianism, and as seen in Egypt under the now ousted President 
Morsi, it is clear that Islamic extremists share many traits with the region’s 
authoritarian rulers making them more likely to attempt to impose sectarian based 
autocratic rule and repression under the justification of religion than to encourage 
the emergence of tolerance, freedom and democracy.   
 
This realisation is spreading across the Middle East. In Syria the Al Qaeda brigade 
the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant has imposed its rule in the only provincial 
city no longer in regime hands as at August 2013, Al Raqqa.  However their 
attempts to create an Islamic emirate are largely unwelcome with unarmed 
protesters taking to the streets yet again to chant ‘Islamic State leave our area’ and 
to express opposition to the brigade’s human rights abuses and authoritarian 
governance.  Syrian activist Khaled Sajjar observed that the people of al Raqqa 
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are resisting the imposition of local Islamic rule as they ‘see the continuation of 
the government operation but only with a different face’ (Khodr, Syrians protest 
against al Raqqa's New Rulers, 2013). 
 
4.4   The Sunni Shia Divide:  Conclusion 
 
The Syrian crisis intersects with the sectarian conflicts and tense rivalries across 
the region including the contest between the Shia axis of resistance and the Sunni 
regimes for prominence in the region.    Due to transnational sectarian politics and 
cross border tribal ties throughout the Middle East, repercussions from conflicts 
readily cascade from one state to its neighbour making surrounding states 
vulnerable to their neighbours crisis’s or as former Syrian dictator Adib 
Shishakli’s stated ‘when Syria’s adversaries in Lebanon sneeze Damascus gets 
pneumonia’   (Olmert, 2011).    
 
The Arab Spring uprisings and any subsequent introductions of democracy are 
likely to, in the short term at least, create instability whilst new political contracts 
are negotiated and a new power balance between the different ethno-sectarian 
groups is established.   As such there has been a rise in sectarianism in response to 
this insecurity (Grenier, 2011) resulting in the intensification of the Sunni Shia 
divide  (Abdo, 2013).   This supports Barry Posen’s observation that the anarchy 
that follows regime change is similar to the anarchy of the international political 
system.  This state of anarchy increases ethno-sectarian groups’ perceptions of 
insecurity resulting in a greater likelihood of inter-group conflict (Wolff, 2009, 
pp. 26-27).    
Sectarianism has also been exacerbated by the theological debates over the role 
and nature of Islam sweeping the region.   Syria has become a focal point for 
radical Islam in the struggle between secular and religious governance, and 
between moderate and radical Islam.    At this stage the increased Islamic 
presence that initially followed the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia potentially 
contradicts the aims of the social movement in Syria for freedom, human rights 
and democracy creating concerns about post Assad governance amongst many 
Syrian civilians.  There is a growing understanding that Islamic radicals are 
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authoritarian in nature with significant religious out-group prejudices and are 
likely to work towards political domination should they come into power.   
With the Shia seeking to retain leadership in Syria and the Sunni seeking to re-
establish their historical dominance or at least achieve a Sunni dominated 
democracy, the Syrian sectarian unrest within the uprising mirrors the regional 
contest between transnational Sunni and Shia interests resulting in it serving as a 
proxy war.    Furthermore radical groups have come to the realisation that the 
uprising signals that the old order is vulnerable, and as such now is the time to 
make their move, concurrently the secular democratic movement has come to the 
same conclusion.   
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Chapter Five 
From Protest Movement to Armed Rebellion:  Ethno-Sectarian 
Dynamics within the Uprising 
 
5.1 The Syrian Uprising:  Sunni Ambition or Social Movement? 
 
The Arab Spring has been generated in part by seismic global events such as the 
increased availability of social media and the economic downturn.  This has 
resulted in a political environment marked with changes and instability  (Kyrou, 
2011).    These events occurring against a backdrop of globally rising religious 
tensions (Danin R. M., Religious Restrictions and Violence Growing Globally led 
by the Middle East, 2012) has led to a very fraught situation in the Middle East 
where competing political agendas, with an ethno-sectarian bias, are in a state of 
flux.   Whilst there is a significant level of ethno-sectarian tensions within the 
resultant Arab Spring, the protests at least initially represent social movements 
against autocratic, incompetent and corrupt rule. 
 
This drive for political change can be significantly attributed to the rise in poverty 
(Svadkovsky, 2012).    Due to economic hardship there is significant periphery 
resentment fuelling the Syrian uprising.   Another driving force behind the Arab 
Awakening is the youth population bulge with an unprecedented 60% of the 
region’s population under the age of 25 years  (Wilkins, 2011).  With phenomenal 
growth in secondary and university education, a 50% rise in urbanisation, the 
introduction of communications technology and exposure to international media 
youth expectations are high.  However the corrupt, autocratic and stagnant 
regimes are failing to meet these expectations instead political repression, the low 
standard of living experienced by many and the global economic downturn has 
resulted in high youth unemployment and corresponding frustration  (Shaikh, 
2011).     
 
This combination of highly educated, technologically savvy and underemployed 
youth with repressive and stagnant political systems is proving to be a 
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combustible mix (Stimson Center, 2011, pp. 36, 45, 71).   The emerging 
generation’s desire for change is strengthened by being shared throughout the 
Middle East across sectarian lines leading to a grassroots resistance to autocratic 
rule (Stimson Center, 2011, p. 49 & 97).   The Middle Eastern social movements 
represent a drive to end to corruption, cronyism and repression, plus a desire for 
freedom, human rights and democracy.     
 
The Syrian uprising has many features of a popular social movement.  Resource 
Mobilisation Theory outlines how empowerment starts with frustration and the 
meeting of a minimum level of resources to facilitate collective opposition.  
Additionally mobilisation must be sufficient to overcome apathy in face of long 
term powerlessness (Sadan, 2004, pp. 150-151).     In the case of the Middle East, 
in particular Syria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, intense and rising discontent against 
widespread corruption and repression had grown to the extent that it overpowered 
fear of opposing the regimes with a Syrian opposition member stating ‘People 
reached the point at which they preferred death to humiliation.  The only thing the 
regime can do is kill us’ (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 5).    It is very 
difficult for autocratic regimes to rein in civilian demands once psychological 
barriers, such as sufficient fear, have broken down (Sadan, 2004, pp. 156-157). 
 
Additionally Political Process Theory’s explanation for social movements stresses 
the importance of political opportunity and timing particularly relating to rising 
expectations of success (Opp, 2009, pp. 161-165).  As such the speed in which 
popular protest overcame both the Egyptian and Tunisian regimes contributed 
significantly towards motivating Syrian activists.   
 
Social Movement Theory identifies that self representation in order to challenge 
regime narratives contributes to social movement mobilisation.  As such 
communications technology has given Middle Eastern protesters a means to 
communicate their grievances and challenge the regime’s use of state media to 
broadcast narratives criticising the protesters’ aims and actions.  In this way 
activists are able to create and broadcast an identity for the uprising to challenge 
the one imposed on them by the regime (Sadan, 2004, p. 124).  
 
74 
 
Furthermore a key source of motivation and recruitment within the Egyptian 
revolution, replicated strongly in Syria, was the use of social media sites such as 
the Egyptian Facebook page ‘I am Khalid Said’ to highlight regime abuses, a 
move which strengthened solidarity through a  sense of shared injustice.  Social 
media also helped to remove barriers to participation revealing the full extent that 
the average Egyptian citizen opposed the regime (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 
28).  Through increased communication citizens begin to see their repression is a 
source of connection leading to collective activity (Sadan, 2004, p. 222).   
 
The Syrian revolution is part of a new era of social revolutions where 
international and national audiences, both individuals and governments, are 
sought via the internet giving under resourced grass roots social movements a 
powerful means of opposing autocracy  (Kyrou, 2011).   Additionally social 
media has provided an avenue for recruiting participants, identifying grievances 
and attributing blame thus fulfilling the requirements that   Resource Mobilisation 
Theory outlines as needed to generate a social movement.       
 
New Movement Theory was developed to analyse Western grass roots value 
movements such as the green movement.  The theory proposes these movements 
developed due to fractured identities as a result of the fast pace of change within 
these societies (Buechler, 1995).  Correspondingly in the Middle East the 
breakdown of the old order as demonstrated by  an emerging divide between 
secular ideologies and Islam, between moderate and radical Islam, plus the 
introduction of communications technology and higher rates of education has also 
led to a re-assessment of identities, religion, ideologies and political systems.  
However existing alongside the Middle Eastern social movements based on 
modern ideals such as democracy there is a conflicting movement back towards 
traditional Islamic values resulting in two contradictory movements 
simultaneously in motion.    This drive towards traditionalism complicates the 
Syrian political movement, and is reinforcing the growing Islamification whilst 
also strengthening sectarian sentiments. 
 
Despite initially being a social movement aiming to redraw the contract between 
ruler and ruled in Syria, the high level of Sunni participation within the uprising 
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has resulted in it having a significant Sunni face.   This has meant that despite 
cross sectarian support for many of the movement’s aims, such as challenging 
corruption and improving human rights, Sunni dominance of the uprising has 
discouraged cross sect participation.    
 
The high Sunni participation is due to several factors.  Firstly Bashar al Assad had 
abandoned his support for the rural poor, the greater numbers of which were 
Sunni, in favour of policies and networks that supported his contemporaries 
within the wealthy urban elite (International Crisis Group, 2011).  Additionally 
Sunni have long resented Allawite rule particularly given it usurped Sunni 
dominance, and furthermore the high numbers of Sunni within the protests is a 
reflection of demographic reality given that Sunni are the most populous sect.   
 
Additionally the alienation of citizens from the Middle Eastern regimes meant 
citizens turned to other affiliations for religious, social and political support 
fuelling the development of a layer of mezzanine leaders.  Given that many of the 
mezzanine structures were religious organisations   they tended to strengthen 
sectarian ties (Miscik, 2010).  Thus as a result of government repression of civil 
society and a divided spectrum of opinions within opposition groups, the two 
prominent public voices became regime controlled cultural centres and media, and 
the mosques (Hamidi, 2005).       This increased stature of religious organisations 
enabling the use of Sunni mosques and religious establishments as mobilising and 
recruitment centres for the protest movement. This is in keeping with Social 
Movement Theory’s recognition that mobilisation generally takes place through 
existing social structures and that citizens act upon their grievances once they 
have sufficient resources to facilitate mobilisation (Jackson J. W., 2006).   
However mobilisation through Sunni mosques and after weekly Friday prayers 
has contributed to the identification of the movement with Sunni and 
consequently increased minority fears of the uprising.  
 
Along with a surge in conservative Islamic values, from 2000 moderate scholar’s 
began advocating a renewal of Islamic values to include democracy, women’s 
rights and an acceptance of other religions (Blanford, Syrian Islamic Scholar 
Preaches Moderation: Mohammed Habash offers Alternative to Islamic 
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Conservatism, 2005).  In contrast traditional and radical Islamic thought is 
incompatible with democracy and religious pluralism (Bing, 2011).  One of the 
defining qualities of the Islamic revival in Syria is the diversity of the Islamic 
religious currents ranging from extremists to the renewal movement (Blanford, 
Syrian Islamic Scholar Preaches Moderation: Mohammed Habash offers 
Alternative to Islamic Conservatism, 2005).   However the rising visibility of 
Islamic culture and values in Syria has reinforced the regime’s warnings regarding 
Islamic fundamentalism to the concern of religious minorities and moderate 
Muslims (Wilson, 2005).  
 
Despite the internal Islamic debate, the mosque has provided an important 
psychological and social space for citizens to connect over their dissatisfaction 
with the regime as the mosque is one of the few places they are able congregate in 
significant numbers due to state repression (Jackson J. W., 2006, p. 17).   
Furthermore according to Gurr’s Ethnic Communal Mobilisational Model, a 
strong group identity, in this case Syrian Sunni, alongside grievances advances the 
likelihood of political mobilisation (Sahliyeh, 2001, p. 5).   However the 
significant political mobilisation of the Sunni sect within the uprising discourages 
other sectarian groups from joining the opposition network and is creating a 
sectarian dynamic within the social movement whilst giving the regime the 
opportunity to use sectarian counter revolutionary tactics. 
 
The resulting instability and the sectarian dynamic within the Sunni led social 
movement is increasing communal anxiety.  According to Symbolic Politics 
Theory, mobilisation to engage in ethnic conflict is manufactured by corrupt elites 
through appeals to the ‘emotional bonds based on kinship feelings’ inherent 
within ethno-sectarian groups (Kaufman, 2001, p. 29).   Narratives encouraging 
mobilisation are often grounded in an ethno-sectarian groups’ myths and 
prejudices which highlight the group’s ‘greatest collective fears’ (Kaufman, 2001, 
pp. 29-30).     Thus, given minority groups’ collective fears of Sunni persecution 
and the regime’s willingness to capitalise on this communal anxiety, the social 
movement’s sectarian composition carries an inherent risk of ethno-sectarian 
conflict. 
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In contrast to the majority Sunni sect, minorities did not see the regional Arab 
Spring as an opportunity to overthrow the Assad regime due a perception of 
greater vulnerability.   This has meant that although the aims of the protests were 
shared across sectarian groups, mobilisation to overthrow the regime was 
significantly activated along sectarian lines as the majority Sunni perceived they 
had more to gain and relatively less to lose from toppling the Assads.  This 
calculation was not shared by the minorities whose fear of the regime was 
matched if not succeeded by fears of the sectarian prejudices of the Sunni 
majority and the rise in Sunni fundamentalism.    
 
It is evident through analysing the Arab Spring and the Syrian uprising through 
the lens of Social Movement Theory that many of the elements pertaining to a 
social movement have been met by the uprising.   As such the origin of the Syrian 
civil war was a social movement for freedom, democracy and human rights.   
However with continuing violence and the resulting societal breakdown, Syria’s 
enduring sectarian dynamic is contributing to increases in sectarian violence and 
religious radicalism.     With the social movement and radicalised armed 
opposition groups on divergent paths there is a danger of continued conflict in the 
post Assad phase with the democratic social movement facing challenges from 
militias either Salafist, Allawite and/or undemocratic or even criminal seeking to 
impose their own political, religious or personal will upon others in a similar 
manner to the ousted autocratic regime (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 19).  
Therefore although uprising was not initially a Sunni mobilisation there is 
significant risk of the movement developing into Sunni sectarian ambition driven 
by fear, insecurity and a desire for retribution. 
 
5.2  Sunni Communalism and Rising Sectarian Violence 
 
The Sunni majority is linked together through a variety of diverse Sunni religious 
networks however there is no central religious authority and there are deep 
divisions on issues such as fiqh (religious jurisprudence), what position to take in 
relation to the regime and what religious family one is from for instance (Donker 
T. H., 2010, pp. 437-439).  Nevertheless the strength of the Sunni collective 
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identity has supported and driven the Syrian Arab Spring.  However it has also 
enabled the development of sectarian narratives, often steeped in history, which 
encourage political and social mobilisation against out-groups, consequently the 
prevalence of Sunni in the opposition raises the risk that the social movement will 
degenerate into sectarian warfare.   
 
 Kaufman describes ethnicity as based on communal myth symbol complexes and 
outlines that when hostility towards out-groups is an important part of this 
intergroup conflict is more likely (Wolff, 2009, p. 28).  The Arab saying ‘Me 
against my brother, me and my brother against my cousin; me, my brother, and 
my cousin against the world’ (Salzman, 2008) illustrates how within Syria and the 
Middle East as a whole, ethno-sectarian group’s myth symbol complexes are 
based upon hostility and/or wariness towards out groups.    This increases the 
likelihood that the current Syrian civil war will degenerate further into ethno-
sectarian conflict. 
 
When threatened groups solidify in response.   The cohesiveness of Sunni for 
example, strengthened in response to the Crusaders making inroads into the 
Middle East in the 12th century.    The Sunni orthodoxy was suspicious of the 
heterodox Shi’ite sects’ relationship with the Crusaders, as such Sunni launched a 
Jihad campaign against the Crusaders which overlapped somewhat onto Shia sects   
(Worren, 2007, pp. 57-60).   Furthermore modern Western interference in the 
Middle East has enabled radical groups to strengthen older narratives and myths 
around resisting Crusaders attempts to expand the Christian faith into Muslim 
territories.  Radical groups have intertwined Crusader mythology with 
colonialism, imperialism and the global spread of Western values and culture 
contributing to a visible Islamic (Bar D. S., A Toolbox for Countering Extremist 
Religious Doctrines, 2012, p. 5).  
 
By the 12th century a combination of Crusader and Mongol threats further 
hardened Sunni prejudices against out-groups.   Saladin emerged as the Islamic 
champion who reinvigorated Sunni Muslims and led a successive Jihad against 
the Christian crusaders, recapturing Jersusalem.   However in the Allawite 
historical narratives Saladin ‘laid the foundation for a Sunni Muslim resurgence 
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and the subsequent persecution of Allawites’ (Worren, 2007, p. 57 & 58).    
Allawites were ‘uprooted and marginalised, not to mention oppressed and 
massacred, for the next six centuries’.   The situation became much worse after 
1305 when Sunni scholar Ibn Taymiyyah, whose rhetoric against other religious 
groups is referred to by Salafist Islamists today, issued fatwas declaring that 
Allawites were infidels.   In 1516, after the Ottoman’s vanquished the Mamluks, 
Allawites clerics were massacred after being summoned by Sunni Turkish 
officials to Allepo where they were beheaded.  Other massacres of Allawites were 
carried out at the same time with some sources asserting that approximately 
100,000 Alawis were killed by Sunni. The Allawites were subsequently cleared 
from Allepo and other cities and found refuge in the Jabal Ansariyeh – the 
Mountains of the Allawites.   Until the Assads the following centuries were a time 
of Allawite isolation and backwardness, with the Allawites becoming the 
indentured farmers and servants cast within the Sunni feudal system (Worren, 
2007, p. 57 & 59).  Historical narratives and events heavily influence a group’s 
myth symbol complex and the use of sectarianism, including Ibn Taymiyyah’s 
writings, to justify political aims is being replicated within the 2011 initiated 
uprising through radical clerics using religion to legitimise the removal of the 
‘heretic’ Allawite elite.   
 
In 2005 an observation was made in the Syria Comment blog outlining concerns 
with the growth of Islam in Syria stating ‘there is no clear line between being 
religious, extremist, ideologist or even terrorist: moving from one level to another 
can be triggered by sectarian reasons, superpower threat reasons or other reasons 
such as the crackdown of the regime’ (Landis, Islamism in Syria, 2005).  As such 
there are concerns that regime wrought massacres and high losses suffered by 
Sunni within the civil war may increase the likelihood that extremist Salafi 
rhetoric against Allawites, such as radical cleric Adnan Arour’s declaration that 
‘By Allah we will chop their flesh and feed them to the dogs’ in reference to 
Allawites involved in state actions against the uprising, will resonate with 
growing anger and radicalise Sunni towards revenge (Fielding-Smith, 2011).    
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Accordingly this creates credibility issues and information breakdowns which 
Lake and Rothschild describe as facilitating manipulative elites’ messages and 
discouraging negotiation between groups (Wolff, 2009, p. 28).   As such due to 
radical Sunni sectarian propaganda and the influx of Salafists the Sunni majority 
is further alienated from the minorities and cannot credibly commit to protect the 
minorities thereby contributing to the Allawites and many Christians continuing to 
back regime.   
In 2012 the Associated Press conducted a poll through interviews with Syrian 
protesters in Syria and Lebanon.  The results illustrated that Sunni perceive Syria 
as under Allawite domination.  The regime was accused of religious 
discrimination in favour of Allawites alongside corruption and nepotism.     Sunni 
protesters claimed that the regime discriminated against devout Sunni, outlining 
how many university educated Sunni cannot find jobs whereas university 
educated Allawite youth readily found jobs within state institutions (Karan, 2012). 
According to Ethnic Conflict Theory when one group has dominated a state and 
the power balance begins to shift, there is a high risk of identity conflict 
(Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War, 2001, p. 32). 
This dynamic is reflected within the Syrian civil war and is likely to come to the 
fore as the Allawite dominated regime weakens. 
It is evident that the protesters are predominantly Sunni and that in accordance 
with Gurr’s Ethnic Communal Mobilizational Model the strength of this 
communal bond has helped to shape and drive the protest movement.   
Furthermore significant levels of grievance against the regime and regime 
targeting of Sunni areas is fuelling their feeling of shared suffering and thereby 
encouraging group mobilisation.  Given Syrian communalism the 
interconnectedness within sects generates the potential for political activism along 
sectarian lines both within the opposition and within the loyalist camp. 
The dominance of Sunni within the uprising places it at great risk of degenerating 
into outright sectarian conflict and sectarian ambition.  This relates not just to 
minority insecurity relating to historical persecution by Sunni but also to the 
Sunni myth symbol complex.    Kaufman identifies that a group that holds a belief 
in their own entitlement to power and privileges relative to out-groups finds it 
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easier to justify ethno-sectarian prejudices, increasing the likelihood of 
involvement in ethno-sectarian conflict (Kaufman, 2001, p. 30).    Additionally 
Kaufman points out that a myth symbol complex that heavily features an 
admiration for warrior characteristics also encourages violent attitudes towards 
out-groups (Kaufman, 2001, p. 30).  The Sunni myth symbol complex, 
particularly the Salafi strain, encompasses these two dynamics, and this has 
influenced a new generation of Jihadis emerging within the Syrian civil war. 
Additionally Posen describes how ethnic ties create an easily mobilised army 
(Wolff, 2009, pp. 26-27).  With the Syrian uprising degenerating into the chaos of 
civil war, the conditions for ethno-sectarian insecurity are high.  The FSA was 
initially created to protect protesters under fire from the Syrian security forces 
however given the prevalence of Sunni in the FSA and rising Sunni anger at the 
‘Allawite’ regime there is considerable risk of FSA units further mobilising along 
sectarian lines against the Allawites, alongside the risk of Allawites continuing to 
join pro-regime militias for protection against the opposition.      
Posen identified another dynamic that intensifies ethnic conflict, this being the 
violent actions of extremists from within each group (Wolff, 2009, p. 27).  Clearly 
identifiable as extremists are the predominantly Allawite Shabbiha who have 
openly boasted on social media of violence and massacres against Sunni.  This is 
an instance whereby social media is used as part of a terror campaign with violent 
acts filmed and shared in order to embolden their own side and intimidate the 
other.   Equally on the Sunni side there have been increasing acts of violence 
occurring against Allawites in retaliation for state and Shabbiha terrorism of their 
communities.  As such extremists on both sides are greatly intensifying ethno-
sectarian fears.  
Furthermore Syrian sectarian groups are developing new symbols and myths 
which reinforce their position within the Syrian uprising which according to 
Kelmen, explains the escalatory and self perpetuating nature of ethnic conflict.  
New traumas harden existing myths and intensify hostility and fear often 
culminating in zero sum politics that cast compromise as sectarian betrayal 
(Kaufman, Escaping the Symbolic Politics Trap: Reconciliation Initiatives and 
Conflict Resolution in Ethnic Wars, 2006, p. 205 & 215).  With Allawite elites 
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perceived to be leading  the violence against predominantly Sunni targets the 
‘mass hostility, chauvinist political mobilisation and security dilemma’ that 
Kaufman identifies as increasing the likelihood of  inter group violence is evident 
in Syria (Wolff, 2009, p. 31).   
 Kaufman also identifies demographic concentrations of an ethnic group, political 
freedoms, third party involvement, opposition to the regime weakening its power 
and an opposition base in a neighbouring state as predisposing a state towards 
ethnic conflict (Wolff, 2009, p. 31).      With extensive third party involvement 
within the Syrian crisis given FSA bases in Turkey and Western states calling for 
the regime to step down, which contrasts sharply with Iran, Russia and 
Hezbollah’s support of the regime, the Syrian situation has many factors that 
potentially make ethno-sectarian conflict likely.    With Syrians conscious of Iran, 
Hezbollah and the Shia dominated Iraqi governments’ support of Bashar al Assad, 
as well as Sunni lead nations such as Saudi Arabia supporting the uprising, it is 
difficult for citizens to see the conflict outside of a sectarian prism (Ghadry, 
2012).   
 According to Horowitz’s description ethnic groups are ranked hierarchically in 
order of dominance (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 22-23).  Whilst this is evident within 
Syria the hierarchical dominance of Allawites is not absolute.  The regime 
ultimately benefits the wealthy families within its patronage system irrespective of 
sect and this includes powerful Sunni families (Worren, 2007, pp. 87-89).   This 
complicates defining the uprising as a revolution as described by Horowitz 
whereby ethnic groups seek to change the ethno-sectarian hierarchy and the 
distribution of power and resources (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 10-15). Furthermore, it 
is difficult to characterise the uprising as one of Sunni sectarian ambition due to 
the diversity of positions taken by Sunni in response to the uprising, in particular 
the urban middle classes remain concerned about retaining their employment and 
affluence should the uprising succeed and a societal reshuffle take place as a 
result.  It is thus more accurate to define the uprising as a civil war with a rapidly 
intensifying sectarian dynamic which was sparked off by a harsh armed 
government response to a popular protest movement.     
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Social Movement Theory highlights the importance of an effective narrative for 
protest movements (McAdams, 2001, p. 44).  Sunni divisiveness relative to the 
uprising is impacting on the protest movement which has a corresponding lack of 
unity and as a result lacks a consistent narrative (Sheppard, 2011).  This has 
obstructed its development into a coherent and unified social movement against 
the regime and is increasing sectarian insecurity.    Although regime violence is 
pushing the revolutionary cause in the minds of many citizens, the Syrian people 
need the opposition to develop a unifying narrative that resonates with their own 
needs as they  lack confidence in emerging leaders to  manage Syria in a post 
Assad era  (Sheppard, 2011).    
The challenge for the Syrian social movement has been to overcome the inherent 
social divisions within the population (Gamson, 2011) and the myth symbol 
complexes of the key participants, the Sunni and Allawites, which predispose both 
groups towards either fears or hostility towards out-groups.    However unity 
within Syria is significantly compromised given that the struggle between the 
rebels and the government is not only perceived as a struggle between Sunni and 
the Allawites, but also it is increasingly appearing as a struggle over the identity 
and ideology of the state with alternative positions existing between rich and poor, 
secularism and Islam, modernity and traditionalism (Khalaf, 2012). 
5.3   The Shabbiha:  Allawite Militia or Regime aligned Mafia? 
The Shabbiha emerged in 1976 during the Lebanese civil war when the Syrian 
army entered Lebanon.  The Shabbiha, which is generally taken to mean phantom-
like, consisted primarily of young Allawite men from the coastal towns of 
Latakia, Tartus and Banias.  Prior to the uprising the Shabbiha were involved in 
the smuggling and sale of stolen goods and/or banned popular Western goods 
such as Coca Cola, Levis and Malboro cigarettes across the Lebanese border and 
carrying out raids on warehouses and civilian homes (Stratfor Global Intelligence, 
2012).   As the first Allawites who felt safe to leave their villages due to the Assad 
regime pushing underground outright Sunni animosity, many poor uneducated 
young Allawite men saw smuggling Western goods across the Lebanese border as 
a financial opportunity  (Mohammad, 2012).   
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Smuggling was a lucrative business and aware that they were above the law, 
members of Hafez al Assad’s extended family joined the Shabbiha.  The back 
window of their Mercedes cars, known as al Shabah (the Ghost) was reserved for 
pictures of ‘Father the Commander’, Hafez al Assad (Flamand, 2012).   
In 1983, a failed coup by Hafez al Assad’s brother,   Rifaat al Assad, resulted in 
the disbanding of his Defence companies containing 53,000 Allawite elite 
soldiers.   It was Rifaat’s elite force that had lead the deadly strike against 1982 
Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Hama.  Many of the disbanded Defence 
companies and intelligence units loyal to Rifaat eventually joined the Shabbiha 
resulting in a considerable increase in their numbers (Stratfor Global Intelligence, 
2012).   
The boundaries between the Syrian regime and the Shabbiha are unclear although 
there are significant kinship links between Shabbiha ‘bosses’ and the Assad 
family.   The Assad regime and the Shabbiha share a similar approach, the 
exercise of power and control primarily implemented through violence (Salih, 
2012).     
Due to its connections with the governing family the Shabbiha, alongside the 
security apparatus, were part of the regime’s wall of fear used to maintain power 
and control over its citizens and were often hired by the regime to carry out 
violence against opponents.  These links between the al Assad family and the 
Shabbiha have become increasingly relevant (Mohammad, 2012) with the 
European Union imposing sanctions in May 2011 on two of Bashar al Assad’s 
first cousins, Fawwar and Munzir, for their involvement in  ‘the repression against 
the civilian population as members of the Shabbiha’ (Flamand, 2012). 
There are four characteristics of the Shabbiha, the first being that its members 
primarily belong to the Allawite sect (Salih, 2012). To qualify this in areas 
heavily populated with Sunni the Shabbiha includes Sunni in its numbers, as like 
the regime it is dominated by but not exclusively Allawite (Sly, 2012).  The 
second is a hostility towards society making criminal acts towards civilians 
acceptable and even justifiable according to this attitude.  The third is loyalty to 
their leaders and lastly they are united by a motivation to achieve economic gains 
through the Shabbiha networks (Salih, 2012).   
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Through interviews conducted by the Associated Press the view emerged that 
with unemployment high amongst Syria’s large youth population, the Shabbiha is 
a means for predominantly Allawite youth to gain employment and social 
mobility.   A Syrian refugee in Lebanon stated ‘An uneducated Shabbiha can get 
whatever he wants, versus the most educated person in Syria’ (Karan, 2012).   
Due to the uprising the Shabbiha are now paid much more than the average Syrian 
salary and are able to loot and steal in order to increase their earnings.  They are 
often involved in repression campaigns which involve horrific levels of violence  
(Flamand, 2012). 
In the context of the uprising the opposition’s use of the word Shabbiha extends 
from the criminal gangs to the pro-regime militias that are the People’s Army 
sections of the Popular Committees formed to protect loyalists against opposition 
forces.   These paramilitary groups have a historical precedent given the Ba’ath 
party has used paramilitary forces to defend their interests since 1963, particularly 
against the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1980s.    Loyalist armed groups were 
called the Jaysh al Shabi by the mid-1980s and were estimated to number 100,000 
as at 2011.   Within the civil war both the Jaysh al Shabi and the criminal 
Shabbiha have received training and support from the Iranian government as the 
Iranians try to establish links to proxy groups within Syria that could survive the 
fall of the Assads and thereby enable  Iran to continue to project power in the 
Levant (Will Fulton, 2013, pp. 19-20). 
In order to heighten perceptions amongst minorities that the regime is necessary 
for their protection the regime has employed the Shabbiha, along with security 
detail, to disseminate information that actively portrays the current unrest as the 
work of militant Islamists and terrorists. Andrew J Tabler reported further 
sectarian tactics when he travelled to Lebanon’s Wadi Khaled and spoke with 
Sunni refugees from the Syrian town of Tal Kalakh which is surrounded by 
Allawite villages.  The refugees described the Shabbiha ransacking homes and 
threatening to kill or assault protesters in the coastal areas and countryside in co-
ordination with cannon fire from the Syrian army (Tabler A. , 2011, pp. 2-3).  
This points to the regime approaching the conflict as a Sunni challenge to its 
authority. 
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There is a belief that the patronage system of the al Assads has grown to resemble 
a mafia extortion network and is increasingly outside of the regime’s control.  The 
Shabbiha militias are similarly a law unto their own and whilst supporting the 
President are unlikely to be under his direct authority.   However despite this it is 
generally understood that Shabbiha militia report to a security officer who in turn 
reports to the President’s brother Maher al Assad  (Flamand, 2012). 
The regime’s open use of the sectarian and criminal Shabbiha intensifies the view 
that the regime is corrupt and resembles a mafia state.   The regime has had no 
qualms either before or during the uprising to use criminal tactics to ensure its 
power and privilege is maintained (International Crisis Group, 2011, p. 6).  As 
such the Shabbiha essentially mirrors the dark side of the regime displaying self 
interest, violence, sectarianism and a willingness to resort to criminal violence in 
order to achieve power, control and privilege (Salih, 2012).   The Shabbiha 
alongside the security apparatus are the regime’s violence mechanism within its 
power and control structure. 
Kaufman identifies that when a group feels that it is faces an existential threat to 
its survival, and has the opportunity to mobilise the prospect of ethno-sectarian 
conflict rises  (Wolff, 2009, pp. 30-31).  These preconditions are clearly evident 
within the Syrian situation.   Many Alawites see the uprising as an existential 
threat with an interviewed Shabbiha member stating ‘I know the Sunnis will take 
revenge for what we have done. I am fighting to guarantee a good future for my 
sons and grandsons. So this is the final battle: Win, or die’ (Flamand, 2012).  
Through the Shabbiha and the military Allawites are able to mobilise as an armed 
sectarian group to protect their interests and the regime.     
Rhetoric from the Shabbiha accessed via the internet is very loyal to Bashar al 
Assad with mottos like ‘Bashar, do not be sad: you have men who drink blood’ 
(Sherlock, 2012).  The violence of Shabbiha slogans and online videos increases 
the insecurity of other sectarian groups, particularly Sunni.  As such the regime’s 
reliance on sectarian militias to support the security forces is not only responding 
to sectarian tension within the unrest but it is also heightening it.  Unfortunately 
the killings and violence carried out by the Shabbiha and the regime is increasing 
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the number of individuals with scores to settle particularly from within the Sunni 
community (Abdulhamid, The Shredded Tapestry, 2012).   
However whilst the existence of the Shabbiha increases the odds of outright 
communal conflict due to its identification as an Allawi militia, the Shabbiha are 
not popular with all Allawites and this is causing tensions within Allawite 
support.  In October 2012 a gunfight which resulted in one dead and another 
wounded was reported in the Assad family’s hometown al Qardaha.  The fight 
involved Mohammed al Assad, known as the ‘Mountain Sheik’ for his powerful 
family connections and his involvement in smuggling and the other criminal 
activities that underlie the local economy of the Allawite hills. Although accounts 
vary it has been reported that Mohammed al Assad took offence to expressed 
opinions that Bashar al Assad should step down in face of high Allawite 
casualties.  Futhermore the regime largely ignores Shabbiha criminality, 
particularly those with familial ties to the President.  The effect of this on the 
economy and people of the Allawite hills is an additional source of Allawite 
resentment  (Oweis, 2012)  
Nevertheless as the loyalty of military units with high numbers of Sunni becomes 
increasingly questionable, the Shabbiha’s importance as a loyalist militia is rising 
(Oweis, 2012) particularly as Shabbiha numbers may have grown to as many as 
100,000 members (Pollack K. M., 2013, p. 7).  Moreover as the Shabbiha are 
likely to be among the first to face retribution should the regime fall their 
commitment to the regime’s survival is very high  (Flamand, 2012).   Dr Azzawi 
from the Syrian Network for Human Rights in London supports this through his 
claims that the Shabbiha have been manipulated by the regime.   ‘They are fuelled 
by this belief that they are fighting for their survival,’ said Dr Azzawi. ‘Assad tells 
them that they must defend the government or else they will be destroyed; it's kill, 
or be killed’ (Sherlock, 2012).   
Fear and sectarianism are an effective way for elites to mobilise the disadvantaged 
to defend elite privilege and power (Salih, 2012).    Ultimately however the Assad 
family are loyal to themselves and it is likely that if they are toppled the regime’s 
inner circle will attempt to escape the country and leave the Shabbiha, Republican 
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Guard and other visible Allawite armed factions to face retribution from within 
the revolution.    
In conclusion the regime’s use of the Assad linked Shabbiha criminal networks 
and Allawite militias to repress the uprising has transformed the general 
understanding of the Shabbiha to include a sectarian militia.  Effectively the 
Shabbiha are a criminal organisation that has been mobilised and its ranks 
expanded in order to protect the regime.   The regime’s use of the Shabbiha is 
reinforcing perceptions that the regime is significantly resorting to sectarianism to 
oppose the uprising.  The Shabbiha’s violent and extremist culture combined with 
its origins as an Allawite criminal network has significantly exacerbated sectarian 
animosity and fears.    
5.4 Sectarianism and the Syrian Security Apparatus 
The Syrian military and security apparatus is a highly sectarian institution with the 
roots to this characteristic emerging from the French mandate of Syria.  During 
their administration the French employed the tactic of sectarian ‘divide and rule’ 
in order to control the population.   As part of this strategy they drew recruits for 
the ‘Speciales Troupes’ from ethno-sectarian minorities such as the Armenians, 
Kurds, Allawites and Circassians as opposed to the Sunni majority.   Given that at 
the end of the French mandate the Speciales Troupes formed the Lebanese and 
Syrian armies, this concentration of minorities became a defining factor in the 
relationship between the military and the civilian politicians.  Politicians during 
this period largely still represented a wealthy, nationalist, anti-French and mostly 
Sunni elite  (Whitman, 2011, pp. 11-15). 
Syria’s first military coup was led in 1949 by General Musni Za’im and this left 
an enduring legacy on the Syrian political environment with subsequent   power 
transfers typically achieved through military coups (Whitman, 2011, p. 28).  
Additionally by making himself both Head of State and Head of National Defence 
General Za’im linked together the military and the state (Whitman, 2011, pp. 33-
48).  As such from 1949 the military played an influential role within Syrian 
politics (Whitman, 2011, p. 28).    
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From 1949 to 1970 the military had the opportunity to develop the art of 
influencing Syrian politics.  From the late 1950s the military began to combine 
itself with the Ba’ath party and since 1964 the Ba’ath regime has relied on its 
links within the military and security apparatus to retain its rule.     Hafez al 
Assad’s takeover in 1971 resulted in the army becoming firmly entrenched within 
the Syrian regime.  By this stage many army officers also belonged to the Ba’ath 
party and the two institutions were significantly intertwined.  This situation has 
continued into Bashar al Assad’s rule, to the extent that the army and security 
apparatus are part of the regime and ultimately for the army to turn on the regime 
would be tantamount to turning on itself (Whitman, 2011, pp. 40-52).    This is 
particularly true of the military and security forces leadership which is 
significantly based on extensive patronage systems commonly arranged through 
familial networks linking back to the Assads (Holliday, The Assad Regime: From 
Counterinsurgency to Civil War, 2013, p. 31). 
 
Horowitz identifies the military as a ‘significant symbol of ethnic domination’  
when the composition of the military heavily favours one ethno-sectarian group as 
this group is then able to use the security apparatus as a tool to repress internal 
challenges (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 10-12 & 443).    As such the primarily Allawite 
regime elite’s control over the security apparatus enabled them to dominant the 
citizenry.  Prior to the uprising the security forces were embedded in the civilian 
structure and given intelligence officers were present in most towns they were 
able to control civilian life  (Bar S. , 2006, p. 390).   
 
The al Assad family’s hold on the Syrian army is secured through sectarianism 
and patronage with the internal loyalties based around corruption and leadership 
reminiscent of mafia networks.  Although the military’s 300,000 conscripts were 
predominantly Sunni, of the 200,000 career soldiers in the Syrian army 70% are 
Allawite.  80% of the officers are estimated to be Allawite effectively giving the 
sect command of the military.    Furthermore Allawite elite divisions, such as the 
Air Force Intelligence Service and the Republican Guard, receive the best training 
and equipment (Bhalla, 2011) and remain committed to the regime.   
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The higher number of Allawites in the officer class greatly reduces the influence 
of Sunni officers.  Upward mobility in the army is harder for Sunni than Allawites 
and Sunni officers are more likely to come under investigation  (Zenobie, 2011).     
However Sunni representing the greatest proportion of the rank and file somewhat 
complicates defining the military as an Allawite institution.  Then again, 
effectively Syria is ruled by an inner circle of security chiefs.  After the blast in 
July 2012 killed four of these men the inner circle became exclusively Allawite 
given the casualties included Christian Defence Minister General Daoud Rajha, 
Sunni Assistant Vice President Hassan Turkmani and Sunni Major General  
Hisham Ikhtiar  (Tabler A. , President Bashar al Assad: His Inner Circle and 
Options, 2013).  
 
The predominance of Sunni within the uprising has contributed to Sunni soldiers 
defecting from the army as they discover the discrepancy between the regime’s 
claims that that they are defending the state against terrorists and the discovery 
that they are in reality expected to fire on Sunni protesters, FSA fighters and/or 
civilians.  However defections have not been in high enough numbers to 
decisively weaken the state security forces and soldiers are tending to defect 
individually  (International Crisis Group, 2011, p. 2) as the sectarian structure of 
the military makes it difficult for Sunni soldiers to act in unity.   
However a former Syrian army officer has claimed that approximately 6,000 
soldiers recorded as Syrian army casualties within the civil war as at May 2012 
were shot by regime loyalists  (Pfeffer, 2012).   This is difficult to verify, however 
it is evident that Bashar al Assad has tasked the security apparatus to identify and 
remove possible defectors and to enforce compliance with orders to fire on 
protesters by detaining, torturing and/or shooting soliders who refuse (Holliday, 
The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War, 2013, p. 13).   There 
are also reports of Allawite units accompanying mixed sectarian units and 
shooting soldiers who refuse to fire (Zenobie, 2011).     
 In order to discourage the defection of entire units Assad has deployed politically 
reliable units with high numbers of minorities whilst keeping Sunni soldiers away 
from active combat (Holliday, The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to 
Civil War, 2013, pp. 26-28).   The regime has also cynically used Druze and 
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Christian troops, as well as Allawites, against Sunni protesters in an attempt to 
reinforce the wedge between minority sectarian groups and Sunni (Bhalla, 2011).    
However this selective deployment has had significant repercussions for Assad’s 
military strategy as he has subsequently been unable to generate enough reliable 
troops to secure the whole country (Holliday, The Assad Regime: From 
Counterinsurgency to Civil War, 2013, p. 26). 
Questionable loyalties, defections and attrition are causing an over reliance on 
trusted units, with Allawites increasingly being called on to fill the gaps in the 
armed forces.  As such many Allawites believe that the Assad regime is 
implicating their sect in criminal violence against the rest of the population and 
that this is stirring opposition forces towards sectarian retribution.   An Allawite 
doctor interviewed in Lebanon stated how many Allawites felt ‘Assad is not 
representing the Alawites; he is using them. If Alawites are prepared to die for 
Assad, it is because they fear for themselves, not because they love him’ (Sly, 
2012).    
There is also growing resentment that whilst many Allawite families have 
suffered casualties supporting the Assads none of the grieving families are called 
Assad, Makhlouf or Shalish.   There are reports that the regime is beginning to 
suffer recruitment problems, primarily among Sunni conscripts, but also numbers 
of young Allawites are evading conscription given the opposition is holding up 
against the regime and casualties are rising (Oweis, 2012).    . 
Considering the high number of Allawites employed within the Syrian security 
and military apparatus many Allawites face losing their incomes should the Assad 
regime fall.    Prior to the uprising a growing number of Allawites were cynical 
about the regime as most did not directly benefit from the regime patronage 
system.  However with high youth unemployment Allawites took up opportunities 
to become state employees despite the low pay, particularly in the security forces 
and the army.  The prevalence of Allawites in elite security units and within the 
officer class has further disconnected both the security apparatus and by extension 
the Allawites from mainstream Syria.   This has significantly played into 
Allawite’s historically based fears of persecution at the hands of the Sunni 
majority ( International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 5 & 21).     Moreover the security 
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forces are increasingly seen as the face of the regime.  The security force’s 
association with escalating levels of brutality, Allawite political dominance and 
the Shabbiha, has strengthened the most extreme stereotypes surrounding the 
regime and the Allawites ( International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 4) creating a 
situation whereby Allawite existential fears are valid (Holliday, The Assad 
Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War, 2013, p. 41). 
Reports emerging that pro-regime fighters have been supplementing their incomes 
and gathering resources through corruption and criminal practises has further 
damaged the reputation of the security forces and military, again reflecting on the 
Allawites.   A businessman in Homs who dealt with both pro-regime fighters and 
the opposition described a situation where the regime forces were profiting from 
the unrest ‘Corruption has grown to unprecedented levels. In Homs, troops were 
encouraged to pillage. Money is made by stealing, selling war booty or even 
weapons. People pay to be released from prison or to be able to escape an area 
under attack…As a result, many of these people involved in repression now have 
a vested interest in ensuring chaos lasts as long as possible’ ( International Crisis 
Group, 2012, p. 32).   
 
As the civil war progresses desertions, both political and military, are ensuring 
that the regime is being stripped back to its backbone which is essentially the 
military and security apparatus.   Since the 2012 summer, command of military 
has decentralised with important implications for units post Assad.  Furthermore 
the distinction between Syrian army officers and pro-regime militias is becoming 
increasingly blurred (Holliday, The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to 
Civil War, 2013, p. 29) (Pollack K. M., 2013, p. 6&7).   If the regime deteriorates 
further the state army will begin to represent another militia within the civil war.   
Whilst this would represent a considerable weakening of the Assad elite’s power 
this development would also  be problematic as it is easier to topple a government 
then remove a large and well equipped  militia ( International Crisis Group, 2012, 
p. ii).       
The regime has locked itself into a sectarian armed conflict and ensured that the 
security apparatus’s fate is linked to its own thereby securing its loyalty (Haddad, 
The Syrian Revolution's Business Backbone, 2012).   Given the extent of the 
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regime’s brutality the regime has no credibility to negotiate and no legitimacy to 
re-engage with Syrian citizens, a condition outlined by Ethnic Conflict Theory as 
predisposing a situation towards ethno-sectarian conflict.    
The US experience in removing the Ba’ath government from Iraq has led to the 
understanding that retaining the existing security institutions to transfer to an 
emerging democratic government is important to ensure future stability.   
However the Assad elite has precluded this outcome as the stripping back of the 
regime’s forces to a brutal cohesive faction that is fighting for its survival has 
made it more likely that the remnants of the regime will join and morph into pro-
Assad militias post the Assad regime (Holliday, The Assad Regime: From 
Counterinsurgency to Civil War, 2013, pp. 40-41). 
To conclude, Bashar al Assad and his generals are increasingly aware that they are 
unlikely to regain power and will consequently work to retain sectarian control of 
the armed forces.  In order to survive they are likely to fracture Syria until it 
resembles Lebanon thereby ensuring they remain an armed political player and 
that the Allawite sect remains loyal and is able to avoid outright retribution 
(Holliday, The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War, 2013, p. 
41). 
 
5.5  From Protest Movement to Armed Rebellion - Ethno-Sectarian 
Dynamics within the Uprising:  Conclusion 
 
The Syrian civil war began as a social movement for democracy, freedom and 
human rights, evidence of the contagion effect as a result of the rapid success of 
the Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings.  However many factors point to the civil war 
continuing to develop a sectarian dynamic that threatens both the ability of the 
uprising to overthrow the Assads but also its ability to achieve any real benefits 
and stability for Syrians should it succeed.    
 
Traditional Sunni religious culture with its prejudice against out-groups and a 
history of dominance within Syria prior to the Assads intensifies Sunni dislike of 
the ‘heretic’ Assad regime.  However Sunni animosity towards the Allawite elite 
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is also a reaction to modern issues such as corruption, harsh repression and 
perceived favouritism of Allawites over Sunni with regards to state employment, 
advancement within the military and security services plus other opportunities.   
Given the absence of alternative meetings places much of the protests have been 
organised through mosques and after Friday prayers contributing to significant 
Sunni mobilisation within the opposition.  Although a proportion of Sunni remain 
wary of developments, this has created perceptions of the uprising as a Sunni lead 
movement intensifying the likelihood it is seen through a sectarian prism.   This is 
intensified by both sects having differing armed bodies within which they are 
highly represented, for instance the Allawites in the armed forces and Shabbiha 
and the Sunni within the FSA and extremist Islamist brigades, giving both sides 
the ability to mobilise armed sectarian units.  Therefore regardless of the uprisings 
origins as a social movement the revolution has disintegrated into a sectarian civil 
war with the intensity likely to escalate the longer the conflict continues (Pollack 
K. M., 2013, p. 1&2).   
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Chaptor Six 
Syria’s Fractious Opposition Movement 
 
6.1   The Grass Roots Revolution 
 
Despite the rapid devolution from demonstrations to a civil war with a sectarian 
dynamic, the initial uprising was a social movement that precipitately grew from a 
surge of optimism following quick removal of the Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan 
regimes.   The Syrian people saw a historic opportunity to rid themselves of 
authoritarianism through a grass roots protest movement and an opportunity to 
introduce democracy, freedom and human rights.    This was a popular movement 
which initially resisted the historical and cultural instinct to resort to 
communalism. 
 
 The arrest of teenagers for spray painting ‘down with the regime’ on a school 
wall on the 25 March 2011 in Deraa quickly grew into nearly national wide 
protests against the regime (O'Bagy, 2012, p. 20).  The uprising was led by 
citizens, with a significant number of youth participants, acting within a local 
capacity against the regime.    From the outset the revolution contained divisions, 
primarily along sectarian and rural-urban lines, due to the socio-economic, 
sectarian and political divisions within Syria and the regime’s balanced use of 
these to secure acquiesce.   
 
The grass roots revolution has not stemmed from the established political 
opposition nor is it lead by them.   There is a fundamental disconnect between the 
two (O'Bagy, 2012, p. 20).   The political opposition appear urban and are 
predominantly educated, often in the West, and have previously fled or been 
exiled from Syria (O'Bagy E. , Syria's Political Opposition, 2012, p. 10). 
Participants in the uprising are predominantly rural, 15-35 years old, poor or 
middle class (O'Bagy, 2012, p. 21) these being groups significantly marginalised 
by the regime with 56% of youth unemployed in Syria (Momani, 2012).  The 
traditional political opposition has had years of articulating their political and 
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ideological vision for Syria, whilst the protesters’ goals for Syria appear little 
developed beyond broad ideals and the fall of the regime (O'Bagy, 2012, p. 20).    
 
It has been difficult for the grass roots opposition to connect with the international 
community and within Syria due to political inexperience, regime pressure and 
sectarian divisiveness.      However there are developing organisational streams 
within the grass roots movement capable of co-ordinating on a local level and 
adapting strategies in pursuit of their aims.   Despite many of its leaders having to 
led double lives or live in hiding with their identities only known to their 
immediate associates, formal structures have formed within the protest movement.   
However the organisational ability of the grass roots activists is limited by the 
intelligence capabilities of the regime.  Larger more unified councils require 
communications and assembly as such they are more vulnerable to interception by 
the regime’s intelligence. These structures, predominantly the revolutionary 
committees, work to co-ordinate protests, media releases, humanitarian and 
medical aid, security and armed operations (O'Bagy, 2012, p. 21 & 25).   
 
Small local groups have formed into Local Coordination Committees of Syria 
(LCC) who primarily consist of youth activists who support nonviolent political 
action (Abdulhamid, Syria 2013: Rise of the warlords, 2013).  The LCCs, along 
with armed opposition groups, are able to coordinate their activities through the 
next organisational tier, the Revolutionary Councils and Revolutionary Command 
Councils that operate at city or district level.    The activities of the regional 
councils are in turn promoted by the main national body, the Syrian Revolution 
General Commission (SRGC) which manages  diplomatic advocacy, organisation, 
mobilisation and acts as the main media outlet. An example of a SRGC initiative 
is the  document ‘Pointers for Demonstrations’  which was posted on its website 
with its advice followed on the same day in places as far away from each other as 
Deraa and Idlib pointing to its influence and ability to reach  protesters.   However 
although the SRGC represents 70% of the Revolutionary Councils,  the SRGC is 
essentially a body that connects rather than leads as it  has a limited ability to 
control local groups (O'Bagy, 2012, pp. 21 & 25-27).    The command structure is 
bottom up, so to speak, rather than top down. 
 
97 
 
The LCC are the backbone of the revolution and by early 2012 most Syrian 
villages and neighbourhoods had formed their own LCC.  There are 
approximately 200 LCCs with volunteers coming from diverse backgrounds and 
including women, differing sectarian groups and varying ages.   These committees 
operate within their own communities organising, filming and publicising their 
own demonstrations (O'Bagy, 2012, p. 22). 
 
The Revolutionary Councils have primarily formed in urban areas to oversee 
developments and are the point of contact for the opposition’s activities within 
districts.  They help coordinate the activities of LCCs including demonstrations 
and armed groups.   Activists claim there are approximately 50 Revolutionary 
Councils in Syria.  Of particular note is the Council in Homs which has a high 
level of organisation featuring an elected leadership and separate divisions 
responsible for publicity, demonstrations, medical and humanitarian aid and 
armed operations.   Security detail is also attached to protests and checkpoints are 
manned daily to alert activists of approaching regime forces.  As at January 22 
2012 the Homs Revolutionary Council was feeding 16,000 families (O'Bagy, 
2012, pp. 22-23).    It is important to note that although the uprising is 
increasingly organised many of the protests as one activist noted ‘just happen’ 
(O'Bagy, 2012, p. 24) reflecting a  strong motivation within the protesting 
proportion of the Syrian population that precludes the need for leadership from 
above to maintain its momentum. 
 
The largest national coalition is the SRGC.  Again due to security concerns many 
of its leaders have chosen to remain anonymous.   An emerging problem is that 
many protesters resent those that claim to represent them and this resentment is 
not just reserved for dissidents organising from outside the country but also 
includes  the SRGC, with one Syrian complaining that ‘there are too many groups 
trying to take over the revolution’ who claim they ‘represent the people’.   The 
grass roots social movement started the revolution and currently remains the 
dominant force that attempts to keep it moving forward.   This is increasingly 
recognised by political opposition groups with many moving to connect with the 
social movement.   However protesters recognise that in the contest for influence 
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and power groups may seek to impose leadership from without rather than from 
within the revolution (O'Bagy, 2012, p. 27).    
 
Activists are aware that among the groups jostling for position to take the 
revolution from its grass roots origins are local and foreign Jihadis and other 
Islamic groups.  This threat is weakening grass roots efforts to broaden support 
through uniting sectarian groups behind the uprising.  However as the movement 
matures, its leadership and organisation abilities are  improving and any 
subsequent leadership or political agenda will have the strongest legitimacy if it 
emerges from within the grassroots opposition rather than imposed from without. 
 
Whilst there are disagreements within the opposition as a whole over what form 
of governance should replace the Assad regime the social movement is primarily 
united around a desire for change, particularly relating to the introduction of 
democracy, freedom and improved human rights.  An example of the common 
purpose within the uprising is the unanimously naming of the Friday protests 
nationwide.     In the beginning of the week the Syrian Revolution 2011, who are 
aligned with the SRGC, holds a poll on its Facebook page offering a variety of 
choices regarding protests themes. Once votes are in, the Friday protest theme is 
posted onto both its Facebook page and the Facebook pages of the committees, 
councils and organisations that form its entirety (O'Bagy, 2012, pp. 27-28).   
 
Social media is a valuable tool for activists and protesters within the social 
movement as it is an important means of forming a largely anonymous space for 
connecting activists across the country (O'Bagy E. , Syria's Political Opposition, 
2012, pp. 28-29).   Social media circumvents networks based on sect and unites 
activists from different ethno-sectarian, socio-economic and regional 
backgrounds.    However the regime’s censorship and monitoring of social media 
hinders the opposition.  Additionally the infiltration of regime agents into 
opposition organisations significantly disrupts the uprising.  In response the 
opposition often falls back to relying  on tradition meeting places such as the 
teahouse and  Sunni mosques  (O'Bagy, 2012, pp. 28-29)  which weakens 
opportunities for cross sectarian unity and strengthens Sunni leadership of the 
social movement. 
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Some opposition groups are aware of the importance of cross sectarian unity for 
the success of the social movement for example the Nabd Gathering for Syrian 
Civil Youth works to counter sectarianism linking young Syrian civilians 
concerned with  ‘the fragmentation of the social fabric of Syria’.    The cross sect 
organisation seeks to promote unity amongst all Syrians in face of the increasing 
numbers of Jihadis and the regime’s sectarian characterisation of the uprising.  
The group claims to have cells in every city and is grateful to its minority sect 
members, including Allawites, who are freer than Sunni activists to move supplies 
through government checkpoints to the FSA.     In order to stress minority 
participation in the uprising the group reveals minority activists who have been 
arrested and detained by the regime on its Facebook page.  Founding member 
Nabeel, 24 year old Dr from Homs, claims that it is a mistake to assume that 
minority citizens who do not openly protest are pro-regime.  He points out that 
many minority sect members are unable to protest openly within their loyalist 
neighbourhoods but are supportive of the uprising (Bramley, 2012 ).   
 
In conclusion the uprising began as a social movement that was not organised 
along communal lines in contrast to the political culture of the region.   It contains 
grass roots organisations that seek to promote unity within Syria and have an 
understanding that cross sectarian mobilisation is the surest way to bring down the 
regime.   Furthermore it includes activists that are working to ensure it continues 
as a movement for change and resists deteriorating into a sectarian contest for 
political power and influence as the regime weakens.   However with the onset of 
civil war this is a real challenge. 
 
6.2   The Arming of the Opposition and Rising Sectarianism 
 
Acutely aware of the Egyptian and Tunisian regimes’ quick demise to non-violent 
protest the Assad regime from the outset sought to push the social movement from 
peaceful to an armed confrontation high on sectarian sentiments (Abdulhamid, 
Syria 2013: Rise of the warlords, 2013).  Armed resistance in Syria began as early 
as April 2011 with individuals in the Homs districts of Bab Amr and Bab Sbaa 
taking up arms to defend protesters and their districts alongside corresponding 
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reports within the same time frame of outbreaks of armed resistance in the 
provinces of Idlib, Deraa plus Damascus and its suburbs  (Rosen, 2012).     
The armed groups are predominantly from rural areas or the urban working class 
as these men typically have access to arms and have been marginalised by the 
regime thus they have  less to lose through engaging in armed struggle than 
educated activists from the upper and middle classes.  These pockets of armed 
resistance developed into a configuration of units loosely united under the banner 
of the Free Syria Army (FSA) (Rosen, Q & A: Nir Rosen on Syria's Armed 
Opposition, 2012).    Alongside the FSA are locally based companies mostly lead 
by traditional tribal elites (Pollack K. M., 2013, p. 4). 
The FSA was publicly announced in Syria’s 2011 summer.  The majority of the 
fighters are civilians although defected soldiers continue to join their ranks.    
Despite the regime’s claims, the fighters are not armed gangs nor part of a foreign 
conspiracy orchestrated by Israel and the US against the regime.  The FSA 
members are typically fighting for self protection, family, friends, village, 
province, revenge, dignity, and democracy  (Rosen, Q & A: Nir Rosen on Syria's 
Armed Opposition, 2012).   
The FSA is not an organised disciplined fighting force, rather it is an umbrella 
term to describe the opposition fighters working at a grass roots level to remove 
the regime from power.  Whilst there is some leadership and structure the armed 
opposition is primarily a grass roots armed uprising with limited central 
leadership (McNaught, 2012).   
 
Attempts by FSA heads such as Riad al Asaad to centralise leadership of the FSA 
have been largely unsuccessful at controlling or even maintaining regular contact 
with armed groups.  The real leadership is localised, this is accentuated by the 
necessity of armed groups to fund and arm themselves separately from any central 
leadership (Rosen, 2012). 
With fighting intensifying from March 2012 cooperation has increased between 
the FSA and the grass roots protest movement (O'Bagy, 2012, p. 30).   It is 
evident that the FSA’s actions are predominantly carried out in response to events 
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on the ground as opposed to a coordinated strategy.  The LCC actions are 
indirectly creating FSA operations given their protests typically lead to an armed 
response from the regime which provokes a FSA rejoinder (Kyrou, 2011).  Armed 
opposition groups often receive guidance from local Revolutionary Councils 
giving the grass roots leadership the potential to contribute politically should the 
Assads fall  (O'Bagy, 2012, p. 30).  Significantly the FSA and the grass roots 
opposition are seen as the ‘popular resistance’ by Syrian citizens according them 
greater legitimacy as the revolutions leaders than the Syrian National Coalition 
(NC) and other political groups (O'Bagy, 2012, pp. 30-31). 
The growing consensus that force is the only means of coercing the regime to 
relinquish control has legitimised the armed opposition and increased the 
popularity of the FSA with protesters.  Many protests chant slogans such as ‘Free 
Syria Army’ and ‘the people want a declaration of Jihad’ (Rosen, 2012).    The 
FSA has a considerable amount of legitimacy with the population, not least 
because they are typically made up of local community members.  Despite this 
citizens are wary of FSA entering their neighbourhoods due to the regime’s 
indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas to remove an FSA presence (McNaught, 
2012).   
Given that the FSA is made up of predominantly Sunni lower ranking soldiers and 
rural poor there is concern about the possibility of ultra conservative Salafists 
gaining traction within the FSA.  Despite NC and FSA assertions that this is not 
the case wariness is relevant considering transnational Salafist interest in the 
conflict.  For instance protests have been staged in support of the Syrian 
revolution in the Lebanese city of Tripoli which is a traditional stronghold for 
Sunni Salafists. These protests have featured Salafist clerics such as Dai al-Islam 
al-Shahhal calling for Lebanese Sunni to actively support the Syrian opposition 
movement  (Zambelis, 2011).   The entrance of Jihadis into the conflict and calls 
for Sunni region wide to mobilise in support of Syrian Sunni supports the 
regime’s claims that the uprising is the work of Islamic terrorists and helps the 
regime maintain the necessary divisions between Syrian sectarian groups, thereby 
keeping the uprising confined to a largely Sunni mobilisation. 
 
102 
 
FSA heads such as General Ahmad Rahal have sought to reassure the civilian 
population, asserting that once the regime falls fighters will be urged to surrender 
their weapons and return to their previous jobs (McNaught, 2012).  Whether they 
do so remains to be seen, and given the Libyan example where ex-revolutionary 
Islamic militia have not disbanded it is likely to be difficult to get rebel units to 
disperse, especially in the vulnerable security situation following the ousting of an 
autocratic regime.   
 
Assessing the extent of Sunni sectarianism in the uprising is complex.  When 
journalist Nir Rosen travelled extensively throughout Syria in 2011 he observed 
that the FSA fighters he met in Homs, Idlib, Hama, Deraa and Dasmascus were 
typically pious Sunni Muslims.    This helps explain the why units are often 
named after Islamic martyrs or terms with ‘heroic’ religious connotations, 
additionally this further cements Sunni unity within the uprising  (Rosen, Q & A: 
Nir Rosen on Syria's Armed Opposition, 2012) given it reflects the Sunni myth 
symbol complex.    
 
The strong religious identification within the battalions casts doubt on the ability 
of the FSA leadership to control sectarianism within the armed opposition.  
However in terms of communalism contributing to mobilisation, Nir Rosen found 
that members of the armed uprising were divided, with some identifying their 
Sunni roots as a significant reason for joining the uprising, whereas for others it 
was not part of their calculation at all (Rosen, 2012).   
  
The religious focus of the armed groups is not typically Salafist or radical but a 
reflection of the conservative religious culture of Syrian Sunni.  As such many 
fighters pray.  Furthermore Nir Rosen met fighters who were not religious before 
the uprising but had turned to prayer as a reaction to the extreme uncertainty of 
civil war.   However despite this increased religiosity if a group member did not 
pray Rosen observed that there was no pressure brought to bear on them to do so 
(Rosen, 2012). The majority of the armed rebels are traditional rather than 
Islamist and whilst not purely secular they are pursuing a conservative civil future 
for Syria and are wary of the Islamist agenda (Abdulhamid, 2013).   However the 
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prevalence of Sunni religiosity within the armed opposition contributes to 
minority exclusion from the conflict and increases minority fear of how armed 
Sunni groups will behave once the regime falls given the increasing amount of 
arms passing into Sunni hands.   
 
This fear is intensified through YouTube which features hundreds to thousands of 
videos inciting sectarianism in Syria.  Many videos star extremist opposition 
fighters, in some instances  forcing captured Allawites to confess to acts of 
violence against Sunni such as the rape and the killing of Sunni women as the 
video authors seek to intensify  sectarian hatred in order mobilise fellow Sunni to 
seek retribution through opposing the regime (The Arab Digest, 2012).    
 
However within towns that the FSA have secured locals have stated that they 
would rather have anyone then the regime proving the desire to be free of the 
Assad regime is well rooted.  However as freed towns resort to self rule they face 
issues such as  rising sectarianism, lack of resources and a lack of leadership 
which is leading to factionalism and infighting.  For example the Binnish Youth 
Organisation sought to strengthen unity between local sectarian groups including 
local Allawites, however their inclusive position was challenged by a small group 
of well armed and organised Salafists (Tanir, 2012).   
In conclusion the armed grassroots opposition to the regime has a decentralised 
leadership by necessity due to regime repression preventing greater co-ordination.    
As such the grassroots opposition has formed through local agencies and not 
behind visible leaders or one organisation thus making it hard for the regime to 
destroy, as Elisabeth O’Bagy states, the opposition is ‘disorganised like a fox’.  
The localised activities of the armed opposition and the protest movement also 
means that they are part of and able to closely identify the needs of their 
constituencies potentially creating the grounds for a pluralistic political future 
(O'Bagy E. , 2012).   However this is complicated by the high number of Sunni 
within the opposition, and the religious character of Syrian Sunni.  Minorities fear 
that the opposition movement is, or will become due to regime violence, a 
sectarian uprising intent on imposing Sunni power.  This works in the favour of 
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the Assad regime who understand that should the uprising begin to mobilise more 
extensively across sectarian lines they will be unable to hold onto power. 
The grass roots movement is unified in its focus on ousting Assad and currently 
this overrides agendas of imposing sectarian dominance, however a contest for 
influence between the conservative religious Sunni and groups seeking a secular 
democratic government is emerging, similar to the Egyptian situation with the 
standoff between ex-President Morsi and his Islamic supporters and Egyptians 
seeking secular governance.  In contrast to Egypt the contest in Syrian is taking 
place in a state with a mosaic of sectarian groups which will either assist in the 
establishment of democratic rule or it will hasten descent into communalism in the 
manner of Lebanon.    It is evident that armed struggle is necessary to overthrow 
the regime however the conflict is radicalising the population, causing civilians to 
seek the security of ethno-sectarian ties and increasing the likelihood of ethno-
sectarian conflict.   
6.3 Radical Islam and its Impact on Communalism within the 
Uprising 
 
Most opposition fighters joined the uprising as revolutionaries within a popular 
revolt, however the prevalence of Sunni within the uprising has meant that many 
relate their struggle to Islamic cultural constructs such as Jihad.  Generally their 
use of Islamic symbols and myths is incidental and relates to their cultural 
heritage as opposed to evidence of an Islamic uprising.    As such much of the 
FSA can be accurately described as religious nationalists, fighting for a Syrian 
cause whilst mobilising through references to their Islamic culture (O'Bagy, Jihad 
in Syria, 2012, p. 18).      
 
This is reflected in the increasing use of symbols by the rebels that are derived 
from Jihadi tradition.   However it is important to distinguish between the use of 
Islamic references as symbols of revolution, such the chant ‘God is Great’, 
Islamic Friday protest themes and rebel units named after significant Muslim 
figures, as opposed to espousing a Salafi Jihadi ideology.   Many fighters have 
grown long beards for example that are traditionally associated with the Salafi 
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Jihadis, however as long beards drew the attention of state security forces prior to 
the uprising the beard has therefore come to symbolise a ‘tough rebel look’ 
(O'Bagy E. , Jihad in Syria, 2012, pp. 21-22).    
 
Additionally due to its association with rebellion and defiance Jihadi symbols 
such as the traditional black Jihadi flag have been used by rebels as a statement of 
allegiance to the revolution.  Whilst this flag is typically associated with al Qaeda 
it has a long history as a ‘popular symbol of resistance’.  For instance many rebel 
groups that carry the black flag also display the Syrian 1938-58 national flag, 
which contradicts Jihadi thought given nationalism is incompatible with al 
Qaeda’s global caliphate aspirations  (O'Bagy, Jihad in Syria, 2012, pp. 21-22).     
This indicates that in line with Symbolic Politics Theory the rebels are drawing 
inspiration from their culture’s myths and symbols, in this case the Islamic 
tradition of Jihad or holy war.    However, the use of Jihadi symbols is evidence of 
growing militancy and this militancy is further reinforced by the use of Islamic 
symbols of Jihad (O'Bagy, Jihad in Syria, 2012, pp. 21-22)  Moreover these 
symbols spark fear in minority sects given they represent a violent tradition of 
prejudice against other religions. 
 
Although the FSA appears to be largely supportive of the democratic agenda of 
the protest movement, there are units under the FSA umbrella who are not secular 
in outlook, instead espousing an Islamic agenda and seeking a moderate 
interpretation of Sharia law and Islamic governance in Syria without extending 
these goals to an Islamic caliphate.  One such group is Suqour al-Sham based in 
Idlib. In April 2012 their leader Abu Issa delivered a speech in which he 
advocated seeing politics as a vehicle for God’s word and framed his speech 
within Jihadi framework declaring that Muslim’s had lost their honour as they had 
abandoned Jihad.  Suqour al-Sham is a moderate Islamist faction given Abu Issa 
declared he wanted to establish an Islamic state ‘without imposing it on society’ 
(O'Bagy, Jihad in Syria, 2012, p. 23).  Abu Issa’s references to Jihad and honour 
links to the region’s tribal culture with its emphasis on honour and is evidence of 
the use of cultural myths and symbols within a conflict setting as described by 
Symbolic Politics Theory.   
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Fig 6  Reliosity Spectrum within the Armed Opposition 
 (O'Bagy, Jihad in Syria, 2012, p. 18) 
 
Other groups are more radical in their outlook as seen in fig 6 which displays a 
selection of armed groups across the spectrum from secular to Salafist. The 
violence and chaos of civil war constitute the ideal conditions for the growth of a 
home grown Jihadi group.  Consequently Jabhat Nusra (Support Front for the 
People of Syria from the Mujahedeen of Syria in the Place of Jihad) released its 
founding video on 24 January 2012.     Nusra (JN) has claimed responsibility for a 
number of attacks across Syria and has grown in prominence in early 2013.  Local 
activists have revealed that initially JN was inexperienced but has since received 
help from foreign fighters some from Fatah al Islam and subsequently improved 
in effectiveness and influence (O'Bagy, Jihad in Syria, 2012, pp. 31-33).   
 
The emergence of the al Qaeda ideology in a home-grown group with a domestic 
platform gives Jihadis a credibility they struggled to achieve in Syria prior to the 
revolution (O'Bagy E. , Jihad in Syria, 2012, p. 38).   JN identifies its struggle in 
sectarian terms describing itself as defending Sunni against the ‘Allawite enemy’ 
and its ‘Shi’ite agents’.  JN often refers to Allawites as Nusayri to emphasis their 
view that the Allawites worship their founder Muhammad ibn Nusayr and as such 
are outside Islam, rather than employing the accepted term Allawite which refers 
to Ali Ibn Abi Talib considered by Sunnis to be the 4th Caliph (International 
Crisis Group, 2012, p. 11).  In accordance with Ethnic Conflict Theory the use of 
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religious narratives in this manner greatly increases the risk of ethno-sectarian 
conflict. 
 
Whilst JN is associated with Al Qaeda there are independent Salafi units who are 
not subject to the Al Qaeda’s political baggage and are thus considered more 
legitimate by the opposition.   The most prominent independent Salafi group is 
Kata’ib Ahrar al-Sham with supposedly 200 battalions.  Online statements declare 
their primary objectives to be establishing an Islamic state and waging Jihad 
against Iranian attempts to project Shia power in the Levant  (International Crisis 
Group, 2012, pp. 14-15).  Another independent Salafi group, Liwa Saqour al-
Sham (Falcons of Syria Brigade), which has 4000 fighters, describes the state 
army as the Nusayri (Allawite) army and believes that Arab nationalism is 
‘absolutely forbidden’ by Islamic law given it unites Sunni Muslims with 
Christians and Allawites (International Crisis Group, 2012, pp. 16-18). Given 
such rhetoric Syria’s minorities are under considerable threat from radical Salafi 
groups.    In accordance with Ethnic Conflict Theory the existence of radicals 
escalates tensions and thus greatly heightens the risk of ethno-sectarian groups as 
a whole engaging in communal conflict.     
 
Fortunately Jihadi ideology does not have the support of mainstream Syria.  Many 
within the uprising are fearful of the presence of highly motivated extremists who 
believe their agenda is ordained by religion, with activist Abu Yassir stating 
‘They [Jabhat Nusra] are stealing the revolution from us and they are working for 
the day that comes after’. The increasing visibility of groups such as JN reinforces 
the regime’s narrative which asserts that the uprising is not part of the Arab 
Spring but is the work of Islamic terrorists and armed gangs   (O'Bagy, Jihad in 
Syria, 2012, p. 38).   Salafist and Muslim Brotherhood ideologies are not 
prevalent in Syria and it was not until 2013 that they became a significant factor 
within the uprising.   
 
Jihadists and JN have at times worked alongside the FSA in joint operations. 
Various units of the FSA express a willingness to work with JN and other 
Jihadists due to their common commitment to the downfall of the regime, their 
effectiveness in battle and their greater access to resources.   The admiration for 
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bravery that JN has earned from the FSA and sympathetic citizens is not an 
indication of acceptance of JN’s ideological stance, but a willingness to accept 
additional fighters as the opposition becomes increasingly desperate  (O'Bagy, 
Jihad in Syria, 2012, pp. 36-37).     
 
However this does not negate the developing distrust between the two groups over 
their ideological differences which has at times escalated into violence.   Reports 
have emerged of fighting between rebels and Islamic groups for control over rebel 
held villages.  For example in Homs, a Fatah al Islam member, Walid al Boustani, 
attempted to establish an ‘Islamic Emirate of Homs’.  Within a few weeks Walid 
al Boustani was executed after a trial by the FSA for the kidnap and murder of 
Syrian citizens.  This is emblematic of the conflict within the uprising between the 
founding mainstream opposition with its democratic and pluralist aims and the 
radical elements increasingly inserting themselves into the chaos (O'Bagy E. , 
Jihad in Syria, 2012, pp. 27, 36 & 37). 
Furthermore foreign fighters are also a worrying dynamic, particularly as they get 
more established within Syria, although they are marginalised by the revolution’s 
local leadership and as such are not able to significantly alter the nature of the 
grass roots uprising against the Syrian regime  (O'Bagy, Jihad in Syria, 2012, pp. 
19-21 & 24-26).     JN and al Qaeda in Iraq number at least 5000 fighters and 
maybe as many as twice that out of approximately 100-150,000 rebels in which 
only 30-40,000 fighters are prepared to fight outside their home towns (Pollack K. 
M., 2013, p. 3). 
The early actions of the Syrian regime facilitated the arrival of religious radicals 
into Syria.  The Syrian regime’s earlier ties with terrorist groups had resulted in its 
inclusion on the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list since 1979. This particularly 
relates to their support of Jihadis in their ‘holy’ war against the US presence in 
Iraq.  However these ties enabled Jihadis to develop networks and a logistical 
knowledge of Syria, providing them with a useful platform to infiltrate the 
opposition and extend their influence (O'Bagy, Jihad in Syria, 2012, p. 9 & 13). 
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Religious tensions within the uprising has been further accentuated by militant 
Iraqi Sunni joining the fighting espousing it is their divine duty to support the 
Sunni lead movement.  There has been a corresponding arrival of militant Iraqi 
Shi’ites in support of the Allawite regime, a move reportedly facilitated by the 
Iranian government. The Iraqis are bringing with them militant sectarian attitudes 
honed within their own civil war adding to the escalating sectarian hatred 
(Arango, 2012).   
Futher regional developments are evident in Lebanon with the Lebanese political 
power balance likely to change should the Assad regime weaken further as this 
will reduce the dominance of Syrian aligned Hezbollah. As such some Lebanese 
Sunni are leaving to fight in Syria with one describing it as ‘a chance to check 
Hezbollah’s power’ by ousting the Assads (O'Bagy E. , Syria's Political 
Opposition, 2012, pp. 24-26).    
With the traditionally marginalised Shia mobilising politically within the last 20 
years across the region and gaining ground in Iran, Lebanon and Iraq, radical Shia 
are interpreting the Syrian conflict as a fight for the future of  the Shia faith to 
preserve the sect’s recent advances resulting in a rise in the Shia Jihad narrative.  
The Iraqi Shi’ites are joining forces with Iranian and Lebanese Shi’ites creating a 
potential for an all-out proxy war with Syria as the regional sectarian battlefield in 
the contest for power and influence between the Sunni and Shia  (Arango, 2012).     
 
Intensifying this development is the very anti-Shi’ite Salafi rhetoric within Syria 
where prominent clerics are rejecting the notion that the Syrian uprising is a social 
movement for democracy instead declaring it is ‘a Jihad on behalf of Sunnism 
against a polytheistic Allawite regime waging full-scale war against Islam as part 
of a broader Iranian-led regional Shi’ite conspiracy’.  Unfortunately moderate 
clerics are either keeping a low profile within Syria or remain loyal to the regime 
resulting in little religious challenges to the narratives of radical clerics.  This is 
making it increasingly difficult to contradict the regime’s narrative and gives 
legitimacy to regime advisor Buthaina Shaaban’s description of the uprising as 
fitna (religious strife) (International Crisis Group, 2012, pp. 30-33).   
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As such Al Qaeda’s attempts to graft itself to the revolution is supported by 
religious narratives including declaring Sunni Muslims as duty bound to fight 
against the heretic Syrian regime. However given that al Qaeda ideology rejects 
Arab states due to their Western origins this translates as a rejection of the 
nationalistic loyalty displayed by the rebels   (O'Bagy, Jihad in Syria, 2012, p. 29).   
Given that Al Qaeda’s ideology also clashes with the revolution’s primary 
objectives of democracy and pluralism it is evident that Al Qaeda’a solidarity with 
the Syrian uprising is opportunist.  Rather than genuinely supporting the 
revolutionaries’ key aims the group is instead attempting to position itself so as to 
take advantage of an anticipated upcoming power vacuum in order to advance 
their own goal of imposing an Islamic caliphate.    
 
As such radical Islamists are challenging the rebels for the right to choose the 
future of Syria.  This is evident in the following statement by an Egyptian Salafist 
talking to a group of fellow Jihadis ‘You are in confrontation with two apostate 
armies,’ he said referring to both the Syrian army and FSA, ‘When you have 
finished with one army you will start with the next’, this statement was recorded 
at the border post of Bab al Hawa where a group of foreign Jihadis had raised the 
al Qaeda flag (Abdul-Ahad, 2012).    As such Jihadi participation in the uprising 
has been divisive with reports that a Homs protest dispersed when a Salafist stood 
up and chanted Salafist slogans  (Wood, 2012).    
Debates over leadership within rebel held areas is also creating conflict between 
Salafist armed groups and local rebel units.  For example the FSA Islamic Farouq 
brigade accused foreign Jihadis of spreading yet another disfigured form of Islam 
and behaving like war lords within a local community.  Farouq issued a death 
threat against the Jihadi group’s leader Abu Mohammad if he did not leave the 
area.  The Jihadi leader refused as he claimed that given the Arab Spring was due 
to Islamic fervour they had a right to remain.  A few days later Abu Mohammad 
was found dead in a ditch.  Given rebels are already resisting Salafists seeking to 
impose local authority they are likely to resist a radical Islamist takeover should 
the regime fall (Abdul-Ahad, 2012).  Furthermore the lack of international and 
domestic support means that JN and other radical Islamic groups would lack the 
capacity to govern effectively.  However it is likely that in a post Assad 
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environment radical Islamists will continue to contest for control therefore they 
represent a danger to the future stability of Syria (Blake, 2013, pp. 12-13). 
As such rising militancy and radicalism is exacerbating Syrian sectarianism and 
this is intensified by being set against the Islamic revival.      In 2005 the Daily 
Star reported Sheikh Wehbi Zuleimi, a conservative Islamic cleric described the 
Islamic revival sweeping the region in these terms, ‘It is a reaction to the flagrant 
European and American policies that challenge the existence of Islam and try to 
rid Islam from the region’ (Blanford, Syrian Islamic Scholar Preaches 
Moderation: Mohammed Habash offers Alternative to Islamic Conservatism, 
2005).      This reflects the Sunni myth symbol complex which is based around 
struggles against outsiders perceived to be challenging Islam.    
 
Historically this was evident within resistance to the Christian Crusaders, and in 
the modern context extents to resistance to  globalisation and the corresponding 
spread of Western lifestyles and values such as secularism which are threatening 
to marginalise not only to the Muslim religion but also to decrease the social 
power and influence of its clerics.   Consequently politically motivated clerics 
seek to promote the Sunni Islam and to encourage a defensive cohesion amongst 
Sunni.  Sadeq al-Asm states ‘Fundamentalists believe this is the final 
confrontation,’ he said. ‘If the modernization of states continues like this what is 
there to prevent Islam from eventually becoming like Christianity in Europe? 
They feel that if they don't stand up now and draw a line, that's it’ (Blanford, 
Syrian Islamic Scholar Preaches Moderation: Mohammed Habash offers 
Alternative to Islamic Conservatism, 2005).   Most Syrians however remain 
moderate in their religious views and remain fearful of Islamists installing a 
repressive Islamic regime  (Blanford, Syrian Islamic Scholar Preaches 
Moderation: Mohammed Habash offers Alternative to Islamic Conservatism, 
2005).   
 
Manipulative elites provoke group defensiveness in order to mobilise sectarian 
groups for political goals of power and control, a tactic identified within Ethnic 
Conflict Theory (Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic 
War, 2001, p. 34) and often used by radical clerics.    This was evident within the 
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protests and violence in reaction to the ‘Innocence of Muslims’ film with Bernard 
Haykel observing that ‘It’s true that there are sanctions against insulting the 
Prophet, but this is really about political or symbolic opportunists amidst the 
breakdown of traditional religious authority, who use religious symbols to 
advance their own power or prestige against other groups’ (Worth, 2012).   
 
There are contradictory influences running through the local population regarding 
the monopolisation of Islam for political purposes.  Regionally Islamic terrorism 
is losing credibility and going the way of Arab nationalism, as it is revealed to be 
another ideology that has failed to improve the lot of Middle Eastern citizens 
(Wright, The Struggle within Islam, 2011).    However direct exposure to state 
violence is decreasing resistance to Islamic rhetoric amongst affected sectors of 
the population.  The Middle Eastern Islamic cultural emphasis on obedience to 
authority and a reliance on religious guidance potentially heightens the 
susceptibility of Muslim populations to the extreme sectarian rhetoric of clerics 
such as al Qaeda’s Zawahiri who called on Muslims in Syria to join the 
international Jihad against the Syrian regime and the West (The Arab Digest, 
2012).    
 
Additionally the lack of unified leadership, including the disconnect between the 
exiled political leadership and the protesters, has created a vacuum and there is a  
risk  this void will be filled by extremists voices such as Salafi Sheikh Adnan al-
Ar’our, who has proclaimed that the Sunnis should take back Syria (Nayel, 2011).  
The Salafist worldview is particularly harmful in conflict situations given it 
features the negative defining of out-groups, a readymade narrative encouraging 
armed conflict, and justification for martyrdom (International Crisis Group, 2012, 
p. 5),  thereby satisfying many of the characteristics Ethnic Conflict Theory 
outlines as increasing the likelihood of ethno-sectarian conflict. 
 
Although the mainstream opposition rejects Jihadi ideology and has repeatedly 
confirmed their commitment to democracy, pluralism and the protection of 
minorities,  given many Sunni are religiously conservative many are predisposed 
towards a moderate Islamic reform of Syrian governance.   Though moderate 
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Islam is not incompatible with democracy there is increasing concern that the 
uprising may be losing sight of pluralistic democracy as its end goal (O'Bagy E. , 
Jihad in Syria, 2012, p. 9 &24) and looking towards assuming power in the more 
traditional Middle Eastern style, i.e. the big fish eats the little fish, and 
legitimising such actions through Islam and tribal culture (Salzman, 2008).  
Additionally Sunni’s voting choices within any potential democracy are likely to 
reflect their Islamic faith through the support of sectarian based political parties 
meaning at least initially democracy is unlikely to lesson sectarian tensions 
created within the civil war.   
 
Jihadis on the other hand are completely incompatible with democracy as they 
seek to establish dominance through changing the global world order to an early 
Islamic model.    However the persistent use of violence and state terrorism by the 
regime has ‘blurred the line between proponents of peaceful reform and 
proponents of armed struggle, which in turn has blurred the line between political 
Islamists who have resorted to violence and Salafi-Jihadists who espouse a global 
Islamist agenda’ as it becomes increasingly evident that force is the only means to 
rid Syria of the regime (O'Bagy, Jihad in Syria, 2012, pp. 10-18). 
 
Ethnic Conflict Theory identifies that people seek the security of sectarian 
alliances to solve issues of fear and insecurity as well as using ethnic and religious 
myths and beliefs as justification for violent ‘defensive’ actions (Kaufman, 
Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War, 2001, p. 31). This 
increases the threat of massacres and revenge killings, given the insecure 
conditions of civil war, widening sectarian divides and the Islamification of the 
opposition (O'Bagy E. , Jihad in Syria, 2012, p. 24).   The regime’s terrorist 
narrative and the Islamification of the opposition is thus increasing moderate 
Syrians and minorities’ fears.   However despite the acerbating influence of 
Islamic radicals, the Assad regime’s military response to the uprising is the 
primary cause of hardening sectarian tensions within the civil war.     
 
Despite the rise in Salafi fighting groups the ideology is not deeply rooted nor is it 
a widespread social phenomenon that has been exposed by the drawing back of 
regime repression.  In Salafi rebel held areas local communities have already 
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shown signs of resistance to their strict Islamic rule.  Rather it is an ideology well 
suited to take advantage of ethno-sectarian tensions within a conflict situation as it 
draws on these fears and places them into a readymade Jihadi narrative. 
Extremists’ explanations and incitements to mobilise in protection of their own 
sects are emerging both amongst both Allawites and Sunni and are largely a 
symptom of civil war however there is the potential for this dynamic to decrease 
should the regime be toppled, provided that democracy and human rights are 
sufficiently observed in the post Assad political environment (International Crisis 
Group, 2012, pp. 36-37).   
 
However a protracted civil war, overlaid with an intensifying transnational 
religious contest between radical Sunni and Shia, is likely to increase desires for 
retaliatory violence which can be easily legitimised through a radical 
interpretation of Islam and tribal culture’s emphasis on retribution to redeem 
honour.  This would greatly intensify Syria’s sectarian divisions and hinder the 
development of a future democratic government.   
 
6.4 The Marginalised Political Opposition and its Anti-Sectarian 
Stance 
 
The uprising took the traditional political opposition by surprise.    In October 
2011 the Syrian National Council (SNC) was formed by mostly exiled activists in 
an attempt to participate in the uprising and unite the opposition.  They announced 
their intention to function as a government in exile in order to direct the future 
development of Syria.  Despite this the SNC has had very limited success at 
uniting the opposition despite Western support.  This has partly been due to 
infighting, particularly over suspicions regarding the influence of the Muslim 
Brotherhood within the SNC.  Additionally the grass roots movement is resentful 
of exiles and ex-patriots assuming leadership of what they see as their uprising 
(O'Bagy, Syria's Political Opposition, 2012, p. 9).     The political opposition was 
not poised to lead a social movement for political change, as such they are now 
struggling to gain relevance and leadership of a political movement that they did 
not instigate but which provides them with political opportunities. 
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Upon its formation in Istanbul the SNC leader was Paris based Syria political 
scientist Burhan Ghalioun and it consisted of seven main groups: the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the Damascus Declaration, National Figures/National Bloc, Kurdish 
Bloc, Assyrian Democratic Organisation, Independent Figures and representatives 
of the Local Coordination Committees.  By April 2012 seats were distributed as 
follows: 8 seats allocated to the National Bloc, 6 Independents, 5 Independents, 5 
Muslim Brotherhood, 5 Damascus Declaration, 4 Local Coordination 
Committees, 2 Kurds and 2 for the Assyrian Bloc.    The SNC aimed to provide 
the political framework in support of the uprising and to work towards the 
establishment of a ‘democratic, pluralistic civil state’ (O'Bagy E. , Syria's Political 
Opposition, 2012, p. 10).    However some of the groups within the SNC have a 
communal or religious bias.   
 
SNC members are predominantly established dissidents exiled due to state 
repression of political activism.  They are well educated with an understanding of 
the West.  Due to their ability to form secure and good communication channels 
with key international figures they have been able to emerge as the leading 
political opposition group on the international stage,  (O'Bagy, Syria's Political 
Opposition, 2012, p. 10)  a position however that  increasingly weakened to the 
point that the SNC became part of the Syrian National Coalition for Opposition 
and Revolutionary Forces (NC) formed in November 2012 in yet another attempt 
to unite the fractious Syrian opposition (New York Times, 2012).   
 
The international community is reluctant to intervene in Syria due to a lack of 
leadership, complicated regional politics and few perceived credible alternative 
political organisations to the Assads which in light of the uprising has heightened 
sectarian anxiety.    In order to secure international and domestic support the SNC 
held a conference in Tunisia in an attempt to consolidate its aims, unify the 
opposition and create momentum.   This was a difficult task for the SNC   (BBC, 
2011) as there is a feeling amongst protesters that the SNC are external Syrians 
preparing to assume power through diplomacy and negotiations whilst the 
protesters risk their lives for the cause  (O'Bagy E. , Syria's Political Opposition, 
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2012, p. 9).  Despite this there is support for the SNC from the LCC which 
features a statement on its Facebook page declaring that the SNC ‘aims, according 
to its founding statement, to support all Syrians, regardless of sect or ethnicity; to 
overthrow the regime; and to establish a civil society and democratic, multi-party 
system’ (Local Co-ordination Committees, 2011).     
The international community, for the lack of an alternative political body, 
acknowledged the SNC in April 2012 as ‘the legitimate representative’ and the 
‘main interlocutor with the international community’ citing ‘the urgent need for a 
political framework for the revolutionary work being done on the ground’.  
However despite these acknowledgements the SNC has legitimacy problems 
within Syria, the grass roots movements has developed a leadership structure of 
its own which,  although seriously hampered by a need for secrecy, has a higher 
degree of domestic legitimacy  (O'Bagy E. , Syria's Political Opposition, 2012, pp. 
9-10). 
 
 The political opposition does not drive the revolution, in fact it is merely 
attempting to assume leadership of a revolution started and carried forward by 
others.  The grass roots movement is driven by a deep rooted desire for change 
and by the internal frustration of citizens rather than inspired by the ideologies of 
political figures (O'Bagy E. , Syria's Political Opposition, 2012, pp. 9-10). 
 
The effectiveness of the SNC has been compromised by internal divisions and 
disagreements, the most significant disagreement being over whether the SNC 
should support the internal armed opposition.   Further issues emerged during 
February 2012 when 20 SNC members broke away to form the National Change 
Movement amid complaints over a restructuring that secured more power for 
Ghalioum and his supporters and a lack of transparency over the use of funds 
(O'Bagy E. , Syria's Political Opposition, 2012, pp. 11-15).   
   
Additionally there have been criticisms of the Muslim Brotherhood’s activities 
within the SNC with claims made both by outsiders and some SNC members that 
the SNC is a front through which the Muslim Brotherhood pushes its own agenda.   
Due to high level of unity among its members and the extent of funds they have 
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put forward for the SNC, the Muslim Brotherhood has been able to exert 
considerable influence within the SNC (O'Bagy, Syria's Political Opposition, 
2012, pp. 11-15).     
 
The Muslim Brotherhood is the most influential and prominent Islamic group in 
the political opposition.   Its prominence is secured through its pragmatism and its 
Muslim revivalist program which resonates with the Sunni religious conservatism, 
particularly among the urban middle class (Lund, 2012 , pp. 104-105) (Bar, 
Islamic Leader Paradigms, 2012, p. 7).  Although it is the party with the highest 
membership in Syria this is balanced by the fact that it has been operating out of 
Syria since membership of the Muslim Brotherhood was made a crime punishable 
by death in 1980.  Additionally its ability to organise and influence events is 
limited due to minorities, secularists and many civilians’ fears of the Brotherhood, 
which relates particularly to the violence carried out by the group between 1979-
82. Additionally the Muslim Brotherhood has many enemies within the general 
population despite having some support within the Sunni religious community. 
The regime has capitalised on this implying that the Muslim Brotherhood is the 
real force behind most opposition activity within Syria   (Lund, 2012 , pp. 104-
106).   
 
As such the Muslim Brotherhood struggles to overcome the distrust and fear they 
generate amongst many citizens (O'Bagy E. , Syria's Political Opposition, 2012, p. 
16) despite  their new March 2012 declaration announcing support for religious 
equality stating ‘every citizen has the right to reach the highest of positions’ 
(Lund, 2012 , p. 107).    Despite its lack of domestic support and weak internal 
networks the Muslim Brotherhood is strengthened by its established regional 
networks and access to funding from wealthy and powerful supporters in the Gulf  
States (O'Bagy, Syria's Political Opposition, 2012, p. 16). 
 
The umbrella group, the SNC, is placing itself behind the social movement’s 
agenda whilst resisting engaging the sectarian tensions within the uprising.   In 
order to strengthen its anti-sectarian position and to gain support from within the 
largely anti-sectarian grass roots opposition movement and the West, the SNC 
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elected the recently exiled Christian George Sabra as President in November 2012 
which Sabra declared was an indication that the SNC would not allow the uprising 
to descend into sectarian conflict and chaos   (Gutman, 2012).   
Both the Syria National Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NC) 
and the SNC are increasingly aware that international support is dependent on 
commitments from Syrian’s that the post Hussein sectarian civil war in Iraq will 
not be replicated in Syria.  Nir Rosen reported that ‘The regime has tried, since 
the beginning of the revolution, to fragment Syrian society and drive a wedge 
within mixed communities by dividing cities along military and security lines,’ to 
counter the regime’s rhetoric the SNC issued a February 26 statement declaring 
‘The Alawites remain an important component of Syria, and will continue to 
enjoy the same rights as other citizens as we build one nation of Christians, 
Muslims, and other sects. The regime will not be successful in pitting us against 
one another’ (Rosen, Syria's Allawite Activists stuck in the Middle, 2012). 
However the SNC is struggling to remain relevant with leadership of the political 
opposition groups now assumed by the NC (New York Times, 2012) and with 
then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stating that any new emerging 
opposition group should include more representation from within the uprising 
(Gutman, 2012).    However the new coalition is also struggling to emerge as the 
legitimate political voice for the revolution given many fighting within Syria 
continue to operate independently to the exiled opposition (New York Times, 
2012). 
 
Another political grouping, the National Coordination Body for Democratic 
Change (NCB),  was formed on 30 June 2011 three days after the unprecedented 
but unfruitful Semiramis Congress opposition meeting which was allowed by the 
regime amidst unfruitful meetings with regime officials.  The NCB    primarily 
unifies the leftist-nationalist flank of the Syrian political opposition.  The NCB is 
committed to the formation of a democratic government to replace the al Assad 
regime and believes the revolution should adhere to what it calls the three no’s:  
no violence, no sectarianism, no intervention.    Its formation has counterbalanced 
the SNC whom the NCB believed were forming a government in exile through 
119 
 
which to call for foreign intervention.  The NCB generally represents nationalists 
and leftists with some Kurdish support, however it lacks the backing of Sunni 
Islamists and liberals. The NCB has a stronger minority representation than the 
SNC with a number of Allawite activists at its formation including Aref Dalila 
and Abdelaziz al Khayyer (Lund, 2012 , pp. 80-81, 84).     
 
The NCB has positioned itself within a gap in the political landscape as the 
internal political opposition.  It shares the regime’s intense resistance to US and 
Western influence in the Middle East explaining its opposition to violence within 
the revolution given it could provoke foreign intervention.  The regime has been 
comparatively more tolerant of the NCB due to its stance against Western 
intervention and the NCB gives them the opportunity to appear less autocratic 
through granting a nonviolent opposition group a voice.  Furthermore from the 
regime’s perspective the NCB is usefully contributing to opposition divisiveness 
(Lund, 2012 , pp. 88-90). 
 
Although the NCB’s secular, anti-sectarian and nonviolent approach is reassuring 
for minorities and the business sector, it alienates the more determined armed 
rebels and protesters who are now committed to a violent resolution and the 
complete removal of the Assad regime.  Furthermore the NCB is not well 
connected to the large number of youth driving the uprising and has not created a 
prominent profile in regional or international media in contrast to the better 
funded SNC  (Lund, 2012 , pp. 90-91) and NC. 
 
The biggest grouping within the political opposition is the Sunni Islamic 
opposition which has been reinforced by the growing observance of Islam within 
Syria.   However as with the rest of the opposition, Islamic opposition is divided 
with varying ideological, political and theological strands (Lund, 2012 , p. 104).    
 
An ultra conservative branch of Sunni Islam, the Salafists have made inroads into 
certain areas, mainly among Arab poor, although it is present in some form in the 
majority of Sunni areas.  It derives its theology from the ‘Wahabbi’ religious 
institutions in Saudi Arabia and its followers adopt a strict dress code with rigid 
family and societal rules.   Political Salafists see the imposition of Islamic law as a 
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holy struggle and reject the regime as anti-Islamic due to its secular position 
whilst also opposing the regime due to the ‘heresy’ of Allawite rule (Lund, 2012 , 
pp. 108-109)     
 
Many refer to ancient fatwas given by medieval scholars such as Ibn Taymiya 
who declared the Allawites as enemies of Islam and heretics who should be 
annihilated.  The most prominent Syrian Salafist group is the transnational Hezb 
al-Tahrir who are seeking to establish a Sunni Islamic caliphate and take a long 
term approach to this goal in order to avoid direct violent confrontations.  
However they have encouraged Syrians to overthrow the regime on the basis that 
it does not rule by Sharia law.  The ultra radical Jihadi Salafists, such as al Qaeda, 
regard themselves as engaged in Holy War with secular Middle Eastern regimes 
and the West, and are somewhat scornful of other Islamic groups which extends to 
hostility towards the Muslim Brotherhood.  They see unrest as an opportunity to 
insert themselves within a weakened state as such they seek to ‘ride the wave of 
popular protest’   in Syria despite serious misgivings from the majority of Syrians  
(Lund, 2012 , pp. 108-109)  (Lund, 2012 , p. 111).    
 
There is also the loyal opposition, parties such as the National Committee for the 
Unity of Syrian Communists which is a splinter of the Syrian Communist party 
and headed by Qadri Jamil who is a reformist with regime connections.   The 
Iranian, Russian and Syrian media outlets have all portrayed Jamil as an important 
opposition leader.  This is not true, in fact opposition leaders with regime 
connections or who extend support to the regime whilst advocating for reforms 
and/or more inclusive governance are under threat from the rebels.   For example 
Ali Heidar’s Syrian Social Nationalist Party/Intifada party has been being targeted 
with Heidar’s son and another party official assassinated by rebel forces in May 
2012 (Lund, 2012 , p. 101). 
 
Importantly the grass roots movement is beginning to organise politically and the 
US has indicated that it supports political coordination that includes domestic 
opposition from within the uprising.   The Civilian Protection Commissions 
(CPC) created by the activist Abu Jafaar, an ex-Shabbiha member, is an example 
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of local organisation with the potential for political involvement.  The CPC was 
formed to help coordinate the civilian activists and FSA efforts to manage the 
Homs crisis.  The CPC was met with enthusiasm from civilians, humanitarian 
organisations, human rights activists and armed opposition groups who rallied 
behind its efforts.   The CPC is clear that it supports the growth of opposition 
political resistance ‘on the soil’ from within the ‘popular resistance against the 
Assad regime’ (O'Bagy E. , Syria's Political Opposition, 2012, pp. 31-32).  
Groups such as these could become important should the regime fall as Syrians 
have become wary of political leaders and are likely to seek leaders from within 
the movement itself. 
In order for the political opposition to achieve greater international support they 
need to broaden their base, however pressure from the Muslim Brotherhood 
within the NC is increasingly blocking greater representation, particularly of 
liberal groups such as those lead by Michel Kilo.   The actions of the Muslim 
Brotherhood exposes its real attitude towards pluralism and representative 
government i.e. only if they have too.  The strength of the Muslim Brotherhood is 
based more in their regional backers, most notably Qatar, then from support 
within Syria (Hassan, Inside Syrian Opposition's Talks in Turkey, 2012). 
Despite the external political opposition consistently verbalising anti-sectarianism 
its influence within Syria is hampered by lack of communication channels due to 
regime repression, but is also by the internal opposition movement’s suspicions 
and resentment that an external educated source is attempting to assume 
leadership of what they see as their revolution.  Additionally for a number of its 
members, most notably from within the Muslim Brotherhood, anti-sectarianism is 
likely to be a transient and pragmatic choice rather than an ideological stance.   
6.5   Syria’s Fractious Opposition Movement:  Conclusion 
The uprising began as a grass roots movement, however overtime divisions within 
the opposition have become increasingly evident. Whilst all want the downfall of 
the regime, ideas about what should replace the Assads varies greatly.  The groups 
that constitute the opposition movement range from secular through to radical 
Salafist  as such whilst it is clear the opposition are uniformly anti-regime not all 
the opposition are pro-democracy.   
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Despite an influx of Jihadi’s and the establishment of home-grown Salafist armed 
units these groups are still considerably outnumbered by more moderate Syrian 
nationals.     Considerable wariness of al Qaeda and Islamic terrorism within the 
domestic population is limiting the influence of extremists.  However the surge of 
radical Islamic groups greatly complicates the outcome of the revolution and 
contributes to international and domestic reservations regarding the uprising.    
Due to the varied ideological and religious stances within the opposition 
movement and the logistical difficulty of communication due to state repression 
and violence, establishing a common leadership for the movement has proved 
difficult.    The mainstream moderate opposition generally represents the nature of 
the uprising but given other more radical elements it is unable to realistically 
promise security, stability or safety for all sectarian groups.    
Grass roots opposition is the driving force behind the uprising. Most of the 
fighters in the armed rebellion are best described as Sunni religious nationalists.  
They are firmly behind the Syrian state, religiously conservative, and generally 
seek freedom, human rights and the downfall of the regime. The opposition 
activists and fighters are typically wary of leadership and are concerned about 
political groups stepping in and taking over the revolution once they have secured 
the downfall of the regime.      This means that despite the efforts of the political 
groups like the NC and the Revolutionary Councils the uprising does not have a 
coherent narrative through which to convince the minority groups and Sunni wary 
of the uprising to join the movement in significant numbers and to reassure the 
population of coherent plans for the future of Syria.     
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Chapter Seven 
Minority Responses to the Uprising:  Allawite Fears, Christian 
Vulnerability and Kurdish Aspirations  
7.1 The Allawite Dilemma:  Allawite Security and the Assad Regime 
 
From the eleventh century the Allawite myth symbol complex permanently 
included animosity towards and wariness of the Sunni sect (Worren, 2007, p. 53 
& 57).  To escape persecution Allawites fled to the safety of geographical 
isolation in the Jabal al-Sahiliyah Mountains in North-Western Syria.  However 
this placed them further onto the social periphery and contributed to them being 
seen as ‘wild’ and ‘uncivilised’ heretics (Worren, 2007, p. 44 & 54). The Allawite 
identity is constructed around their insecurity within a threatening environment in 
which they have typically been the subject of persecution and social rejection.   
The insecurity of the Allawites, and other minorities, is the primary reason that 
the most Allawites remain committed to the Assad regime (Worren, 2007, pp. 96-
98).   
 
Symbolic politics outlines how ethnic conflict becomes part of an ethno-sectarian 
group’s identity and how in the case of the persecuted, each time they suffer 
violent discrimination it confirms their victim status (Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: 
The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War, 2001).  Historically the Allawites have been 
subject to ongoing sectarian persecution by Sunni Muslims. For example the 
Sunni Mamluks, like the Ayyubids who ruled the region before them, saw the 
Allawites, Ismailis and Twelver Shi’ites as heretics and persecuted them on this 
basis (Friedman, 2010, p. 62 & 176).  The Ottomans who ousted the Mamluks 
continued to persecute Allawites as non-Muslims, beheading Allawites they 
deemed to be testing the existing order.   This led to Allawites politically 
prioritising security (Goldsmith, Resiliance of Allawite Asabiyya and 
Implications for the Syrian Uprising, 2012).     
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Even as recently as 1950 Allawites remained uneasy about travelling to Latakia 
due to Sunni animosity (Mohammad, 2012).    Each violent and/or prejudiced 
event has became part of the Allawite identity and its myth symbol complex 
which centres on the Sunni as threatening and themselves, the Allawites, as at risk 
(Worren, 2007, p. 102). 
 
In contrast, the history of the Christians and the Allawites is marked with 
cooperation dating back to the Crusaders campaigns in the Holy Land in the 11th 
century where the Allawites and the Christians discovered a common interest in 
resisting Sunni domination (Worren, 2007, pp. 57-60).  According to Ethnic 
Conflict Theory when faced with assessing a current threat communal groups 
refer to history, particularly where other groups are implicated in past atrocities.  
However referring to a past marred by communal conflict makes a recurrence of 
such conflict more likely  (Wolff, 2009, pp. 26-27) and given the historical 
persecution and clashes between minorities such as the Christians and Allawites 
with the Sunni this therefore has important implications for the current uprising.  
 
Given their history of marginalisation and persecution the Allawites perceive that 
they need the Assad regime for protection against the Sunni majority.  The Assad 
regime elite and the Allawite sect have a symbiotic relationship in that both assess 
that without the other they would face hostility.   However although the majority 
of the political and military elite are Allawite it does not follow that all Allawites 
are privileged.   Benefits to Allawites from the Assad regime can be very uneven, 
however the previously universally poor Allawite region has largely been better 
off financially since Hafez al Assad and indeed some of its community members 
have since risen to become the wealthiest in the country  (Bar S. , 2006, p. 393).    
Despite this there are still villages in the mountains in Northern Syria that do not 
have access to electricity or a ready water supply and live under poverty stricken 
conditions (Beck, 2010, pp. 85-86).  As such Bashar al Assad’s perceived 
alignment with the wealthy elite to which he belongs has contributed to rising 
resentment amongst Allawites.  
 
Therefore although the Assad regime is headed by an Allawite family the regime 
does not represent Allawite sectarian dominance of Syria.  Political power in 
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Syria is held by an inner circle of the Assad family and their close associates, who 
are often but not always, Allawite  (Rais, 2008).  The regime has co-opted 
individuals from all sectarian groups in order to broaden its support base creating 
a political system based on an Allawite dominated confessional coalition (Bar S. , 
2006, p. 357).   It is important to note that whilst the regime would fall without 
Allawite support, particularly as this relates to the security apparatus leadership, 
the Allawite sect as a whole are ultimately another repressed group within Syrian 
society (Rais, 2008).    
 
The regime are keenly aware of how vulnerable they are to the Allawite sect and 
as such  opposition that comes from this sector  appears to be met with harsher 
punishments then meted out to members of other sectarian groups (Goldsmith, 
Syria's Allawites and the Politics of Sectarian Insecurity: A Khaldunian 
Perspective, 2011, p. 46).  Furthermore in order to consolidate its influence over 
the Allawite sect the Assad regime has steadily worked to overtake any internal 
Allawite leadership.   Traditionally the Allawite clerics were prominent 
community leaders, including during the French Administration and in early 
independence.  A loosely constructed Allawite national council, the Majlis Milli, 
co-ordinated Allawite affairs and also held some influence over the President 
Hafez, however over time both the influence of community leaders and the power 
of the Allawite religion and clerics has been eroded by the regime (Bar S. , 2006, 
pp. 393-394).    
 
Under Hafez al Assad the Allawites entered a period of relative security which 
was shaken by the Muslim Brotherhood uprising between 1976 and 1982 and 
culminated in the state massacre of predominantly Sunni in Hama.   Not only was 
much of the Muslim Brotherhood rhetoric and violence aimed at Allawites but the 
harsh regime reaction meant that Allawites now had a strong reason to fear Sunni 
retribution and this cemented Allawite reliance on the regime for security  
(Goldsmith, Syria's Allawites and the Politics of Sectarian Insecurity: A 
Khaldunian Perspective, 2011, pp. 42-43).  Ethnic Conflict Theory shows that 
sectarian conflict often has its roots in the past which is reflected in the current 
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civil war given that Northern Syria, significantly Hama and Homs, have emerged 
as key opposition areas within the 2011 initiated uprising.    
  
Additionally Lebanese and Iraqi sectarian violence, the rise of Sunni Islam and 
activities of Salafists around the region has upheld the belief that Allawites are 
still vulnerable to sectarian threats and therefore continue to need the Allawite 
dominated autocracy for security  (Bar S. , 2006, p. 393).  As such Allawites 
become nervous and potentially more loyal when the regime is under threat such 
as during the Special Tribunal for Lebanon crisis  (Goldsmith, Syria's Allawites 
and the Politics of Sectarian Insecurity: A Khaldunian Perspective, 2011, pp. 48-
49) caused by the assassination of former Lebanese PM Hariri and the subsequent 
2005 ousting of the Syrian military from Lebanon.  
 
However the primary feature of this period was the significant weakening of the 
regime’s wall of fear, including within the Allawite community as emphasised by 
activists such as Allawite Professor Aref Dalila beginning to publicly criticise the 
regime.  This activism was advanced by the growth of  online communities which 
linked together dissenters from all sectarian groups signifying the potential to 
corrode the sectarian insecurity necessary to maintain the regime’s support from 
within the minority sects (Goldsmith, Syria's Allawites and the Politics of 
Sectarian Insecurity: A Khaldunian Perspective, 2011, pp. 45, 46-48).    
 
Furthermore the earlier Allawite Interior Minister Ghazi Kana’an was an 
alternative source of influence within the Allawite community. With rumours of 
links to anti-Syrian Lebanese and the Sunni politician Abd al-Halim Khaddam, 
Kana’an could conceivably have orchestrated a challenge for leadership of the 
Allawite community.    This speculation that Kana’an represented a threat to the 
authority of the Assad regime both nationally and within the Allawite region was 
seemingly confirmed by his death in 2005 described as ‘state suicide’ and is 
another indicator that Allawite unity behind the regime was fracturing 
(Goldsmith, Syria's Allawites and the Politics of Sectarian Insecurity: A 
Khaldunian Perspective, 2011, p. 47) prior to the uprising.  
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However the uncertainty and instability caused by the uprising, high Sunni 
numbers among the activists and the elites’ use of sectarian tactics has 
predominantly reversed the Allawite drift away from allegiance to the regime 
(Sheppard, 2011).   According to Symbolic Politics Theory fear is the key to 
understanding ethnic conflict.   Groups such as the Allawites with myth symbol 
complexes that heavily feature feelings of persecution and victimization are 
already geared towards fearfully defensive attitudes (Kaufman, 2001, p. 31).  
Security concerns manipulated and intensified by a predatory elite are often the   
root cause of ethno-sectarian rifts  (Kaufman, 2001, p. 34).   As such fear of both 
Sunni Islamists rising to power and sectarian chaos, intensified by the regime’s 
rhetoric and actions, is the primary glue that secures many Allawites, Christians, 
the business class and secular middle class citizens to the Assad regime in face of 
the uprising.   
 
In order to secure minority allegiance and to justify violence against the internal 
opposition the regime is circulating a narrative that resonates with the US War on 
Terror and civilian fears of Salafist terrorists who have destabilised the region in 
recent years  (Sheppard, 2011).   For instance in early 2011 Presidential advisor 
Buthaina Shaaban made a statement claiming to both national and international 
audiences that there was no uprising, that alternatively Syria was facing attacks 
from  Muslim terrorists and/or an Israeli/US or Saudi/US conspiracy to destabilise 
Syria.  Shaaban declared that the terrorists were aiming to disrupt the peaceful 
coexistence of sects and had timed their mobilisation with the Egyptian and 
Libyan revolutions in order to appear as a popular protest movement for human 
rights and democracy.    She also implicated the Muslim Brotherhood, claiming 
they were enacting revenge for their failed uprising in 1982 and that the protests 
were not representative of the Syrian people  (AFP, 2011).  
 This rhetoric is in line with Ethnic Conflict Theory’s proposition that 
manipulative elites play on the greatest fears of their sectarian group, in this case 
sectarian conflict and retribution.  As such the Assad regime is mobilising support 
through framing their aim to hold onto political power as a necessary for the 
maintenance of sectarian security and stability (AFP, 2011).  However the fact 
this narrative is politically expedient does not discount the comparative security 
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the regime has afforded Allawites and other minorities but neither does it reveal 
the extent to which the regime has manipulated the sectarian dangers.  Moreover it 
is evident that the regime has highlighted radical Islamists within the uprising 
whilst attempting to persuade citizens that radical Islamists are representative of 
the whole opposition movement in order to provoke fear in minorities and 
moderate Sunni. 
Freelance journalist Moe Ali Nayel’s trip to Syria in 2011 depicted the growing 
sectarian tensions.  He discovered that despite Allawites living relatively 
peacefully alongside Sunni prior to the uprising, the Allawite neighbourhoods in 
Homs were now guarded by the Mukhabarat and army tanks.   All the Allawites 
he spoke to were convinced by the state’s assertions that the revolution was a joint 
Saudi/American conspiracy to pressure Syria to remove its allegiance from the 
axis of resistance whilst forcing it to sign a peace treaty with Israel and abandon 
its connections with Palestine  (Nayel, 2011).   
Allawite actress and activist Fadwa Soliman spoke out about the regime’s 
attempts to manipulate minority sectarian insecurity  (International Crisis Group, 
2011) (Atassi, 2011).   She claims they had proof that the regime tried to incite 
rifts by staging sectarian conflicts through sending a troop of 200 men to kill 
members of one sect then dropping the bodies into another sect area. Despite her 
fears of the regime security forces, Fadwa Soliman had joined the protests in an 
attempt dispel the perception that all Allawites support the Assad regime (Atassi, 
2011).    
Additionally reports have emerged that the regime has used the security apparatus 
to spread rumours of sectarian violence, distributing sandbags and weapons long 
before there was a need for them in order to intensify fearfulness amongst 
minority groups.   Over time the effects of state repression and state violence 
within the uprising has resulted in the reality beginning to approach the regime’s 
rhetoric.  The regime’s actions have intensified the historical perception of the 
‘savagery’ of the Allawite community and exacerbated past grievances such as the 
transfer of land ownership from Sunni elite to Allawite serfs in some areas during 
the early years of Ba’athi rule (International Crisis Group, 2011, p. 2).   
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There are emerging pointers that the regime is securing areas for Allawites in the 
region that was formally the Allawite autonomous state given large numbers of 
Sunni being displaced following clearance campaigns in Sunni enclaves along the 
coast in Baniyas, Bayda, Tal Kalakh and Latakia’s Rama neighbourhood. 
Moreover given the lack of state denial of the recent massacres of Sunni civilians 
by Allawite Shabbiha and the security forces in Baniyas and Bayda, coupled with 
a YouTube video showing a leader of the Alawi militia alongside an Allawi 
religious leader outlining plans to ‘cleanse Baniyas of the traitors’ in what appears 
to be a calculated move, these operations point to an additional motivation.  It 
appears that the regime is attempting to intimidate Sunni and to deliberately 
intensify sectarian hatred in order to secure Allawite recruitment and support 
given anti-Assad attitudes developing amongst Allawites, most notably in the 
Assad hometown of Qardaha where a rift amongst Allawite elite lead to clashes in 
Fall 2012  (O'Bagy E. , Syria Update: Assad targets Sunni along Syria's Coast, 
2013).    
 
The coast is not a homogeneous Allawite area given the presence of Sunni 
enclaves.   Figures released recently by the International Strategic Research 
Organisation place Sunni at 45 % in Tartous, 50% in Latakia and 70% of the 
population in Latakia’s outskirts.  Allawite numbers in Tartous were reportedly 
90% at the beginning of the uprising but due to influxes of civilians, mostly 
Aleppo’s upper classes escaping inland violence by retreating to their coastal 
resort homes, the figure decreased to 60% by summer 2012. Additionally whilst 
the clearance campaigns were taking place the security forces were successfully 
suppressing anti-regime cross sectarian demonstrations in Latakia.  Given these 
demonstrations the coastal region may emerge as the ideal place for future cross 
sectarian mediation (O'Bagy E. , Syria Update: Assad targets Sunni along Syria's 
Coast, 2013).    
 
The opposition movement has long been aware of the Assad regime’s dependence 
on Allawite support with former Muslim Brotherhood leader Ali Bayanouni 
stating in 2006 ‘The Alawites in Syria are part of the Syrian people and comprise 
many national factions... [The] present regime has tried to hide behind this 
community and mobilize it against Syrian society. But I believe that many 
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Allawite elements oppose the regime, and there are Alawites who are being 
repressed.’  Attempts to reassure minorities of their place within Syria have also 
emerged within the current conflict for instance protesters have chanted ‘Syrians 
are one!’ (Goldsmith, Syria's Allawites and the Politics of Sectarian Insecurity: A 
Khaldunian Perspective, 2011, pp. 50, 51 & 53).   
 
However as the uprising wears on sectarian violence on the ground is 
undermining opposition attempts to reassure Allawites that their security is not 
dependent on the regime.  As a result Allawite activists tend to keep their 
sectarian identity secret or they make a very clear stance of their allegiances, with 
the example an Allawite protester declaring over the microphone at a protest ‘I am 
from the Allawite sect not the Assadi sect’ (Rosen, Syria's Allawite Activists 
stuck in the Middle, 2012).   
 
Disengaging Allawite support from the regime will be a difficult. Given that the 
Muslim Brotherhood and many Sunni have repeatedly voiced disapproval of Syria 
being ruled by Allawite heretics, the regime has worked to mainstream their 
sectarian position through an ‘Islamification’ of the Allawite religion and 
suppression of outward expressions of the Allawite identity.  As such the Allawite 
religion is underrepresented within the religious schooling system, with the Sunni 
religion having hundreds of religious schools in contrast to the complete lack of 
Allawite establishments (Bar S. , 2006, p. 394).   With the Allawite religious 
identity suppressed, an alternative identity centred on the Assad family was 
enforced by the cult of personality around the Assad Presidents.   To an extent 
‘Assadism filled the gap left by the negation of traditional Allawite identity’ 
(Khoury, 2012 , p. 50).     The Allawite adage ‘You are with Assad, you are with 
yourself’ used widely in the uprising, reflects that the identification of many 
Allawites with the Assads has been strengthened by the current instability   
(Balanche, 2011).   
 
Furthermore the personality cult surrounding Bashar al Assad has extended within 
the uprising to accord him god sanctioned status as defender of the homeland.  As 
such the cult of personality propaganda has reinforced the intertwining of the 
Allawite sectarian identity with the Assad family whilst invoking nationalism to 
131 
 
justify state violence against the opposition movement and the hero worship of 
Bashar al Assad (International Crisis Group, 2012).     
 
However the regime’s rhetoric does not stand up to analysis.  It is clear that the 
uprising is not solely comprised of Sunni radical Islamists nor do radical Islamists 
lead the movement.  It is evident however, that many within the protests are rural 
Sunni and that significant numbers of Allawites, Christians and Sunni 
commercially linked to the regime are notably absent within the opposition 
(Shabaan, 2013).  As a result there is a sectarian imbalance within the protests and 
correspondingly this meant that once the FSA started to protect protesters 
militarily the social movement began to take on the appearance of a Sunni lead 
anti-Allawite rebellion with the escalating violence from both sides leading to 
civil war.  The civil war and the rise of home-grown Jihadi groups such as Al 
Nusra are increasing fears of outright sectarian conflict and lending credibility to 
regime arguments (Wood, 2012).  According to Ethnic Conflict Theory people 
seek safety through their ethno-sectarian communities in times of stress and this is 
happening to a considerable degree, particularly among the Allawites.         
However the regime’s sectarian and terrorist narrative is being challenged by the 
opposition through social media. Daily videos are posted showing state violence 
against protesters and civilians on opposition internet spaces such as the Syrian 
Revolution 2011 Facebook Page (Syrian Revolution Facebook Page, 2011).  
However simultaneously YouTube updates from Jihadis promoting their goals of 
an Islamic Caliphate are undermining attempts to reassure and unify sectarian 
groups behind the uprising.  Regime supporters doubt the credibility and/or the 
ability of the moderates within the uprising to contain sectarian retribution and 
continue to believe that they need to hang together to succeed or they will be hung 
separately  (Sheppard, 2011). 
A 2012 New York Times interview with a Damascene Allawite woman described 
the security situation for Allawites, she outlined that when she went out she now 
wore a headscarf in order to be taken as Sunni, and that most of the Allawites she 
knew including her family were moving back to their villages of origin in the 
Allawite area. With her husband in the Syrian Army, she believes that retribution 
is likely as ‘Who lost a son or a brother wants revenge, and he will take 
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vengeance from Alawites before anyone else because most Alawites are 
commanders of security forces. I am sorry to say this, but I think the Assad 
regime is using us in the crackdown, and when it will falls, they will run away, 
and we will pay the heavy price’ (Bakri, 2012).  This fear is supported by Ethnic 
Conflict Theory which asserts that when a minority inflicts a great trauma on a 
majority group if that majority group becomes dominant they will seek retribution 
for past grievances  (Wolff, 2009, pp. 39-40). 
 
Furthermore a sentiment heard amongst Allawites is that the regime has damaged 
the Allawite reputation and as such was responsible for sectarian tensions which 
would be ‘very harmful in the hypothetical situation where a new regime cannot 
guarantee the rights of the Alawi community’ (Worren, 2007, p. 88).  Arguably 
this is no longer a hypothetical situation. 
Social Identity Theory suggests that inter-group hostility stems from conflicting 
goals and the employment zero sum competition  which leads to negative 
stereotypes and hostility (Wolff, 2009, p. 37).  The combined effects of the regime 
tactics to encourage minority insecurity and to put down the largely Sunni led 
uprising are likely to bring about the danger to minorities that the regime claims 
they are protecting them from.   The more violent the regime’s repression the 
greater the retribution the regime and Allawites face should the regime fall.  
Conversely the opposition know that if they fail to topple the regime they face 
death, torture /or imprisonment by the regime with retribution extending to their 
family members. It has become an existential contest in which for their safety 
both sides must win. 
The Allawites were the vehicle through which the Assad regime secured political 
power and plundered the country for their own gain. Coupled with state violence 
in face of the uprising and the high number of Allawites in the armed forces the 
Allawites are increasingly perceived to be the regime (International Crisis Group, 
2011, pp. 2-3).  This perception is becoming increasingly accurate as Sunni 
defections are creating a higher and higher representation of Allawites within the 
regime and security apparatus (Al Jazeera, 2012, p. 4).   In affect the Al Assad 
regime is using the Allawites and other minorities to hold onto power, thereby 
holding them hostage and linking their fate, in particular the Allawites, with the 
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regimes.  This is creating a situation where they need the regime to remain in 
power or they face the angry and prejudiced Sunni masses (International Crisis 
Group, 2011, pp. 2-3).   However there is likely to be a breaking point whereby 
the regime gets so violent and/or it begins to fall, with the result that Allawites 
will be forced to reassess their allegiance.  Historically pragmatic, the Allawites 
will at this point seek to re-establish their security through other means than the 
regime (Jackson, 2006, pp. 15-16). 
 
7.2   Kurdish Mobilisation and the Syrian Uprising 
  
In accordance with the Ethnic Communal Mobilizational Model given the extent 
of the Kurd’s grievances and marginalisation under the Assads the potential for 
them to mobilise as an ethnic group has been high.   The regime strategy 
regarding the Kurds has been to repress their identity and continue their 
marginalisation thereby removing challenges from the Kurdish quarter.    
 
Kaufman describes a precursor to ethnic conflict as the opportunity to mobilise.  
Political repression can prevent ethnic or sectarian opponents from being able to 
effectively mobilise ethnically based opposition groups.   Conversely a 
breakdown in state authority within an ethnically divided state can create an 
opportunity for ethnic groups to violently seek to redress the political balance 
(Kaufman, 2001, p. 32).   The predominantly Sunni uprising against the regime 
has afforded Kurds this opportunity however Kurdish infighting and tensions 
between Kurdish groups and the predominantly Sunni opposition are weakening 
the chances of future stability and complicating the Kurds escape from 
marginalisation within Syria. 
 
The Kurds are a classic example of a nation without a state.  Divided between 
Syria, Iraq, Iran and Turkey the Kurds have struggled to gain equal rights and 
escape marginalisation.   Within Syria the Kurds have been actively repressed 
since the 1950s under the guise of promoting Arab unity (Human Rights Watch, 
2009, p. 10).     The Ba’ath party continued the repression of Kurds after they 
came into power in 1962, part of which was a census within the Kurdish al-
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Hasakeh region under the pretext that a number of the Kurdish population had 
illegally entered the country from Turkey.  This led to the citizenship of 120,000 
Kurds being revoked.  With the status as non-citizens being passed onto children, 
the number of stateless Kurds has since grown to 300,000.   Stateless Kurds are 
denied their rights with their ability to engage in education, employment, property 
ownership, legal marriage and politics severely restricted  (Human Rights Watch, 
2009, p. 10).      
 
Another key part of the regime’s strategy to keep the Kurds politically and 
socially marginalised was to establish an Arab belt by resettling Arabs within the 
traditionally Kurdish area involving the forced displacement of Kurds already on 
the land.  This Arab belt also served to separate Syrian Kurds from the 
increasingly politically assertive Iraqi Kurds (Human Rights Watch, 2009, p. 10). 
 
Horowitz states that ‘language is a symbol of domination’ with the status of a 
language being a symbol for the status of a group (Horowitz, 1985, p. 219).  This 
is particularly significant in terms of the Kurds as the regime set out to repress the 
Kurdish identity and culture, denying Kurds the right to speak their language in 
public and banning Kurdish language publications.   In 1977 the state renamed 
Kurdish regions and villages with Arab names, justifying this on the grounds of 
establishing an ‘Arab identity’.   The 1973 constitution also asserted the Arabness 
of Syria and the denial of any other ethnic group by stating ‘the people in the 
Syrian Arab region are part of the Arab nation (Human Rights Watch, 2009, p. 11 
& 12)’.    
 
In the 1980s the onset of conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood lead to an attempt 
to co-opt Kurdish compliance through more  tolerance of Kurdish cultural 
expression and the enlisting of many Kurds into the military and security forces  
(Human Rights Watch, 2009, pp. 11-12).     However the repression of the 
Kurdish identity largely still continued with the regime suppressing Kurdish 
political and cultural gatherings such as Nowruz, the Kurdish New Year 
celebrations (Human Rights Watch, 2009, p. 22).  Furthermore Presidential 
Decree No. 49 enacted in 2008 further disadvantaged Kurds as it restricted the 
purchase and sale of private property in certain border areas which has 
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undermined the local economies of the Kurdish region (Human Rights Watch, 
2009, p. 20).     
  
In contrast to its treatment of its own Kurdish community the Syrian regime 
supported Kurdish rights during the 1970-80s in the neighbouring states of Turkey 
and Iraq.  This was a strategic move to weaken the Iraqi and Turkish regimes 
through its support of Kurdish activism, and in turn to convince the Iraqi and 
Turkish Kurds to dissuade Syrian Kurdish mobilisation. With these aims in mind 
during the 1980s and early 1990s the Assad regime supported the Kurdish 
Workers Party (PKK) through arming and training its Lebanon based soldiers 
(Human Rights Watch, 2009, p. 12). 
 
In common with its strategies regarding other ethno-sectarian groups the regime 
suppressed the majority of Kurds whilst allowing a select number of Kurds to rise 
to positions of authority within the regime such as Mahmud Ayubi who was 
Prime Minister between 1972-1976.  This gave the regime the ability to defend 
itself against criticism of sectarianism by highlighting out-group individuals co-
opted within the regime structure (Human Rights Watch, 2009, pp. 12-13). 
 
Kurdish activism revived in the 2000s following the end of Syrian support for the 
PKK in 1998 after considerable Turkish pressure.  Additionally a renewal of ties 
between the Iraqi and Syrian regimes strained the Assad regime’s relationship 
with Iraqi Kurds.  Changes continued, with the Damascus Spring that 
accompanied Bashar al Assad ascendency to the Syrian Presidency creating an 
opening for Kurdish activism and leading to new Kurdish political parties.  
However political repression soon re-asserted itself with many Damascus Spring 
activists arrested and imprisoned (Human Rights Watch, 2009, p. 14).     
 
The 2003 US removal of Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq emboldened Syrian 
Kurds as they observed the increase in autonomy this afforded the Iraqi Kurds.  
Tensions rose between the Kurds and Arabs in Syria as many Arabs believed that 
the Syrian Kurds supported the US invasion of Iraq and the removal of Saddam 
Hussein who had ruled through the Sunni minority (Human Rights Watch, 2009, 
p. 15).   
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These tensions finally spilled over in 2004 when Kurdish supporters fought with 
Arab supporters at a football match in Qamishli (Human Rights Watch, 2009, p. 
15).     The Arab supporters reportedly held up photographs of Saddam Hussein 
whilst Kurds shouted slogans supporting US President George W. Bush (Noi, 
2012, p. 18). The response of the Syrian security forces focused solely on the 
Kurdish supporters resulting in seven Kurdish fatalities and the deployment of 
several Arab tribes against the protesters.  The next day there were further 
Kurdish casualties as the security forces fired upon demonstrations and the funeral 
processions for the fatalities from the day before (Human Rights Watch, 2009, p. 
15) (Noi, 2012, p. 18).    
 
The two days of violent protests that followed the incident in Qamishli and other 
Kurdish towns resulted in state and privately owned property being destroyed and 
the death of a police officer.  The security forces responded with force, 
surrounding and entering Qamishli and other major Kurdish towns in Northern 
Syria, arresting, beating and detaining many Kurds.  At least 36 Kurds were killed 
with an estimated 2000 detained (Human Rights Watch, 2009, p. 15).    The 
regime reacted to the protests by intensifying repression of Kurdish culture and 
political mobilisation (Noi, 2012, p. 18).   
 
However tension continued to increase between the regime and Syrian Kurds as 
the Iraqi example continued to intensify Kurdish political aspirations. The arrest 
and death, reportedly from torture, of Kurdish reform activist Sheikh Mohammed 
Ma’shuq al Khiznawi on May 2005 further heightened Kurdish hostility towards 
the regime.   The 2004 Qamishli incident had also stoked latent anger at the 
regime and lead to a tide of Kurdish anti-regime violence primarily lead by a grass 
roots youth movement (Bar S. , 2006, p. 397)  (Danish Immigration Service, 
2010, p. 29) .  
 
The 2004 Kurdish protests left Kurdish youth particularly embittered not just 
against the regime but also other Syrian ethno-sectarian groups due to their lack of 
support.  This added to the myth symbol complex of the Kurds which relates to 
the understanding that they are politically deserted by and alienated from Middle 
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Eastern Arabs and subsequently reinforced their reliance on their narrower ethnic 
loyalty over their Syrian loyalty (Sidki, 2012, pp. 2-3).    
 
It is evident that the regime actively engages in a sectarian balancing act with 
regards to the Kurds, too much freedom could enable Kurdish mobilization to 
become independent of central authority inspiring the same move across other 
sectarian and ethnic groups but too much discrimination and resentment could 
overcome Kurdish wariness of alternative political leaders, in particular Sunni 
Islamists, and led to support for ousting the Assads (Bar S. , 2006, p. 397). 
 
Although most Kurds oppose the regime, the Kurdish position with regards to 
supporting the 2011 initiated uprising was originally divided.  As a minority, the 
Kurds have been subject to the regime’s claims that without the regime’s 
protection minorities would suffer persecution by radical Islamists.  However 
Kurds also have reasons to fear Arab nationalism within the Ba’ath party.   From 
the beginning of the uprising there have been Kurds, predominantly youths, 
actively participating in the protests demanding freedom and democracy, whilst 
also agitating for national rights for the Kurdish people (Sidki, 2012, pp. 2-3).   
However the lack of assurances towards Kurdish aspirations from the opposition 
means that Kurds have assessed there is little to gain from engaging with the 
largely Sunni opposition to a greater degree. 
 
In a post Assad environment the mainstream Kurdish opposition group, the 
Kurdish National Council (KNC), would like political decentralisation, however 
is prepared to concede this if its other demands are met such as constitutional 
recognition of the Kurds, a secular state, constitutional equality between men and 
women, removal of repressive laws against Kurds and compensation for property 
lost during Arabization (Tanir, 2012).    
 
The main opposition’s position relative to the Kurds stresses the continued 
inclusion of the Kurdish regions in Syria with Salih al- Hamwi from the Higher 
Council for the Revolution in Hamah province stating ‘We are a united modern 
civil country and against ethnic or sectarian statelets’.  Firebrand Salafi cleric 
Adnan al-Arour represented the more extreme views within the opposition on the 
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matter when he stated ‘Do what you wish but we will not permit, the division of 
Syria into ethnic regions’ (Ilahan Tanir, 2012).   
 
The uprising in Syria saw the regime attempting to defuse any possible Kurdish 
participation in the revolution through a variety of tactics.   Initially they granted 
citizenship to a significant number of stateless Kurds.  In a more aggressive tactic 
the regime was believed to have assassinated Mishaal al Tammo, the leader of the 
Future Movement, on October 2011 after he had called for the regime to be 
overthrown and his party had attended the SNC Istanbul meeting, where the 
Future Movement had walked out after the SNC failed to agree to remove the 
inclusion of ‘Arab’ in any future naming of Syria. The assassination proved to be 
a miscalculation by the regime as instead of producing submission, it engaged 
Kurds behind the new attitude of angry mobilisation in the face of state aggression 
that has emerged from within the Arab Spring.  For instance on the day of 
Tammo’s funeral  tens of thousands gathered to protest in Qamishli, the largest 
protest in northern Syria up till 2012 (Noi, 2012, p. 24).    
 
There are multiple organisations through which Kurds can confront the regime 
within the uprising.  However the existence of numerous avenues has resulted in 
conflict and division within Kurdish mobilisation.  The three principle camps can 
be outlined as follows:  The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK); however much of 
the Syrian opposition contends that following the initial outbreak of protests in 
Deraa the regime renewed its connection with the PKK and allowed the PKK to 
operate freely in Kurdish areas in return for it not supporting the uprising.    There 
are further claims that the PKK, with Democratic Union Party (PYD) 
involvement, manned checkpoints and that these security details were coordinated 
with the regime’s security forces.  Secondly, the traditional Kurdish Parties who 
have tried to manage a middle ground between supporting the uprising and not 
angering the regime.  And finally the Kurdish Future Movement and the Union of 
Coordinating Committees for Kurdish Youth.  Kurdish youth have actively 
participated in the uprising from its inception (Sidki, 2012, pp. 2-3).   
 
On July 2011 the Kurdish National Conference formed the KNC which demanded 
‘the right to determine the destiny of the Kurdish people in the framework of a 
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unified Syria’ within a ‘plural democratic state’.    The KNC consisted of 250 
individuals of which 60% were unaffiliated and 40% belonged to the traditional 
Kurdish political movement, and did not include the PYD who declined to attend.  
The Council voiced its support of the Kurdish revolutionary youth movement and 
established local councils affiliated with the SNC.   However tensions exist 
between the Council and the SNC with the KNC withdrawing from the opposition 
Istanbul conference in March 2012 when the SNC refused to meet key Kurdish 
demands  (Sidki, 2012, pp. 3-4). 
 
Kurdish divisiveness has become increasingly evident reducing their ability to 
mobilise as a unified ethnic block.  There have been conflicting reports of 
assumed PYD affiliated armed units bearing PKK flags and posters of Abdullah 
Ocalan preventing anti-regime protests from going ahead in February 2012.   In 
late June and early July 2012 the FSA received complaints regarding the PYD 
from the KNC resulting in FSA attacks on PYD checkpoints in retaliation.   The 
PYD asserts that claims they are preventing protests is Turkish propaganda and 
that the KNC and the FSA are negotiating with Turkey to target them.  The PYD’s 
4500 fighters in the Qandil Mountains represent a force that the KNC is unable to 
match as such PYD assertiveness is causing concern  (Sidki, 2012, p. 2) 
(Wilgenburg, 2012).  Given Ethnic Conflict Theory proposes that the violent 
actions of extremists increases the risk of conflict, the involvement of the more 
extremist PYD in the uprising creates a serious risk of both internal Kurdish 
fighting and increases the risk of conflict with other sectarian groups. 
 
It seems likely that the PKK backing the regime was part of a strategy formed 
between the PKK and the Assad regime against the Turkish government, with the 
regime also aiming to weaken the FSA.    However responding to the changing 
circumstances on the ground the PYD has begun to disassociate itself from the 
PKK and the earlier actions of members involved in suppressing Kurdish anti-
regime protests (Wood J. , 2012).     With the regime quietly losing control over 
the Kurdish area the PYD has recognised that moving into governance in the area 
is its best strategy for gaining power  (Ilahan Tanir, 2012). 
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Additionally the Assad regime is cautious about targeting the Kurds as they 
cannot credibly label the ethnic group as Salafist terrorists attempting to install a 
theocracy therefore the Islamic terrorist narrative is not plausible as a justification 
for state attacks on the Kurds.  Furthermore there are a large number of Kurds 
regionally that could mobilise in support of Syrian Kurds should the regime attack 
Kurdish areas.   Additionally most Kurds belong to one of the multitude of often 
very small Kurdish political parties through which Kurds are able to mobilise 
large numbers quickly to join protests.  As such it appears the regime has backed 
off from Kurdish regions having calculated that it is not in a position to handle 
any additional regional and domestic pressure (Independent Kurdistan Journal, 
2011). 
 
The Syrian security forces withdrew from Kurdish territories in mid July 2012 
whereby PYD fighters moved in and by 21 July had assumed control of the cities 
of Afreen, Amude, Derik and parts of Qamishli (Ilahan Tanir, 2012). Skeletal 
remnants of the regime remain through state employees and infrastructure such as 
the courts and schools as the region has neither the funds nor the fighting force to 
remove them and risk an all-out assault (Wood J. , 2012).    
 
The PYD claim that the regime left after a PYD ultimatum, however the lack of 
fighting has raised suspicions that the withdrawal was strategic and aimed to 
strengthen the PYD at the expense of Turkey's internal security and to weaken 
opposition unity. There are also suspicions that the PYD has collaborated with the 
regime in order to assume control of the Kurdish region    (Tanir, 2012). 
Furthermore the regime may have calculated that allowing Kurdish control of the 
Kurdish region would stoke tensions between the Sunni Arab dominated 
opposition movement and the Kurds, whilst also giving the regime the opportunity 
to devote resources and army units to more strategic fronts elsewhere such as 
Homs, Damascus and Aleppo. 
 
After failing to reach an agreement with the SNC the Kurds sought to unite under 
the Erbil Agreement.  This was an attempt to head off politically detrimental 
infighting between the PYD and the rest of the Kurdish opposition with the PYD 
accused of  kidnapping activists and KNC members and assassinating Nasiradeen 
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Piro, a senior leader of the Azadi Par party   (Ilahan Tanir, 2012).  The Kurds 
recognised they needed to unite against the perceived Arab threat following a 
history of persecution from Arab nationalist regimes (Mansour, 2012, pp. 5-6).     
 
The Erbil Agreement was signed on 11 July 2012, through pressure from Iraq’s 
Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani, and exists between the KNC and the PYD, 
establishing unification under a new Supreme Kurdish Council (SKC).  The 
agreement further outlined joint administration of the border posts between Syria 
and Northern Iraq within areas where the regime forces had withdrawn.  In order 
to participate within the new Council the Iraqi Kurds were insistent that the PYD 
renounce ties with the PKK and its use of violence (Mansour, 2012, pp. 4-6).    
However following this accord fighters associated with the PYD assumed control 
over the Kurdish districts and areas within the Aleppo and Hasakah governorates 
(Ilahan Tanir, 2012). 
 
The divided and fractious opposition outside of the PYD have united under the 
KNC out of the necessity to limit the PYD's assumption of authority as the civil 
war has progressed, and additionally to create an alternative source of Kurdish 
political influence to the SNC given Kurdish fears that the SNC was a Turkish 
creation driven by its Muslim Brotherhood members with their Arab-Islamist 
agenda. The creation of the KNC also enabled the launching of a joint Kurdish 
security force with which to face the degenerating security situation  (Ilahan 
Tanir, 2012).   
 
Attempts to unite under the Erbil Agreement fell through after the KNC 
suspended its commitment to the Agreement accusing the PYD of misusing state 
infrastructure and demanding bribes for fuel.  In response the PYD arrested KNC 
affiliated activists from Amude resulting in demonstrations against the PYD.  
After an order from the SKC the PYD released the activists.  Despite the 
aspirations of the KNC around power sharing with the PYD, the PYD appears to 
have used the Erbil Agreement as a front for carrying out power seizures in the 
Kurdish region.   The situation continued to unravel with the People's Defence 
Units declaring in September that they would not heed SKC decisions two days 
before PYD militias raided three KNC party offices near Qamishli.   The PYD 
142 
 
warned that non-PYD militias would be prevented from defending their own 
demonstrations in the area.  Things continued to unravel with the KNC's Vice 
President Mustafa Jumu’ah kidnapped after accusing the PYD of collecting $200 
millions of smuggling revenue (Ilahan Tanir, 2012).   
 
Despite a renegotiation of the Erbil Agreement later in September 2012 with the 
SKC opening five new offices, joint PYD/KNC security control of Kobani 
established and the replacement of political party flags with the sole logo of the 
council, many within the KNC still believe the PYD will not abide by its 
provisions and will continue to work to secure political dominance of the Kurdish 
regions (Tanir, 2012).    For its part the PYD fears that the Turks are enabling the 
growth of anti-PYD Kurdish groups, a fear which has increased with the 
formation of Syrian Kurdish brigade Salah-ad Eyubi who threatened the PYD 
whilst making overtures to other Kurds  (Ilahan Tanir, 2012).   
. 
Due to the FSA’s lack of central command it is difficult to make a conclusive 
statement about their relations with the Kurds.   There is a great deal of wariness 
from Kurds of both the PYD and the FSA, although Kurds are supportive of FSA 
fighting in Arab areas.  There has been reports of both fighting and cooperation 
between Kurds and the FSA (Ilahan Tanir, 2012).  Many Kurds remain worried 
about the FSA and its Arab base.  Kurdish groups have moved ahead and began to 
organise facilities for locals such as Kurdish schools and a volunteer police forces.  
However although in these areas the nationwide conflict is less evident than 
elsewhere, the likelihood of future attention and conflict is high as the region 
produces oil and natural gas.  Given this, the chances that Kurds will be left to 
regenerate under their own devices is unlikely (Wood J. , 2012).    
 
Furthermore tribal affiliations are likely to have a large impact on Kurdish 
aspirations within the Syrian uprising.    The majority of Syria’s Kurds live in the 
Jazirah, Ayn al-Arab, and Afrin regions alongside the Syrian-Iraqi-Turkish 
borders.  In the oil rich Jazirah regions Kurds represent 25% of the region’s 
population and share these oil rich regions with Arab tribes such as the Shammar, 
Baggara and Ounaiza as well as Christians.    The Kurds will need to negotiate 
with the Christians and tribes in the post Assad scenario if their needs are to be 
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incorporated into the new political agenda.  In the past they have managed this 
having shared the outcomes of the regime’s corruption and economic woes with 
these other ethno-sectarian groups.   However if the tribes become fearful of 
Kurdish aspirations and attempt to push them out of any future administration of 
the Kurdish areas the Kurds may feel compelled to side with the PKK and its 
Syrian sometime partner the PYD, a manoeuvre that would greatly threaten the 
security of the region (Heras, 2012).   
 
It is likely that the regime has moved towards a strategy of intensifying divisions 
and conflicts both regionally and within the opposition movement. Through 
moving out of the Kurdish regions and by all intentions attempting to hand them 
over to the PKK and/or PYD  who are distrusted by Arabs, the regime has sought 
to divide the Kurds from the rest of the opposition.   As Kurds have already 
secured some autonomy they now have something to lose through the expansion 
of the FSA into their areas and as such are suspicious of the FSA and other Sunni 
dominated factions.  Additionally Iran, Iraq and Turkey have a considerable stake 
in the outcome for Kurds in Syria given their own sizeable and restive Kurdish 
populations (Al Jazeera, 2012). 
 
Tension are emerging between the FSA and the SKC with the Kurds largely 
preventing both Government forces and the FSA from entering the regions where 
they have autonomy (Mansour, 2012, p. 2).  Fighting between the FSA and Kurds 
is also likely to represent local level protection of communities against looting 
and/or distrusted FSA units (Ilahan Tanir, 2012).  Whilst Kurds are in agreement 
with the overthrow with the regime, there is little advantage to a more active role 
in the revolution given the lack of opposition assurances for Kurdish aspirations, 
the Sunni Arab nature of the uprising and Kurdish  wariness of a radical Islamist 
takeover.  Beyond this they are seeking to formulate a future in which Syria is 
ethnically inclusive beyond its Arab nationalist political history (Harris, Some 
Observations About the Syrian Uprising, 2012, p. 9).  Kurdish infighting and the 
more aggressive tactics of the PYD are both reinforcing the regime’s assertion 
that they alone can maintain stability.   If fighting continues to develop between 
the FSA and Kurds it will open up a second front against the FSA which would 
significantly benefit the regime.   
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7.3   Christian and Lesser Minority Fears of Sunni Muslim Power 
The Levant is the birthplace of Christianity which predates Islam in the region 
(Ehsani, Fewer Christians in Aleppo than Commonly Thought, 2012).   Compared 
to other Middle Eastern states the Syrian regime is more accepting of non-Muslim 
religions, including the Christian faith, provided that religious figures and 
institutions do not oppose the regime.  Christians are able to build churches and 
organise religious gatherings and furthermore like other Syrian religions such as 
Druze, Muslim and Jews, Christians have considerable leeway to oversee family 
law concerns (Beck, 2010, pp. 82-83).   
The Allawites, Druze, Ismailis and Christians form a minority sect coalition in 
support of the Assad regime.    Druze, Ismailis and Allawites are embedded within 
the military and regime bureaucracy whilst Christians are significantly involved in 
the economy.   Like the Allawites, Druze and Ismailis are heterodox Shi’ite sects, 
with the Druze typically inhabiting the Glan and Lebanese border and having a 
history of peaceful coexistence with the Allawites.  In contrast the Ismailis have 
historically rivalled the Allawites within North West Syria (Bar S. , 2006, p. 396). 
The Syrian Druze traditionally reside in the South-Eastern Jabal al-Druz  
Mountains, and played a significant role in Syrian politics during in the French 
mandate years under the leadership of Sultan Pasha al-Atrash.  The Druze made 
up a significant proportion of the military force that challenged French rule from 
1925-27 during the Great Syrian Revolt. With the Druze liberating themselves 
from the French mandate without British assistance in 1945 under the leadership 
of Amir Hasan al-Atrash, and the sect being the driving force behind the liberation 
from France they expected to remain politically autonomous and retain economic 
privileges they had under the French administration within the new Syrian 
independent state  (Landis, 1998).        
However in 1949 Adib Shishakli overthrew the existing government and seeing 
Jabal Druze as a significant threat to his rule he sought, often by force, to integrate 
them into Syrian state.  As a result of Druze resistance to Shihakli’s attempts to 
control the provinces the Druze suffered a decline in their political and economic 
position within Syria and felt marginalised and mistreated by the Syrian state.   
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Consequently the 1954 military revolt that ended Shishakli’s rule had the backing 
and participation of many Druze officers (Landis, 1998).      
Given the Druze are a compact minority in the Suwaidi province in Southern 
Syria they had up until 2012 been able to largely avoid involvement in the civil 
war despite the existence of both Druze activists within the uprising and  Druze 
officers in the regime’s crackdown.   However the Druze community in the 
Jeramana suburb in Damascus are under pressure to choose a side from both the 
regime and the opposition  (Abdulhamid, The Shredded Tapestry, 2012).   
In contrast the 150,000 Ismailites have from the beginning shown support of the 
revolution holding anti-Assad rallies in Salmiyyeh.  However being surrounded 
by loyalist villages they are unlikely to get more actively involved (Abdulhamid, 
The Shredded Tapestry, 2012).   There had earlier been tension between the 
Allawite and Ismaili sects with violent clashes in mid 2005 between Allawites and 
Ismailis in the Qadmous and Misyaf towns (Bar S. , 2006, p. 396).  Many within 
the towns blamed the incidents on unruly youth of both sects  and claimed that the 
regime’s suppression of civil society and the removal of traditional leadership and 
patronage networks had increased dependence on the state for stability and law 
and order (Landis, Allawi-Ismaili Confrontation in Qadmous: What does it 
mean?, 2005). 
 
Another sectarian group at considerable risk in Syria is the small and fragmented 
Syrian Shi’ite community.   Syrian Sunni animosity towards Shia is high due to 
the rising anti-Shia sentiment across the region and the Syrian regime’s Shia allies 
Hezbollah and Iran.  Anti-Shia sentiment is exacerbated by reports of Hezbollah 
operating in Syria carrying out atrocities against Sunni ( International Crisis 
Group, 2012, pp. 30-31).    
Christians typically live in urban areas in and around Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, 
and Latakia as well as the Qamatoun Mountains and the Hasake province (Beck, 
2010, pp. 84-85).    The secular orientation of the Ba’ath party was established to 
a significant extent by its ideological founder Christian Michel Aflaq.  It is the 
secular nature of the party that reassures Christians given their fear of an Islamic 
state.  This is the primary reason for Christian support of the Assad regime.  As 
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such Christian religious leaders are expected by the Assads to be pro-regime and 
often become involved in informal networks supporting the regime (Beck, 2010, 
pp. 84-85).   
However despite the Ba’ath party’s secular ideology Syrian law confers greater 
rights to Muslims than Christians.  For example if a Christian women marries a 
Muslim man she will only be able to inherit from her husband following his death 
if she converts to Islam.  Additionally whilst it is legal for a Christian to convert 
to Islam it is illegal for a Muslim to convert to Christianity (Ehsani, Fewer 
Christians in Aleppo than Commonly Thought, 2012).  Many Syrians believe that 
to be truly Arab also means to be Muslim and as such they assume their Christian 
countrymen identify with the West (Landis, Islamic Education in Syria: Undoing 
Secularism, 2003, p. 36). 
Unlike the Allawite minority who are heavily involved in the regime’s upper 
echelon, Christians are underrepresented in the higher levels of the regime and 
tend to favour the private sector.  However due to their closer association with the 
West they often hold advisor or assistant roles with regime structures.  Christians   
rarely hold leadership positions within the military or security forces and prior to 
1980 Christians were unable to participate in higher military training  (Mouawad, 
Syria and Iraq: Repression, Disappearing Christians of the Middle East, 2001).   
Despite many Christians improving their social status through higher education 
and business opportunities in Lebanon, a disproportionate number of Christians 
have emigrated to the West for greater opportunities and to escape the harsh 
repression and lack of democracy that besets all sectarian groups within Syria 
(Beck, 2010, pp. 86-87).  
In contrast to Sunni conservatism, the nature of the Syrian Christian culture has 
strengthened the relationship between Allawites and Christians.   Both sects are 
more liberal, tolerant and more Western/Mediterranean oriented than Sunni, 
whom they both see as a threat due to Sunni rejectionalism.   Allawite claims of 
sectarian tolerance are usually referencing their close relationship with Christians 
(Worren, 2007, pp. 69-70, 77-78).   
By Middle Eastern standards Syria was considered relatively accommodating of 
Christians, and the regime’s narrative that it protects Syrian minorities is 
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seemingly reinforced by recent events (Williams, 2013).   The sectarian fighting 
in Iraq caused many Christians to flee, the 2011 Maspero demonstrations against 
the Salafist burning of a Christian church in Cairo resulted in the deaths of up to 
27 Egyptian Christians, the rise in Islam religiosity across the region most notably 
following the Arab Spring, and the increase in sectarian based attacks and 
kidnappings in Syria within the civil war have strengthened Christian fears and 
the regime’s central narrative.     
Developments in Iraq have had repercussions in Syria particularly on Assyrian 
Christians.   Within Iraq the Assyrians are perceived as having sided with the US 
forces generating Sunni resentment.   In 2004 the killing of two Christians amid 
Sunni statements that they were ‘Christian dogs’ and ‘Bush supporters’ lead to 
Assyrians in Hasakah protesting for equal treatment from the police.  Hasakah 
residents stated that this was the first time that the Assyrians had staged protests    
(Bar S. , 2006, p. 397).     However a sizable number of Christians considered 
Syria as a comparatively safe place to reside with the Syrian Apostolic, Giovanni 
Battista Morandini, declaring in 2006 that Syria was a state where Islam and 
Christianity lived a peaceful coexistence (Christian News Agency, 2006).  
With the war in Iraq and the overthrown of Saddam Hussein weakening the 
Syrian state’s psychological hold over Syrians many felt more able to express 
their political aspirations and opinions.   Armenian Christian activist Mr Kirakos 
committed the nearly unthinkable act of declaring himself as making a bid for the 
Presidency in 2004 as a protest against the Syrian law which states that the Syrian 
President must be Muslim (Zoepf, 2004).  However the 2012 new constitution still 
contained Article 3, section 1 which decrees ‘The president has to be part of the 
Muslim faith’ despite the majority of Christians supporting the regime, or 
remaining neutral, within the uprising (Moormann, 2012). 
A key pillar of the regime’s strategy for suppressing sectarian conflict has been to 
weaken internal cohesion within sectarian groups.  As such in order to prevent 
Christians presenting a united front, the regime has exploited tensions between 
different Christian groups.  For instance in 2010 the regime moved against the 
Evangelical Christians after complaints from the Orthodox Catholic leaders.  This 
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enabled the regime to support the more widely practiced and easier to control 
traditional Christian establishment (Symth, 2012).    
Middle Eastern Christian’s myth symbol complex focuses on a history of 
persecution from within Islam.  As such the predominantly Sunni led Syrian 
uprising has created anxiety and suspicions amongst Syrian Christians, with Jesuit 
Bishop Antoine Audo in June 2011 describing the protesters as insurgents who 
claimed to be pro-democracy but those real aims were Islamification and 
destabilisation.  He claimed that 80% of the country including the Christians 
wanted the government to remain in power and also asserted that Al Jazeera and 
the BBC were among the media outlets disseminating false information with 
regards to their reporting that the regime was committing human rights violations 
(Christian News Agency, 2011).   Prominent Christian leaders such as Lebanese 
Patriarch Rai also voiced fears of fundamentalist Islamists rising to power within 
a post Assad Syria (Khoury, 2012 , pp. 48-49). 
However other Christian church officials have tempered this stance, declaring that 
many Christians want reform but not the ousting of Assad again due to fears this 
would lead to the persecution of Christians and a significant drop in Christian 
numbers similar to events in Iraq after the ousting of Saddam Hussein’s regime  
(Kerr, 2011).  Christian Patriarchs such as  Hazim of the Greek Orthodox Church 
have, whilst acknowledging the relevance of this fear, stressed that a fear of 
radical Islamists does not translate into support for the Assad regime, stating that 
it is inaccurate to claim that  ‘Christians defend their existence at the expense of 
freedom and human rights’   (Khoury, 2012 , pp. 48-49).        
Christian activists went further criticising Patriarch Rai’s views believing that he 
was highlighting tensions between Syrian sects that were already sensitive due to 
the revolution and rising Islamification.  They stated that they reject the regime’s 
view that the Assad regime protects minorities, and claimed that the revolution is 
a social movement with political rather than sectarian motivations.  The grassroots 
Local Co-ordination Committees contain many young Christian activists who are 
frustrated with the hesitant response of most Christian clergy to the uprising 
(Khoury, 2012 , p. 49).    As the civil war has progressed Christian churches have 
largely withdrawn from publicly choosing a side in the civil war, however despite 
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this the Christians suffer both from the effects of the civil war and from religious 
cleansing efforts by radical Islamic groups in rebel held areas  (Shea, 2013)  
  
In August 2011 claims emerged from the city of Latakia which is a historically 
Allawite stronghold, that the Assad regime was attempting to intensify sectarian 
fears to further cleave the Allawites and Christians to the regime.    The source 
stated that the regime was attacking the Sunni areas, such as Ramel, with 
armoured vehicles supported by Navy ships offshore.   In affect this divided 
Latakia, separating the Sunni area which largely opposed the regime from the 
Allawite and Christian areas (Daragahi, 2011).   
 
Additionally there have been claims that the Assad regime has been inciting 
minority fears against the protests through the distribution of Mukhabarat memos 
within Christian neighbourhoods.  The memos proclaimed that the uprising 
consisted of Salafists supported by Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan and that 
Christian churches would come under attack causing neighbourhoods to construct 
barricades in fear  (Syria Comment, 2011).    
Rhetoric from Sunni radicals has also undermined efforts to encourage further 
non-Sunni to join the uprising with a Christian protester from Homs stating 
‘Christians wished to participate more until they saw people saying “Alahu 
akhbar”, but that made some of the Christians who hadn’t made up their mind yet 
about openly joining the revolution suspicious’ (Fielding-Smith, 2011).   
 
As of 2013 the UN Human Rights Council Commission of Inquiry on Syria found 
that Christians potentially faced an existential threat from Jihadis without the 
protection of the Assad regime.     A source explained to the Asia News that ‘the 
purpose of these groups is not only the liberation of Syria from Assad but also the 
spread by force of radical Islam through the Middle East and the conquest of 
Israel’.   As such Christians, and other sects have been faced with summary 
executions, forced conversion to Islam, expulsion from their homes, and 
discrimination within Islamic courts established by al Nusra and other radical 
groups within their territories.  There are reports that Christians are being forced 
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to pay Jizya, or tax, to remain Christian much like under the Ottoman Empire 
(Shea, 2013).   
 
Thus although the regime promotes itself as unifying Syria its manipulation of 
ethno-sectarian fears has maintained the rift between Sunni and minorities, 
effectively isolating minority groups from mainstream Syrians.  This places 
minorities in a vulnerable situation, because they are disconnected from the 
mainstream and instead aligned with a regime whose real interest ultimately not 
protecting minorities but continuing its rein, and as noted by Nasser Weddady of 
the American Islamic Council, ‘when the Assad regime says it is protecting 
Christians, this sets up a false equivalency: because at the end of the day, this is a 
dictatorship, and the Baath regime is an equal opportunity torturer: if you oppose 
them, they will attack you’ (Khoury, 2012 , p. 50).   
Despite minority fears there are Allawites and Christians within the opposition 
both as activists and within the armed opposition.  They tend to fight within 
smaller secular units such as Unit 111 in Bdama in the Idlib Province and prefer 
to work with the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated groups over Salafists, probably 
due to the foreignness of the Salafi groups and attempts by some to locally impose 
Sharia law (Abdulhamid, The Shredded Tapestry, 2012).    Conversely there is 
emerging evidence that Christian Popular Committee civilian militias established 
to protect Christian areas in Damascus and elsewhere have received arms and 
uniforms from the regime effectively absorbing them within Assad’s armed forces 
(Williams, 2013). 
The existence of settled, secure and often forward thinking Christian communities 
was beneficial to the Middle East in that it contributed towards overcoming 
radical Islam’s legacy of out-group rejection through the encouragement of 
pluralism, thus fostering Islamic openness and the acceptance of the different 
other.   With Jihadis working to drive out Christians in Syria and Christians facing 
increased persecution across the Middle East the region is at risk of further 
radicalisation and intergroup violence as supremist sectarian groups compete for 
power (Shea, 2013).      With regime forces and the uprising at a deadlock the 
importance of all ethno-sectarian groups mobilising to topple the regime is 
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evident, however this looks unlikely in face of the rising extremism and 
sectarianism.  As such the Assad regime’s predictions of a post Assad Syria being 
beset with sectarian conflict and radical Sunni drives for power is becoming 
increasingly probable (Khoury, 2012 , p. 51). 
 
The minorities are in a difficult position,  they face sectarianism from radicals 
within the opposition however if they stay outside of the uprising and the regime 
falls, they may not be able to participate equally as political groups work to re-
establish governmental rule in Syria.   As such they need to at least remain neutral 
if they want their voice in the post-revolutionary phase to have influence rather 
than be regarded with suspicion.   They are also at risk of suffering a continued 
backlash from the more radicalised sections of the rebellion.  This is relevant to 
Christians as while their ‘primarily narrow sectarian perspective based on 
Christian existential fears’ had lead them to predominantly support the regime,  
their alliance with the regime is rapidly becoming a liability  and this will greatly 
reduce their security in the reality of a new security dynamic should the regime 
fall  (Khoury, 2012 , p. 51).  It is likely they are going to have to re-negotiate their 
security in the future with a political leadership with a much stronger Sunni voice. 
 
7.4 Sectarianism and the Emerging Chaos 
 
A functioning state has laws that ensure that cooperating in the interests of the 
majority is enforced and the state monopoly of force punishes those who seek to 
pursue self centred and violent goals.  Incentives are established that ensure ‘that 
in pursuing own interest, individuals acted in a way that supported the interests of 
society’ (Fritz, 2009).     
 
In warlord politics however there are no rules and a weak or non-existent central 
authority.    The law of the jungle prevails as the incentives are no longer 
structured to enforce cooperative behaviour.  Individuals with the ability to 
enforce a coercive advantage do so and garner rewards through predatory 
behaviour.   With no state enforcing right and wrong, players who engage in this 
behaviour seek power at all costs knowing that their rivals in the socio-economic 
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environment will do the same.  Many of these players are already rooted into the 
social fabric of the communities in which they impose their power through 
patronage politics based on in-group ties, often ethno-sectarian, tribal and/or 
familial, in order to gain control.    Those who lack the ability to compete in this 
environment are safest if they submit to the emerging kingpins.  The results are 
‘optimal for the winning player(s) but suboptimal for society at large’ (Fritz, 
2009, p. 81 & 83).   
 
Applying Ariel I Ahram and Charles Kings’ ideas outlined above to the Syrian 
situation it is evident that whilst the Syrian regime was historically strong as 
opposed to weak it failed to create an effective governance whereby cooperation 
is rewarded and ruthless self interest is discouraged.  In this instance effectively 
the leading warlord is the regime and due to the state’s monopoly on military 
force the citizens are forced to submit as they are unable to compete.   The results 
were optimal for the regime and those within its patronage system but suboptimal 
for Syrian society although due to the complete dominance of the regime and lack 
of effective rivals the system was stable.  In contrast to the Assad regime’s 
governance the establishment of the state is intended to supplant the warlord 
culture with a central governance that creates and enforces a set of cooperative 
societal rules (King, 2011). 
 
When a state begins to break down the state disintegrates into pieces, with each 
piece commanded by a warlord who is able to create patronage networks from 
within the local community  (Fritz, 2009, p. 83).   The Syrian uprising has created 
an opening for the emergence of rivals to the al Assad’s warlord style of power in 
Syria.   As such warlordism and competing power structures are emerging across 
Syria amid the chaos and like the regime, any emerging warlords ‘cannot be 
trusted to do what is “right” but what is advantageous and force will be the 
ultimate arbiter’ (Fritz, 2009, p. 83).    As the Syrian civil war progresses and the 
state begins to disintegrate and insecurity increases, the pieces are likely to break 
up along ethno-sectarian and geographic lines as local warlords generate support 
through ethno-sectarian, tribal and familial ties.       
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Partially due to international inaction and the descent of the revolution into civil 
war, some rebel leaders have already taken on the characteristics of local war 
lords.   Members of the FSA are taking advantage of the chaos to pursue their own 
ends, getting involved in racketeering, appropriating donated funds and selling 
arms and medical supplies intended for use within the uprising. Kidnapping for 
ransom is widespread and is used to collect funds by both sides, with the regime 
and security forces reportedly the worst offenders, kidnapping wealthy Sunni and 
Christian citizens on trumped up charges in order to collect bribes to ensure their 
release.  Some opposition members have managed to use their ill-gotten resources 
to create local patronage networks and militias of up to 50-250 members whilst 
claiming to be part of the revolution. Again the numbers are small and their power 
too limited at this stage to indicate they are warlords, but it is of increasing 
concern (Abdulhamid, The Shredded Tapestry, 2012).     
 
Given the rivalries between opposition groups and the lack of a central 
organisation coordinating arms distribution and resources the further development 
of warlordism and militia units is likely.    Already certain leaders of the armed 
groups are emerging as key figures in the chaos such as Jamal Maarouf aka Abu 
Khalid who leads the Brigades and Fighting Unites of Syria’s Martyrs in Idlib and 
parts of rural areas in Homs, Hama and Aleppo.   Abu Khalid represents 
traditional values, has three wives and is a devout Sunni Muslim.  When dealing 
with disputes he draws from Sharia law like many commanders, but claims he is 
willing to hand over such disputes to local government once it is established.    He 
does not support the establishment of a Sharia state, is wary of the Salafists, hates 
the Muslim Brotherhood but works with all groups against their common enemy, 
the al Assad regime.   Attempts to unify the armed opposition into brigades such 
as the Martyrs or the more Islamic Al-Farouq, is creating potential for warlord key 
figures within the civil war as it is consolidating power in the hands of certain 
commanders and groups without achieving overall unification and coordination 
(Abdulhamid, The Shredded Tapestry, 2012). 
 
With state control rapidly shrinking the prevalence of chaos and danger will cause 
Syria to break into its ethno-sectarian parts  (Abdulhamid, The Shredded 
Tapestry, 2012).  In liberated areas where rebels are the only authority, 
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bombardment, sniper activities and checkpoints manned by regime troops and 
loyalists are making local government organisation impossible (Abdulhamid, The 
Shredded Tapestry, 2012).  Additionally there have been reports of Christians and 
Armenians fighting the FSA to prevent them bringing the civil war to their 
neighbourhoods (Malouf, 2012).  Neither are loyalists safe as although the 
regime’s ethnic cleansing has meant areas such as Sahel al–Ghab are now 
predominantly loyalist, the risk of retribution is high and if loyalists begin to feel 
that their survival is at stake they will fight to the bitter end (Abdulhamid, The 
Shredded Tapestry, 2012).  Many within the grass roots movement are seeking to 
prevent the ethno-sectarian disintegration of Syria however unless the situation 
resolves relatively quickly (Abdulhamid, The Shredded Tapestry, 2012) insecurity 
is likely to increase sectarianism and extremism (Al Jazeera, 2012).   
 
Thus far it is a tribute to local leaders that communal retribution killings are not 
more common.  However the threat remains with groups that advocate along 
sectarian agendas increasing in number.  Additionally ethno-sectarian 
communities, such as Sunni communities along the coast, are stockpiling weapons 
to protect themselves against the regime’s ethnic cleansing in and around the 
Allawite area.  Given how close communities are to each other any stockpiling is 
likely to be perceived as threatening creating a security dilemma in which 
defensive actions lead to a corresponding defensive action from neighbouring 
ethnic groups.   As such the regime’s drive to remove Sunni from Allawite 
dominated areas is likely to pave the way for Sunnis to take the fight to the 
Allawite community itself (Abdulhamid, The Shredded Tapestry, 2012).   
 
The departure of the al Assad regime will not guarantee the easing of ethno-
sectarian tensions in Syria.    Most pro-regime militias have been involved in 
atrocities as given Assad’s rhetoric they believe are fighting for their survival and 
therefore see their violence as pre-emptive action needed to protect their 
communities from atrocities by Sunni.  The pro-regime militias are now almost 
solely Allawites with only small numbers of Christians, Kurds and Sunni and 
thereby are identified strongly as sectarian militias, as a result sectarian 
animosities are very likely to become further entrenched and difficult to resolve  
(Abdulhamid, The Shredded Tapestry, 2012).  Futhermore continued state 
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aggression, including massacres such as the one reported in the village of 
Haswiya, and rising violence in 2013 has brought chaotic violence and its 
accompanying sectarianism and radicalisation to the fore and this is likely to be 
difficult to reverse and will greatly complicate any introduction of democracy  
(Doucet, 2013).  
 
Greatly complicating the security situation in Syria is the divide between Islamic 
groups seeking to establish a Sharia state and the majority of the rebels who are 
advocating for a more pluralistic democracy.  This divide has intensified as the 
rebels groups compete for supplies, territory and responsibility for attacks.    An 
example that illustrated the situation is the Libyan ship, the Benghazi, which 
arrived in Syria with humanitarian supplies for the rebels.   The Muslim 
Brotherhood attempted to secure distribution and credit for the supplies, however 
this was opposed by the ship’s captain and after a dispute that lasted weeks the 
ship was allowed to supervise the distribution of supplies themselves 
(Abdulhamid, The Shredded Tapestry, 2012). 
 
Competition has also extended towards coverage of the uprising with the upper 
hand going to the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists through sympathizers within 
Arab media channels.  The Islamists’ greater access to funds and sponsorship has 
also allowed them to buy small channels outright and to secure control over 
internal media teams.  Although they are a small group their access to funds has 
enabled them to secure a profile greater than their numbers (Abdulhamid, The 
Shredded Tapestry, 2012).    
 
The risk of chaos is greatly increased by the influx of foreign fighters into the 
conflict with many coming from the Gulf States, Libya, Tunisia, Chechnya, 
Somalia and Sudan.   Although the incidents are relatively few they are 
increasing, with foreign fighters implicated in kidnapping, torture and mutilation 
of Allawite and Christian captives (Abdulhamid, The Shredded Tapestry, 2012).   
Christians appear more likely to be targeted than other groups, a circumstance 
increased by the absence of a substantial organised Christian militia (Al Jazeera, 
2013).  Ethnic Conflict Theory explains that when extremist segments attack 
another ethno-sectarian group the likelihood that the groups as a whole will resort 
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to violence increases (Wolff, 2009, p. 27).   As such whilst Salafists and Jihadis 
are comparatively few within the opposition their fanaticism and violence means 
that their impact on sectarian tensions and fears is far greater than their number.    
Furthermore as Christian awareness of their greater vulnerability mounts, armed 
sectarianism as a form of self protection may begin to make sense. 
 
With the number of militias rising, individuals within the Muslim Brotherhood 
and the SNC are also attempting to establish their own armed groups in order to 
compete in the developing open season on power in Syria.  The agendas are both 
personal and ideological (Abdulhamid, The Shredded Tapestry, 2012).  It appears 
that individuals are planning for the day after, and are envisioning that armed 
struggle and force is the way to get rid of the regime and to eliminate rivals for 
political power further down the road (Abdulhamid, The Shredded Tapestry, 
2012). 
 
There is a real concern that the fall of the Assad regime will create an opportunity 
for terrorists and insurgents to gain access to the regime’s WMD.   It is estimated 
that Syria ‘has one of the largest and most sophisticated chemical weapons 
programs in the world and may also possess offensive biological weapons’ (Blair, 
2012).  This threat is especially alarming due to insurgents in Syria becoming 
increasingly radicalised and sectarian, the potential for escalating sectarian attacks 
from religiously fanatic Sunni or Shia Jihadis under such circumstances is very 
high.     Syria’s WMD in extremist hands would severely disrupt the state and 
threaten the security of the region (Blair, 2012).   
Civil war is likely to continue within Syria for some time with the remnants of the 
Assad regime gradually shrinking to the best equipped and largest militia group.  
Groups who seek to impose their own ideologies through force and autocracy 
such as Salafists will attempt to impose their power and control over an 
unguarded territory alongside local militias who seek to gain security, power and 
control over their immediate environment.  These militias will draw significantly 
from within their own sectarian and tribal groups to mobilise fighters and organise 
patronage networks.   
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Additionally in a post Assad environment there is a danger of the Libyan outcome 
whereby there are two centres of power, rule by the state and informal rule held 
by militias and revolutionary groups who hang onto power in the post civil war 
era (Sharqieh, 2012).   In face of this chaos the movement for democracy and 
freedom will lesson in importance over security and survival until the regime is 
fully deconstructed.  Democracy is likely to be welcomed by mainstream Syrians 
although it will be challenged, particularly within warlord or Salafist strongholds.  
Central control will be difficult in face of Islamic parties seeking to impose Sharia 
law and tensions will remain high between ethno- sectarian groups.   
 
The Syrian revolution reflects strongly the characteristics Bernard Shaw describes 
when he outlines the revolution that replaced the Umayyads with the Abbasids at 
the head of the Islamic Empire.   
 
‘It was a revolution in the History of Islam...It came about not as 
the result of a palace conspiracy or a coup d etat, but by the action 
of an extensive and revolutionary propaganda and organisation, 
representing and expressing the dissatisfaction of important 
elements of the populations with the previous regime and built up 
over a long period of time.  Like most revolutionary movements it 
was a coalition of different interests, held together by a common 
desire to overthrow the existing order, but doomed to break up into 
conflicting groups once victory was obtained.  One of the first 
tasks of the victorious ‘Abbasids was to crush the disappointed 
extremist wing of the movement which had brought them to 
power’ (Lewis B. , 1956, p. 80).  
 
 This dynamic is reflected in the current situation as in order to form a new stable 
balance between the confessional groups in Syria the current revolution’s main 
task should it oust the regime will be to defeat the divisive extremist Islamists and 
war lords and remove them from political contention. 
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7.5  Minority Responses to the uprising - Allawite Fears, Kurdish 
Aspirations and Christian Reticence:   Conclusion 
 
Despite the regime being an authoritarian repressive regime and violent towards 
any opposition regardless of sectarian group, its fall potentially exposes minorities 
to a greater risk in the immediate instance.  Futhermore regime violence carried 
out by the Allawite dominated Shabbiha, military and security forces   has  tied 
the fate of the Allawite sect to the regime securing their loyalty due to a realistic 
fear of sectarian retribution as Allawite sect is closely identified with the regime 
despite not all Allawites benefiting from its patronage.    
 
This fear of the Sunni dominated uprising is shared by other sectarian minority 
groups, particularly Shi’ites and Christians.  Despite their internal divisions the 
Kurds see the uprising as an opening to pursue greater political control over their 
region and are actively organising themselves with this in mind.  However this has 
placed them at odds with the Sunni led movement, particularly the Islamist 
brigades. 
 
In the short term the chaos of regime change and the breakdown of a central 
authority is likely to increase extremist Islamic activity, criminal activity and 
sectarian conflict.    The minorities are safer under stable autocratic rule than they 
are under chaos and a lack of authority.  As the civil war progresses anarchy is 
becoming a reality.  
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Chaptor Eight 
Final Conclusion 
 
The Arab Spring is indicative of a wider phenomenon.  With UN norms such as 
the Responsibility to Protect there is a shift in expectations of leadership from 
entitlement to power and privilege towards responsibility for citizens.    Reporting 
on the Arab Spring Telegraph journalist Richard Spencer went further to claim 
that the end of the ideology of dictatorship was approaching, (Spencer, 2012) this 
was supported by Bernard Lewis declaring ‘the tyrannies are doomed’ (Lewis B. , 
The Tyrannies are Doomed, 2011).    However, the less than successful outcomes 
of the Arab Spring has proven that the Middle Eastern political culture continues 
to be resistant to democratic pluralism and human rights. 
Coinciding with protests against the region’s autocracies has been a rise in 
religious tensions, with the Middle East topping the globe in terms of religious 
conflicts and state repression of religion  (Danin R. M., Religious Restrictions and 
Violence Growing Globally led by the Middle East, 2012).  The political culture 
in the Middle East, including Syria, is significantly based upon an opposition to 
other dynamic which is deeply rooted in tribalism and Islamic chauvinism 
predisposing the region to ethno-sectarian tensions and conflict (Salzman, 2008).  
Additionally there is a historical precedent for Islam to be the foundation of the 
established political order with religion consequently the key mobilising political 
narrative.   This political use of Islam has continued to a lesser but still significant 
extent into present day Syria.  
 
Relative to this background, this thesis has looked to answer the puzzle of the 
importance and role of sectarianism within Syrian politics.    It is evident that 
sectarianism is a significant tool within the Assad regime’s mechanisms of power 
and control over the Syrian population, most notably through the Allawite elite’s 
dominance of the upper echelons of power both within the political establishment, 
commercial sphere and the security forces.  Furthermore it is clear that ethno-
sectarian tensions have contributed heavily to the escalation of the civil war and 
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that the social movement for the downfall of the regime and democracy is 
overlaid with significant ethno-sectarian political mobilisation. 
 
Whilst the aims of the uprising appeal across sectarian lines the mobilisation 
within the social movement is primarily sectarian with a high number of Sunni 
participants.  This strengthens the uprising as it instantly gains the cohesion of a 
readymade group identity with shared historical experiences, culture, religion and 
grievances plus it gains the added support from transnational Sunni networks.  
However it also weakens the uprising’s ability to broaden its support base beyond 
Sunni given minority fears relating to the Middle Eastern culture of zero sum 
ethno-sectarian competition, and the increased visibility of Islamic extremists with 
high out-group prejudices.   Furthermore it has also given the regime room to 
manoeuvre in a way that the Egyptian and Tunisia governments lacked.  With 
many protesters Sunni, and the regime aware it would be difficult to justify 
fighting peaceful unsectarian democratic protesters the regime provoked the 
opposition into violence and hence both sides into defensive sectarian blocks.   
 
Although the Assad regime does not represent the dominance of the Allawite sect 
as a whole and is more accurately described as a confessional coalition dominated 
by an Allawite elite (Bar S. 2006, p. 357) the civil war is narrowing the Assad 
support base towards the Allawite sect and thereby increasing sectarian divisions 
within Syria.  The Allawites were saved from marginalisation by an Allawite elite 
which employed various power and control mechanisms to gain and maintain 
political power including sectarianism, however they are now at risk of suffering 
retribution through the sectarian politics which saw their elite come into power.  
This fear of retribution has led to the emergence of Allawite militias and whilst 
this is in part a defensive move it is likely to spur the continued development of 
similar Sunni militias in a post Assad environment.   
 
The entrance of radical Islamists, both Sunni and Shia, into the Syrian civil war 
from both domestic and international sources is greatly complicating the domestic 
sectarian dynamic.    Both Sunni and Shia Islamic radicals present themselves as 
the vanguards of their respective faiths and represent the intensifying Sunni Shia 
divide across the region, thereby presenting a grave threat to the future stability of 
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Syria and the Middle East.  Extremists on both sides of the sectarian divide see a 
primordial world where their respective Islam is threatened by infidels and they 
position themselves as the champions of their faith drawing heavily on their 
respective Islamic myth symbol complexes to legitimise their political goals.     
Fortunately it appears that across the sectarian groups there is a shared distrust of 
Islamic extremists despite the religiosity of Syria’s sects. 
 
It is likely that the gravest threat to the minorities is the breakdown of law and 
order.  As realist theorist Kenneth Waltz states the opposite of anarchy is not 
stability but hierarchy.  That is to say that a state where someone is in charge has a 
greater chance of avoiding war than one in which authority is definitively held by 
no one (Kaplan, 2013).   As such the chaos of civil war is likely to create 
conditions in which sectarian attacks increase.    Although the uprising was not 
initiated by sectarian competition, alternatively beginning as a struggle between 
the oppressor and the oppressed, there is a significant risk of radicalisation and 
sectarianism dominating the Syrian crisis given both Allawites and Sunni 
activists, to an extent correctly, perceive the civil war as an existential conflict.   
Furthermore it is not that the minorities necessarily are against a democratic 
pluralistic government, however they are doubtful it is possible for one to succeed 
against a backdrop of centuries of sectarian prejudice and modern resentments 
caused by the Assad clan’s sectarianism. 
 
Should the uprising succeed introducing democracy is likely to be difficult.  The 
values necessary for a stable democracy, such as compromise and tolerance, are 
not prevalent in Syrian politics given its political experience is grounded in 
autocracy.    Rather than creating stability by suppressing differing factions in the 
manner of autocracy, democracy is a political system that allows for differing 
political aspirations and requires political compromise between different societal 
groups.  In contrast, establishing autocracy is almost instantaneous, and 
neutralises differing views and factions through repression.   
The danger within a state with strong sectarian divides is that the removal of an 
autocratic central power and the introduction of democracy will result in the 
democratic contest for political power being fought along ethno-sectarian lines.   
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Given the strong bonds within sectarian groups and the readiness of myths and 
symbols through which elites are able to mobilise political support, the democratic 
political process contested with a communal dynamic potentially makes for a 
volatile and unstable political environment as mirrored in Iraq – or creates a 
fragile stability dependent on maintaining a balance of power between sects as 
seen in Lebanon.    Democracy in this instance is likely to be marred by 
instability, sectarian political parties, political assassinations, transnational 
political sectarian allegiances and sectarian tensions. 
 As such progress towards democracy needs to be accompanied by a move 
towards values that embrace ethno-sectarian equality and the political focus needs 
to shift towards addressing the needs of the nation’s citizens, as opposed to 
politics being driven by self interested elites seeking power and privileges through 
the support of their communal and other client groups.   In order to avoid sectarian 
contests for power, the old system of violent repression and co-option should be 
replaced with a system in which sectarian political parties are discouraged and an 
emphasis is placed on the emergence of political parties campaigning on 
economic and social platforms.   
Additionally state security needs to prioritise the security of its citizens rather than 
the maintenance of power by the elite over citizens and opposition groups.   
Accountability within the military and security forces must be high, and 
accompanied by balancing sectarian numbers within armed units and the police to 
reduce the risk of one sect securing leadership of the security apparatus. 
The transition to democracy also needs to be accompanied by credible guarantees, 
made with international support, towards the safety and rights of ethno-sectarian 
minorities thereby reducing their need to resort to sectarian bonds for security.  
This will mean a neutralisation or discrediting of extremist opinions and 
narratives and a stronger media presence granted to alternative Islamic voices.  
Whilst in the long run moves towards secular and democratic values promises 
increased stability and security, the initial moves away from traditional values will 
alienate those that stand to lose power, potentially this includes clerics, the 
wealthy political elite, men relative to women, Allawites and religious 
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fundamentalists.    As such a plan needs to be developed to counter the resulting 
rhetoric and rising violence from traditionalists and/or extremists.  
There is a need to remain mindful that moves towards democracy will weaken 
religion and religious leaders who will fiercely oppose any loss in power 
(Shepherd, 2012).  In order for democracy to deliver stability, the Middle East 
needs to adjust its understanding of politics and recognise that politics and 
religion are a volatile mix given religion elicits strong emotions and polarises 
groups reducing the likelihood of rational political choices.   However despite the 
current civil war, Syria’s history under the Assads of secular governance and 
relative sectarian harmony could provide a good base for the introduction of a 
secular democracy, although there will be a need to reconcile the minority-
majority, moderate Islam-radical Islam and Islamist-secular divides  (Sharqieh, 
2012). 
Syria is likely to enter a period of long sectarian civil war, with the breakup of 
Syria into statelets won and lost by competing brigades, including Salafists intent 
on establishing Islamic emirates, so that the social movement is faced with 
battling the regime and then warlords and their brigades once the regime is ousted.   
The post Assad government is likely to have to contend with continued insurgent 
warfare from Jihadi groups who have now established themselves in Syria after 
finding this difficult under the forceful Assad regime.    To counter the resulting 
instability any emerging democratic government needs to focus on establishing 
stability and economic prosperity.   Creating employment and educational 
opportunities for the large youth population is an important way to avoid youth 
turning to radical Islam for self esteem and an alternative sense of purpose.   The 
political focus moving quickly to the creation of jobs, economic policies, 
educational programs and human rights reforms would be prudent in order to 
direct political discussion away from Sharia law and to give peoples’ lives 
purpose and direction outside of religious contests.     
 
To further weaken the traditional involvement of religion in politics the minorities 
need to reassess their position relative to the regime.    By remaining aligned with 
the regime, even if only out of fear, minorities are giving Sunni and extremist 
Islamists the scope to use sectarian arguments to prevent the minorities 
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participating in the post Assad political arena through casting minorities as 
untrustworthy heretic supporters of the corrupt and violent regime.   Additionally 
the removal of minority support from the regime would bring on the fall of the 
regime decreasing the length of the civil war, and thereby preventing further 
militarization and radicalization which would improve the chances of 
reconstructing Syria along secular and democratic lines.   Thus in order to have an 
ability to participate in post Assad governance the sectarian minorities,  Allawites 
and Christians in particular, need to abandon the diminishing safety of the Assad 
regime.     
In order to move forward the Middle East might pay to look back.  In the past the 
power of the sultans was checked by the consultative process between the various 
leaders of the cultural nested communal groups.  Of course hierarchies and 
prejudices existed between groups meaning that the process was unequal.  
However modernity removed the need for the consultative process as groups 
instead sought absolute power within the new state structure through modern 
weapons, communication, and mechanisms of repression.  Consequently the 
modern Middle Eastern states autocrats seized ‘greater power than even the 
mightiest of the sultans ever had’ (Lewis, 2011).   
In order to avoid a backlash towards traditionalism to protect the Islamic identity 
and to remove the resistance to democracy as a Western invention and secularism 
as un-Islamic, democracy could be presented as an institutionalized and more 
structured version of the traditional consultative process.  It might help to give 
nested groups a consultative role in the democratic structure much as lobby 
groups operate in the West.  This will lend democracy greater cultural legitimacy 
whilst giving the nested communal groups a place within the democratic process. 
The aims of the social movement, namely democracy, freedom and human rights, 
are not just held back by the Assads but also by the political culture of the region, 
the domestic sectarian divides, radical Islam and the intensification of the regional 
Sunni versus Shia contest.  It is critical, in order for democracy to work, that the 
Middle East grows to accept that the justification of repression of any one group 
to the wishes and privileges of another – be it a communal or gender group - 
culturally paves the way for the introduction of autocracy and the abuse of power 
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on a much larger scale and thus represents a danger to the freedom of all (Lewis 
B. , The Tyrannies are Doomed, 2011). 
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